VI. Injunction against Running up Prices. One of the functions of municipal administration, according to the Shulchan Aruch, is to provide cheap foodstuffs. Consequently the corporation of a town has the right to fix market prices and to make every violation of the market regulations punishable (Choshen Mishpat 231,27). Above all it is a duty to oppose artifical raising of prices: "Whoever runs up prices without warrant is liable to be punished by stripes or other means" (ibid. 231, 21).

VII. Injunction against Unfair Competition.

Baba Metsia 60 forbids attracting customers by means not derived from the nature of the business itself. Thus a merchant must not present children with nuts and similar delicacies in order to attract their custom. It is worth noting that there is a controversy recorded in the Mishna concerning "sale prices". Some, siding with the producers and dealers, denounce the practice of attracting customers by "price-cutting", others praise those who, by reducing prices, make it possible for the many to supply their wants.

Compare the foregoing rules of fair dealing with the following.

VIII. Ordinances of Church Moralists.

The sellers may, however, clandestinely reduce the weight, number, and measure of their goods to the extent that is required in order to make up the fair price, in cases when the price has been unjustly fixed by the authorities or their agents or when the buyers have agreed, in an unfair manner, not to buy the goods except at a fixed market price which is not quite justified; and this is as it should be, because nobody is wronged if there is a fair relation between goods and prices, so that the merchants have a means for indemnifying themselves without damaging others. The seller of a prime wine may mix it with a less generous sort, so as to approximate the usual market commodity at the current price. Ferraris, Prompta Biblioteca. Tom. II. Contractus Emptionis et Venditionis. Art. III, 23 and 25, p. 1427.

It is no grievous sin to rob him who would give it if asked, although it is done clandestinely against his will, and restitution is not required. Emmanuel Sa, theol. Dr., Professor in the College of Rome, 1530-1596. Aphorismi Confessariorum p. 263 a. Cologne 1621.

If one cannot dispose of his wine at a fair price on account either of the injustice of the magistrate or of the malice of the buyers who have conspired not to buy in order to lower the prices or for some other adequate reason, he may reduce the measure or pour in a little water and still pass it off as full measure or unadulterated wine so as to secure the right price, provided only he does not lie, and if he does lie it is not dangerous and no mortal sin, and restitution is not required. Cardinal Franciscus Toletus, 1532-1596, De Instructione Sacerdotum, p. 1027. Romae 1601. See also Franciscus Xaverius Fegeli, Quaestiones Practicae pars 3, p. 223. Augustae et Herbipoli 1750).

Servants are sometimes exculpated for stealing things from their masters in order to indemnify themselves for extra services required of them, or for receiving extremely low wages when they are not in a position to better themselves. But the master must be in actual need of the services of the attendant. Cardinal John de Lugo, 1583-1660, De Justitia et Jure. Lugduni 1652, p. 468.

Similarly, he does not steal who takes for his just indemnification if he has no other way of coming by what is his due, for instance, if a servant cannot get his hire or if he has been hired unfairly at an unfair wage. Professor Hermann Busenbaum, 1600-1668. Medulla Theologiae Moralis. 1653. New Edition. Rome 1844, p. 160.

The same views are expressed by Claudius La-Croix, Theologia Moralis, Cologne 1757. Page 318 and by Professor Paulus Laymann (1576—1625), Theologia Moralis. Munich 1625. Page 130.

Suppose you stole ten goldpieces three days ago, sinfully indeed, but being to-day greatly embarrassed by serious illness, without any. hope of obtaining money, you use those ten goldpieces to restore your health are you obliged to make restitution, when you are restored to better circumstances? The more common view lays this obligation upon you. The other view which absolves you from restitution is not untenable. Thomas Tamburini, 1591-1675, Opera. Venetiae 1692, p. 222.

On the point of restitution this is the truest rule: Restitution is never incumbent on a man, if this implies an injury to him greater than the gain accruing from it to the person to whom restitution is due. Surely, nobody is obliged to make amends for goods and chattels of inferior value to the loss of his reputation. Antony de Escobar, 1589-1669, Liber Theologiae Moralis. Vol. 4. Lugduni 1652, p. 246. Printed with the approbation of the Church Authorities.

IX. Lost Property and Abandonment ("Yeüsh").

The principle of reciprocity lies at the root of a certain discriminatory law in the Mishna which rules that in case an ox belonging to an Israelite gores the ox of an idol-worshipper the owner of the ox is not required to pay damages to the idolater. Baba Kamma 38a tells the following story. Once upon a time the hostile (Roman) Government sent two functionaries to the Israelite sages (authors of the Mishna and Gemara) with the commission to examine the doctrines of Israel. The functionaries discharged their commission and on leaving said to the sages: "We have found your whole Torah to be just with the exception of one law which rules that in case of an Israelite's ox goring that of a heathen there need be no restitution, but that in case of a heathen's ox goring that of a Israelite the heathen is held to pay damages. We find this unfair, but shall not report it to our Government."

