from Christian doctrine various false elements, to have supplemented it, to have placed it on a truer basis, to have given it more effective sanctions. The question then is: Does Comtism recommend itself to us by any more logical treatment of the great doctrines it borrows from revealed religion? does it shed any more satisfactory light on the problem of existence? does it enable us to achieve any higher righteousness and felicity? does it bring us any larger freedom and hope? Mr. F. Harrison protests that Positivism has a right to use the language and symbols of religion; and if Positivism means by that language and symbolism what Christianity means, or if it means more, Mr. Harrison is quite justified in his protest; but if Positivism means something that Christianity does not mean, or less than it means, then is Positivism convicted of the hypocrisy of another supplanter who stole sweetsmelling raiment to possess himself of another's birthright.

We will now consider Comte's treatment of the doctrine of the SUPREME BEING, and see what is to be gained by the new system. J. S. Mill writes: Though conscious of being in an extremely small minority, we venture to think that a religion may exist without belief in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, an instructive object of contemplation.' (Westminster Review, July, 1865.) Comte thought quite otherwise, and the elaboration of a Deity occupies a large space in his voluminous writings. We are often assured that when a positive philosophy has superseded the old theology, we shall no longer have the confusion and antagonism of thought and conviction which are considered inseparable from the theological régime, but a definite, demonstrable and unanimous faith will succeed. This prospect of unanimity must, however, be con

sidered doubtful, when at the outset, the Peter and Paul of Positivism cannot agree on such a cardinal question, as the necessity or otherwise of a God to a religious faith! Goethe, speaking of development and progress, observed: If there be not a God now, there will be one day'; and SO Positivism, which announces itself as the final religion, although it will not permit us to postulate a God at the origin of things, solemnly announces that, through the process of ages, a Deity has been evolved, and that it is essential to social order and progress that this Deity should be loved and served. Comte denounces, with great eloquence, all godless philosophy. What, then, is this 'new God' that has come 'newly up,' whom our fathers feared not? Is he more thinkable or more lovable than God manifested in Jesus Christ? Mr. Long has just painted for us the curious scene of the idol-making of old Egypt; but we think it is stranger far to stand by and witness M. Comte organizing the God of the modern world.

First, the Universe must be regarded as Divine, and loved and served accordingly: 'It is requisite that our minds should conceive a Power without us, so superior to ourselves as to command the complete submission of our entire life.' (Vol. ii., p. 11.) This external Power is the Order of Nature. This Power must be loved. It is indispensable to our moral nature that our environment should be regarded with enthusiasm : our heart must be captivated, as well as our understanding disciplined, and, therefore, we must regard the Supreme Power with Veneration, Affection, Attachment and Benevolence. 'Man is so much by nature disposed towards Affection, that he extends it easily to inanimate objects, and even to mere abstract rules, so soon as he can see in them any real relation to his own existence. In proportion as positive Belief is developed and en

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nobled in us, we feel more and more Affection for the Order of Nature, and especially for the Progress proper to it.' (Vol. ii., p. 44.) Comte perceives, however, the difficulty of regarding dead matter and mechanical law with affection, and therefore insists that we must consider nature as being alive and having within itself will, feeling and goodness. Helvetius leaned to the opinion, that all matter is, if we but knew it, sentient. not the discovery of such a force as attraction, for example, make us suspect that bodies have properties still unknown, such as the faculty of feeling, which, while only manifesting itself in the bodies of animals, may yet be common to all bodies?' (Quoted by Dabney, Sensualistic Philosophy, p. 41.) This opinion Comte boldly adopts. He considers that the Earth may have modified its own figure, improved its own condition, and that it is susceptible of feeling, desire and love. 'We must suppose, in fact, that the Supreme Power admits of a real attachment on our part-an idea which presumes in it a faculty by which its natural Goodness controls the exercise of its Authority.' (Vol. ii., p. 15.)

There is as much said in Comte about Faith and Love as could possibly have been said in the most fervid Agape of the primitive Church, only nature, and the order of nature, have taken the place of the living God and His government. Faith is a willing submission to the order of nature; and Love is that delight in nature which redeems our submission from servility. Seeing that the earth is alive, we might well fear to pluck a branch or flower lest there should issue words and blood,' as when, in the Inferno, Dante plucked a little spray from the strange trees; only we may remember that a sentient earth is only one out of a score Positivist fictions created to meet certain philosophical and social ne

cessities. We will not here comment farther on this extraordinary spectacle of a philosophical Pygmalion falling in love with a statue, and striving to breathe into it the breath of life; but we simply note the fact, that in the Positivist scheme the physical universe is to be regarded as our Divinity, and as the proper object of our faith and affection.

