of the same sort, he acts according to the law of the King, for all royal laws (State laws) about property are binding. Mishneh Torah, Zechia, I, 14; 15. N. and W; 89).

b) Here the words of Maimonides are literally repeated.

To sum up: The legal maxim that a Jew enjoys no privilege or right of priority in dealing with a non-Jew, not even after having paid for a piece of land, was worded by the Jewish jurists in the form of a legal proverb, viz. "The property of a Goy is like a desert (ownerless), and he who takes possession has acquired it". This axiom can never become injurious to a nonJew; Nöldeke and Wünsche rightly conclude: "Grave as that axiom sounds, it is absolutely harmless on closer examination".

XII. Rohling's Last Refuge.

Rohling in his Reply to the Rabbis (Page 4) repeats his assertion:

The axiom obtains, Gupho muttar kol shechen mamono, i. e. the life of non-
Jews is in thy hands (O, Jew), how much more his property.

He quotes as his authority Joseph Albo, Sepher Ikkarim (i. e. Foundations of Belief) III, 25. Albo took part in the notorious Disputation of Tortosa (1413-1414).

How does the passage (which is, by the way, taken from this disputation) read?

But as to that part of the commandments which regulate the conduct of man to man and which they call Judiciales, the Torah of Moses is in this respect the most perfect of all religious laws. For it inculcates humanity in saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself (Lev. 19, 18). It removes hate: Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart (ibid. 5, 17). And with regard to the Ger (stranger) it says, Ye shall love the stranger (Deut. 10, 19). It exhorts not to overreach him with the words, He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates where it liketh him best; thou shalt not oppress him (ibid. 23, 17). And this refers not only to the "Ger Tsedek" (the complete proselyte) but also to the sojourner who worships no idols. And likewise it commands to put him in the way of profit saying, Thou shalt give it unto the stranger that is in thy gates that he may eat it (ibid. 14,21), i. e. to a sojourner who may eat of an animal torn by beasts of prey. Taking interest it permits only of a Nochri (non-Jew) who worships idols, saying, Unto a stranger thou

mayest lend upon usury (ibid. 23, 21). This refers to an idol-worshipper who, unlike the sojourner, does not observe the seven Noachian commandments. All laws agree that it is permitted (to take the life of such an idolater) and even the philosophers permit the shedding of his blood saying. Kill him who has no religion. Likewise the Torah enjoins, Thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth (ibid. 20, 16). And if his life is at thy mercy how much more his money, for such an idolater deserved to be killed and not to be spared.

Nöldeke and Wünsche add (Nr. 91):

The author merely adopts the wording and the spirit of the harsh Old Testament precepts against idolaters, for the orthodox Jews must, in theory, study even obsolete laws. But by limiting the notion of idolaters and by utilizing the notion of the sojourner - proselyte all this becomes pointless, and it is a distortion of truth to interpret the theory of the life and property of an idolater being forfeit as if it referred to Christians... The passage completely refutes this assumption. At the time when the above-quoted religious precepts were compiled, the prevailing doctrine within Christendom was that the possessions of the Jews did not belong to them. The famous Dominican St. Thomas Aquinas devoted a whole disquisition to this subject (Summa Theologiae III, 2, questio X). And Thomas was of a mild disposition and anything but a Jewhater. Some of his writings have been translated into Hebrew by Jews. Notwithstanding this, he discusses in sober seriousness the question whether and in how far Jewish property might be confiscated. The Duchess of Brabant inquired of him whether and to what extent she might put contributions on Jews. Thomas, thereupon, instructs her in his well-known letter "ad ducissam Brabantiae de regimine Judaeorum" (Opera XVI, 292) that the Jews, legitimately, by their own fault, were doomed to eternal slavery and that, therefore, their masters might claim their possessions as their own with the restriction that they must be left the means to live. But as even Jews and Pagans who are without the pale of the Church ought to be dealt with leniently, that the name of the Lord might not be desecrated, ("ne dominus blasphemetur") the Jews should be spared unprecedented coercive impositions, as human nature is apt to be outraged and grieved by what it is not used to. The Duchess

of Brabant is, therefore, advised to confiscate Jewish property according to the methods of her ancestors.

Later on, it became the generally accepted axiom that the possessions of the Jews belonged to the Barons (“les moebles des Juifs sont aux Barons". Ducange s. v. Judaei) so that even baptism could not save them. Before the Jew was baptized he had to deliver his possessions to the Baron that the latter might not suffer an injury. It was a remarkable event when Gregory the Great felt it incumbent upon him to direct his Defensor Candidus in Sicily to return a paid bond to a Jew (Gregorovius, History of Rome IX, 56). Papal intervention was necessary to enforce this! The oppression of the Jews by individual patrons was such that the Barons were often compelled to get the Jews to swear that they would not leave their dominions. If certain norms of civil law could be established on the maxim "that Christians are not to be appeased by words and soft phrases, but by sums of money and he who falls into their hands can not be redeemed for nothing" (Rabbi Meier of Rothenburg, Responses. Ed. Cremona. Nr. 33) it is certainly a sign of sad experiences.