In trying to account for this discriminatory law, the authors of the Talmud assumed that the Mishna could have had in mind those heathens only who did not observe the Noachian laws nor knew any order of law at all. The Palestinian Talmud says that this law was passed in accordance with the laws of the nations (in the original: kedinehem).

Later centuries looked upon this passage of the Talmud as a proof that Talmudic law was to be communicated to pagans who wanted to know it truthfully and without any alterations just as the ancients had done, although there was the danger of their being persecuted on account of this hard provision against the pagans.

The principle of reciprocity also underlies the statutes concerning the restitution of lost property to its owner. Reciprocity in this case is a legal, not a vindictive moment.

According to the Roman law, legal possession becomes void even if the physical relation of the owner to the object is still valid, directly the owner has given it up; per contra, the corporal but not the legal possession becomes void if the object is in a stranger's power and the owner still claims it.

Possession becomes both physically and legally void if the physical relation has ceased, and then only with the consent of the former owner.

According to the Israelite law, the absolute possession of an object ceases if the owner declares it to be abandoned. The effect of this declaration is that whoever acquires the object becomes its possessor. The former owner, therefore, may also acquire it again as long as no other person has taken possession of it (Nedarim 44a, Choshen Mishpat 273, 3). The will to abandon a thing may also be expressed by action, for instance when one puts a cow in a shed without a door to it, or without tying it to a post, or when one knowingly drops a purse in an open road and passes on (Baba Metsia 25b; Choshen Mishpat 261,4). According to the Roman law, the former owner is assumed to have abandoned every claim to a movable object (a) when he has lost it and when its whereabouts are inaccessible or unknown to him; when he leaves it lying unguarded, unwatched; when the thing, by becoming sacral, is no longer capable of legal ownership;

(b) when domestic animals go astray and can not be found. In these and similar cases the abandonment is inferred (a) from the physical impossibility of possession, because the hope of recovery has been given up;

(b) from the legal impossibility of possession, if possession is prohibited;

(c) from commissions or omissions of the former owner which give notice that he no longer lays any claim to the lost object.

In the Talmudic law, abandonment is assumed if the owner has given up the hope of recovery, but only in case the second owner has not acquired it unlawfully.

The Mosaic law ordains that lost property and a stray animal must be restored to the owner, even if he is an enemy (Ex. 23, 4; Deut. 22, 3). Talmudic law rules that the finder is required to have his find proclaimed in the place where he found it (Baba Metsia 2a).

On the strength of these statutes, the finder of an object was never justified in assuming that the loser had abandoned his property because the law demanded restitution. Retention was theft because ownership had not ceased. But if the object was found under circumstances which precluded the owner's recovering it, as for instance when it was rescued from a rapacious beast or from the sea at the tide, or from an unsluiced stream it was assumed that the owner has given up all hope of recovery (Baba Metsia 24a; Choshen Mishpat 259, 7).

If a find is rescued from the sea at tide or from an unsluiced river, although it have marks by which to be identified, restitution is not incumbent on the finder because the former owner has long abandoned his ownership. Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Gezelah 11, 10. When the Jews became exiles in foreign lands each of which had its own particular pagan laws according to which a find belonged to the finder unconditionally, the Jewish law about finds had to be revised. We have seen that reciprocity was at the root of this law, not as a moral but as a legal factor, namely, the presumption that the finder will return the find in consequence of which the loser does not give up his claim. In pagan countries this presumption was wanting: on the contrary, the majority of the inhabitants did not return finds to their owners. This affected not only the conduct of Jews towards Pagans, but also of Jews towards Jews. As every loser, whether Jew or Gentile, gave up the hope of recovery and of ownership the object found became the legal property of the finder, no matter whether the loser was a Jew or Gentile.

If he found an object in a town mostly inhabited by Goyim but in a place which is frequented by Jews it is incumbent upon him to have it cried; but if he found it in the street or in a place in which crowds foregather, and which is frequented by Goyim, the find is his even in case a Jew turns up and identifies it, for the owner is presumed to have given it up as lost in the belief that a Gentile had found it. Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Gezelah XI,7; N. and W. 79.

Rabbi Yehuda was once walking behind Mar Samuel in the market. Presently he said: "If anybody should find a bag (of money) here how would that be?" He (Samuel) replied: "It would be his". To which the other: "But if an Israelite came and identified it (thus proving he was