As music fills the grove, Redeem'd from death and sin, SERMON II. The simple believeth every word: but the prudent man looketh well to his going.” Prov. 14, 15. It may be very questionable, whether, according to Mr. Parker "superstition and scepticism" are both "founded in credulity." The justly celebrated Claude thinks superstition usually springs from servile fear, an inclination to idolatry, hypocrisy, or presumption. Scepticism is doubt, indecision or unbelief. While therefore superstition may be produced by credulity, or easiness of belief; scepticism (or skepticism) evidently proceeds from an opposite principle viz. an aversion to believe any thing. But whatever may be the origin of superstition or skepticism, we agree with Mr. P. that both are evils, productive of much misery amongst mankind. We are pleased to learn that Mr. P. considers it the right and the duty of men to think for themselves, study the word of God, learn its doctrines and practice its precepts. In the exercise of this acknowledged right, we proceed to examine his second Lecture. He thinks there is too much pretension to free inquiry, and too little exertion in the attainment of the knowledge of the truth. To this sentiment, we give our unqualified approbation. But we have never before heard it suggested that Universalism proceeds from a want of exertion in acquiring a knowledge of the truth; or that U- 2. From the universal goodness of God. 1. We shall notice his examination of the arguments of Universalists drawn from the justice of God. On this point, he quotes a definition of justice from the chevalier Ramsey, a learned Scotchman, who was born in 1686. This he does on the authority of Dr. Edwards, who wrote against Dr. Chauncey of Boston. Why did Mr. P. go back to an author who wrote a whole century since? Was it because the language of that author was more to his purpose, than any thing he could find of a more recent date? Are not living authors who have written in favor of Universalism, entitled to the notice of such men as Mr. P. The definition quoted from Ramsey is the following, "Justice is that perfection of God, by which he endeavours continually to make all intelligences just." Now the truth is, Universalists draw an argument in favor of their sentiments from the justice of God: but that argument is not founded on Ramsey's definition as quoted above. We consider that definition defective. We add to it the following. God "is C infinitely righteous and just in himself and in all his proceedings with his creatures." If the justice of God consists in his being perfectly just in himself and also in his endeavoring to make all intelligences just; how is Mr. P. to evade the force of the argument, which Universalists draw from the justice of God? It will be perceived that all he says on this point, is founded on a definition of justice, which is imperfect, and is not relied upon by Universalists in general. If the justice of God seeks to render all men just-if the purposes of God must be accomplished, will not all men be just? "The law is holy, and the commandment holy and just and good," Rom. 7, 12. A certain lawyer asked Christ "which is the great commandment in the law?" Jesus said unto him, thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets," Mat. 22, 36-40. The law of God which is just, is binding on all moral beings, requires supreme love to God and universal love to mankind, and must be fulfilled. "Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled." It cannot be pretended that the law is not binding on all intelligences; for, if not, those on whom it is not obligatory, would be absolved from their allegiance to God-they would not be responsible beings for where no law is, there is no transgression. It cannot be pretended, the law does not require that we should love God with all our hearts and our neighbors as ourselves; for that would contradict Christ. It cannot be pretended that the law will not be fulfilled; for that would also contradict Christ. So long as there is the least injustice amongst mankind, the law is not fulfilled in "every jot and tittle." When Christ shall have fulfilled the law by subduing all hearts to himself-by removing sin and enmity from the moral creation, we hope Mr. P. will be perfectly satisfied. If it be said, Christ fulfils the law for men: we reply, then that law can require nothing more of men, unless it should require something more than to be fulfilled. It is contrary to reason, justice and scripture, to suppose any moral being is exonerated from duty because another being has done his duty. It is as easy to prove from scripture, that Christ will go to heaven for us; as that he will love God with all the heart and his neighbors as himself for us, i. e. in our stead. Much more might be profitably said on this particular, but we must pass to notice Mr. P's arguments in relation to disciplinary punishment. He endeav ors "to show that justice requires something more than a mere discipline, intended for the good of the offender." 1. Our author contends that "if all punishment is inflicted for this end"-.e. the good of the punished, "then punishment is not on the whole, a real evil." Very true. But there may be "partial evil" productive of "universal good." |