The sovereigns were rarely milder than the small tyrants. Philippe-Auguste of France being once in financial straits ordered the Jews to leave his territories but to deliver first their possessions into the royal treasury (1181). Some years later he wanted money again, so he recalled the decree of banishment for large sums (1198). If then, insofar as Jews were concerned, violence and coercion were the only foundations of law, this condition certainly explains, even if it may not justify the belief of persons of inferior morals, that is was permissible for them to meet ruthless violence with calculated cunning, and, by craft and deceit, to cheat wicked lawlessness of its prey.

Another forgery of Justus (Law 26) is this:

If a Jew does business with an Akum (Christian) and another comes and assists him in cheating the Akum (Christian) by false measure, false weight, or false accounts, both must share the profit.

Here is the literal translation of the complete passage to which Justus refers as his authority.

If one of two partners does business in forbidden wares (without the knowledge of the other), in an animal torn by wild beasts, in carrion or in like (forbidden) things, the profit belongs to both. The loss, however, if there is one, must be borne by him who did the business. Hagaah: The same holds if one of the partners has stolen or robbed; he must share with the other, but bear the loss by himself. This applies if the loss happens before the origin of the goods became known to the second partner; but if, after the sharing of profits, complaint is made; or if one of them buys stolen goods and shares the profit with the other, and complaint follows, they have to bear the loss between them, for the other has subsequently agreed to the act. Choshen Mishpat 176, 12; Yore Deah 117.

There is no mention of an Akum or non-Jew. It is a legal question whether a partner who has stolen, and that from a Jew, is obliged to share the proceeds with his partner, or if in case of evil consequences the partner is obliged to bear his share of them. There is a similar discussion in Choshen Mishpat 183, 7.

If one sends a messenger to fetch money from an Akum, and the Akum gives more by mistake, the whole belongs to the messenger. Hagaah: This obtains only in case the messenger has noticed the mistake before delivering the money; if he notices the mistake after delivery, the surplus belongs to his master.

F

If one does business with an Akum and is assisted by another in cheating the Akum in measure, weight, or number, they share the profit, no matter whether the second has done it for money or gratis. Here, too, we have merely the decision of the legal question: to whom does the profit of a forbidden act belong? In deciding this question, the author did not dream of declaring theft or robbery as permissible, no more than did the Christian moralists in discussing similar questions.

Every female and male person may take and demand payment for the immoral use of her (or his) body, and he (or she) who has promised it is obliged to pay. Emmanuel Sa, Aphorismi Confessariorum, page 412.

How much may a female person rightly ask for the use of her body? Considering everything, as nobility, beauty, age, reputation, one who is reputable and inaccessible deserves more than one who prostitutes herself to everybody. A public harlot may not rightly demand and take more than she is used to demand and take. But a reputable woman may demand and take as much as she likes. Thomas Tamburini, Opera, page 197.

The married woman Elfrida receives from Rabo, a noble youth, a not inconsiderable price for the use of her body. After she has reformed, she is troubled about this price chiefly because she has extorted it by flattery and lies, by pretending she had been deeply in love with him, etc. The question now is whether Elfrida may retain this extorted price of adultery. I answer that she may. Adamus Burghaber, Professor of Theology in Freiburg im Breisgau, 1608-1687, Centuriae Selectorum Casuum Conscientiae Tres, Nr. 33, page 483. Neither Justus, nor Rohling, nor Dinter nor anybody else will infer from this that the theologians quoted approved of lust and adultery. They neglected to add a warning against these sins, because they had treated them fully in another chapter. The same applies to the Shulchan Aruch touching the questions discussed in it. The prohibition against defrauding, robbing and overreaching in measure and weight, in dealing with the Akum, had been inculcated often and fully, as passages quoted above will attest. Thus when a rabbi was consulted on the question as to whom the profit accruing from the mistake of a Goy belonged (see above p. 113) he ruled in accordance with the Shulchan Aruch, but added:

But I say that, for the sake of sanctifying the Divine Name, that Israelite must restore the excess erroneously given by the Christian. For the remnant of Israel shall not do iniquity nor speak lies; neither shall a deceitful tongue be found in their midst, as is taught in Baba Metsia and in Kiddushin. That is why our ancestor Jacob commanded his sons to return the money which they found in their bags to the Egyptians although these were idolaters, and all this in order to sanctify His Divine Name. And it is forbidden to deceive any man, Mohammedan or Christian. I swear by the Temple that such a thing happened to me. I sold goods to a Christian. He paid me too much by mistake. I went to many Christians until I found the buyer and returned the money unto him. Rabbi Benjamin ben Mathatya, Responses Nr. 409. Venice 1539.

XIII. The Jew as Witness.

Justus (Law 19) quotes:

If an Akum (Christian) has a claim against a Jew, a Jew who would have to witness in favour of the Christian must not make this deposition lest he be the only witness in the case and the Jew, on the strength of this deposition, would have to return the money.

9 Bloch, Israel and the Nations.