finds itself in contact, upon three different frontiers, with Russia, England, and France; and for various reasons the importance of maintaining amicable relations with China has become for us much greater than formerly, when our interests in that direction were purely commercial. It is therefore fortunate that our dispute with the Tibet authorities, which brought about a kind of semi-official war on the Sikkim frontier, is now, through Lord Dufferin's skill and patience, in a fair way towards settlement. The particulars of this affair illustrate the curious and intricate structure of Asiatic politics, and the very delicate nature of the relations between differently civilised societies. Sikkim lies on the outer slopes or ranges (towards India) of the Himalayas; it is a State under our protection, bound by treaty to admit no foreign troops without our permission, and to abide by our arbitration in respect to its foreign affairs. But the Raja is Tibetan by descent, is married to a Tibetan wife, is also a Buddhist by creed, and the Buddhist Lamas have much influence with the people. The Tibetan Government claims his allegiance for some interior districts of his chiefship; and all these circumstances, religious and political, favour the constant pretensions of Tibet to predominance in the country. Tibet itself is a State under the theocratic home-rule of the Lamas, acknowledging Chinese sovereignty and the entire control of Pekin over its external relations; so that Calcutta and Pekin are politically connected by a chain, of which the intermediate links are Sikkim and Tibet. In 1886 the Tibetans positively refused to receive a commercial mission that was preparing to set out from Bengal. We believe that Lord Dufferin had been in no way responsible for the initiation of this project, which appears to have failed mainly because those who had undertaken to conduct it did not understand that for such expeditions the preparations should be studiously unostentatious, and that, however strange it may seem to modern commerce, the more they are advertised the less they are likely to succeed. However this may be, the mission withdrew but the Tibetans advanced; and they took up a position within the protected territory of Sikkim, on one of the main roads to India. The English Government began by calling upon the Chinese Foreign Office to enforce its authority at Lhassa, where two ampas, or Chinese chargés d'affaires, are usually stationed; but this the Chinese have always found it very difficult to do, owing partly to the great distance between Pekin and Lhassa and partly to the mysterious sanctity which surrounds the ruling Lamas, who are spiritual

heads, by successive embodiments, of northern Buddhism. Moreover, China has herself been always very sensitive to the touch of English pressure upon any part of the independent territory that blocks us out from immediate access to her south-western provinces. It was, therefore, to be expected that the Pekin Foreign Office should adopt the traditional tactics of delay and procrastination, alleging the necessity of careful local inquiry as to the facts, and being evidently either unable or unwilling to insist upon the unconditional withdrawal of the Tibetan force that had entrenched itself on Sikkim land. Lord Dufferin wrote direct to the Dalai Lama, and a long diplomatic correspondence with Pekin also ensued; until, when the resources of diplomatic warning and expostulation had been exhausted, a small body of Indian troops summarily ejected the intruders. Our forbearance, nevertheless, had so far encouraged the arrogance of the ruling Lamas, that they returned to the attack, when their army was again severely beaten; but in such a position, and with such antagonists, it is impossible to remain long on the defensive, and the Pekin Government, being in no way desirous to see Lhassa threatened by an English expeditionary force, has since been interposing in earnest. The Tibetans will henceforward be prohibited from attempting any interference whatever in the affairs of Sikkim, and a precise boundary will be laid down over which no trespass will be permitted. Remembering that the Tibetans had actually invaded a frontier state under our protection, and that fighting, like fire, is hard to stop or limit when once it breaks out, we may accord much praise to the firmness and moderation with which these proceedings, diplomatic and military, have been guided and held in hand by Lord Dufferin's Government.

The successful termination of another petty border war closes the varied list of military and political operations which the necessity of protecting our Indian frontier has imposed upon Lord Dufferin's Government. It became necessary in October last to send an expedition against certain tribes inhabiting the Black Mountain, which overlooks the extreme north-west district of the Punjab. The country inhabited by these tribes forms a triangle, bounded on the north by the high mountains of Kohistan, on the west by the river Indus, and on the east by the British frontier. They occupy the western face of the great mountain, a mass of precipitous wooded glens sloping down to the Indus; and for twenty years these savage highlanders

have been raiding, murdering, and kidnapping across the border with comparative impunity. In consequence of two wanton incursions made by them on British villages in 1887 one tribe had been put under blockade; but in June last they attacked a party of British troops within our own territory, when two officers and four Gurkha soldiers were killed. Upon this final provocation, and as the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, Sir James Lyall, insisted very strenuously upon the duty of protecting our own people and punishing assassins, a considerable British force marched into the mountains, and compelled the tribesmen to submit to the terms fixed and to pay the penalties demanded. The affair, which was in itself simple enough, attracted some interest on the frontier from the fact that this country was the scene, in 1862-63, of the expedition known as the Ambeyla campaign; when a smaller force of British troops was brought to a standstill and somewhat roughly handled by a widespread combination of the tribes of this region; and on the present occasion it was quite possible that more united opposition might again be attempted. The transIndus tribes this time held aloof, and almost all the offending tribes have been speedily brought to submission, though one or two outlying sections are still defiant. To penetrate far into these highlands, and to chase recusants from one steep range to another, is a kind of warfare in the highest degree unprofitable. But enough has been done to punish actual criminals and to spare Lord Dufferin the unpleasant necessity of considering whether the safety of our people may not some day compel us to occupy permanent posts in the narrow strip of highland which interposes between our present frontier and the Indus, and which has for centuries sheltered a set of indomitable brigands.

We have now gone rapidly over the salient features of India's foreign policy under Lord Dufferin's viceroyalty, and we have endeavoured to describe the general position in which he has placed our external relations. The affairs of Afghanistan, within and without, have been at last brought into something like order by the Amir's severity, and by the demarcation of his frontier upon the only side which is exposed to serious attack so long as he remains our friend. Burmah is settling down under the composing influence of a strongly organised civil administration, vigorously directed by the Viceroy's lieutenant at Rangoon. The Indian border, though it has been greatly enlarged, and has been recently disturbed, is now for the time quiet along its whole length.

If we now take a comprehensive survey of the situation thus attained, we can see that we have reached a different environment from that in which we were formerly placed. We have worked through almost all the loose political formations, effete or ephemeral, upon which we have from time to time attempted to build an outer line of defence; and it is to be hoped that we are at last reaching the solid limits of our territorial extension inland from the Indian seaboard. On the north-west we have a frontier scientifically fortified, with excellent communications in the rear, and an open line of advance, if necessary, into south Afghanistan. On the north and north-east we are still covered by the triple range of the Himalayas; but there are signs of movement. beyond the mountains, for even a veil of perpetual snow cannot long seclude the active and enterprising races on each side of it; and all North Asia, along the whole breadth of the continent, now belongs to Russia and China, two States of a rank and magnitude co-ordinate with our own. We have also arrived within a measurable distance from countries more or less under the political influence of France. In these circumstances, the view taken of our position by competent foreign critics is of much value to us, because it is certain not to be too favourable, and because it is not likely to underestimate our peculiar difficulties in India. Such observers may certainly be relied upon for due appreciation of the degree to which the vicinity of such a military Power as Russia must affect the character of our foreign policy, of our military establishments, and probably of our administration in India. In the present condition of Europe, when huge armies can cross an enemy's frontier in a fortnight, and may crush their adversary in a month, the saying of Hobbes, that the law of nature is the same thing as the law of nations, has been abundantly verified. The primitive necessity of self-preservation casts a dark shadow over the most brilliant civilisation; nor is it to be expected that India should long remain free from the hazards that attach to the possession of a great empire. Upon some foreign critics this aspect of the present situation-the important change in our environment produced by the approach of Russia-makes the greater impression. With others the chief interest centres in the problem of controlling the fermentation of novel ideas and modern aspirations among our Indian fellow-subjects.

Of all the travellers who have visited India, perhaps no one has been better qualified than Baron Hübner to pro

nounce upon the real import and eventual consequence to India of the Russian movements in Central Asia. An eminent diplomatist, thoroughly conversant with European politics, and well acquainted with courts and cabinets, his opinion upon such a question is of the highest value. Yet Baron Hübner, in whose work on the British Empire India holds a foremost place, refers in a calm and slightly incredulous tone to the prevalence among Anglo-Indians of apprehensions with regard to the ambitious designs of Russia. In concluding his remarkable survey of the whole field of Indian politics, he says: It is not the contingency of Russian aggression that would disturb me if I were an Englishman. The internal policy to be pursued in India is the subject that would absorb my attention.' Sir George Campbell quotes this sentence in his brochure on the British Empire as expressing his own conclusions, and adds some observations characterised by his usual shrewdness and his complete mastery of the subject; so that we have the concurrent judgement of recognised authorities in European and in Indian politics.

6

But while the parting words to us of the Austrian statesman, who has twice seen his own empire invaded and dismembered, are that England has in India only one enemy to fear, herself,' such is not the opinion of the distinguished French writer whose book is named at the heading of this article. M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire's work abounds with generous appreciation-we might say, admiration-of the courage and perseverance shown by the English in the acquisition of India, and of the spirit in which they are now pursuing its gradual civilisation. He has carefully studied our administrative system, he is thoroughly acquainted with all the latest official publications that record our proceedings; and he realises all the risks and responsibilities that beset great internal changes and reforming experiments among a vast Asiatic population. Nevertheless, when he, too, asks the inevitable question, Will England be able to 'complete her work in India ?' M. Saint-Hilaire looks not within but beyond our Indian borders for an answer. the very first page of his introduction, which is suggestively headed L'Angleterre et la Russie,' and which summarises his conclusions and latest impressions, he strikes a note of warning; and the whole subsequent tenor of his dissertation upon Central Asian politics discloses strong apprehension regarding the designs and movements of Russia. He begins thus:

In