Secondly, Humanity is necessary to complete the new Divinity. 'Humanity is a vast and vital organism, truly the Supreme Being.' What Comte understands by this Supreme Being' will be evidenced by the following quotations: Humanity is for us the only true Great Being, we, the conscious elements of whom she is composed.' (Vol. i., p. 264.) 'The Supreme Power is the continuous result of all the forces capable of voluntarily taking part in the amelioration of the race, even without excepting our worthy helpmates amongst the animals.' (Vol. ii., p. 54.)

The Great Being is the whole constituted by the beings, past, future and present, which co-operate willingly in perfecting the order of the world.' (Vol. iv., p. 27.) Thus we are to suppose that all good men who have ever lived, that all such as are living now, that all such as ever will live, together with all noble animals, constitute a grand Organism, which it is our highest privilege to worship and live for. This sociological Great Being is to be worshipped. Prayer occupies a large place in Comte's programme of life. There is to be personal or private prayer: the adoration in secret of some loved image or memory. Domestic worship also survives. The father of the Family invokes, as household gods, the chief ancestors of the Family.' (Vol. iv., p. 107.) And finally comes Public Worship the direct worship, that is, of Humanity.' (Vol. iv., p. 116.) Comte not only borrows from Christianity, but also appropriates in its

integrity the ancestral worship of the Chinese. Every where temples and altars are to be built, each day is to be distinguished by fervent outpourings of gratitude and adoration; only 'the treasures of affection which our ancestors wasted upon mystical objects' are, for the future, to be lavished on that Supreme Being who is ever before our eyes-Humanity. Humanity is to be worshipped in Woman: The immediate basis of Sociolatry, personal worship, is characterized above all by the heartfelt adoration of the affective sex, on the ground of the inherent capacity of every true woman to be a representative of Humanity.' (Vol. iv., p. 96.) The Mother, the Wife, the Daughter, or, in default of these, some other member of the sex, is to be elected for adoration.

Comte has a very poor idea of female intellectuality, and will not permit the sex to inherit property, but in other respects he is the very Don Quixote of the philosophical world: In a word, Man will in those days kneel to Woman, and to Woman alone.' (Vol. i., p. 208.) During the Commonwealth a religious fanatic named James Naylor created considerable excitement and was brought before a Committee of the Commons to answer for his blasphemies. The evidence showed that the disciples of this self-styled God would surround his chair, meekly kneeling on their knees, or sitting on the ground, and singing, 'Holy, holy, to the true God, and great God, and glory to the Almighty.' This scene was enacted the whole day long, Naylor calmly accepting the homage as his due. When Positivism becomes the accepted religion of mankind, some similar scene to this will be witnessed in every house: men will kneel before the rocking-chair, and adore its occupant as the true, great and Almighty Deity. Comte is sadly perplexed to find an object for Woman's

worship. Man is to worship Woman, but how shall the analogous feelings of devotion in the other sex be satis

The ingenious philosopher attempts no answer to this: 'My sex renders me incompetent to enter into the secret wants of Woman's heart. Theory indicates a blank hitherto unnoticed, but does not enable me to fill it. It is a problem for women themselves to solve.' (Vol. i., p. 214.) Here is a grand opportunity for the female mind to distinguish itself-to find for itself a god, and thus fill up the blank which theory indicates. As man has found his Deity in woman, there is just a possibility that woman may find her Deity in man.

We come now to the questionWhat is gained by this new Supreme Being this substitution of Nature and Humanity for God in Christ?

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Have we secured a superior ideal? So far as Nature is concerned is this the case? Comte treats nature as the Chinese treat their idols-worshipping it one hour and maltreating it the next. Although in his earlier writings he expresses the utmost admiration for the order of nature, in his later writings this admiration is largely qualified, and nature is persistently depreciated. Pope laid a wager that there was no flattery so gross but that Sir Godfrey Kneller would swallow it. To prove it, the poet said to him as he was painting : 'Sir Godfrey, I believe if God Almighty had had your assistance the world would have been formed more perfect.' Replied Kneller, 'I believe

have expressed, in burning phrase, their vivid sense of her perfection and magnificence; but, Shades of Newton and Shakespeare and Milton ! Comte and his disciples find nature out as a 'blundering contrivance.' He constantly speaks of 'the profound imperfections of the Universal Order.' 'The Order of Nature is doubtless very imperfect in every respect.' (Vol. i., p. 37.) The increasing imperfection of the Economy of nature.' (Vol. i., p. 23.) 'It is essentially important in Biology to explain that the Order of Nature, imperfect everywhere, becomes more so as we pass to the more complicated phenomena. We shall thus be better prepared, morally and mentally, to deal rightly with the still greater and often irreparable defects which we find in the most complex Being of all.' (Vol. i., p. 534.) Even the laws of the Solar System are very far from perfect, notwithstanding their greater simplicity, which indeed makes their defects more perceptible.' (Vol. i., p. 23.)

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In the Positive Polity, Comte ridicules the Omnipotence which theology attributes to its Deity, and declares that such a perfection is manifestly impossible; and yet, in a conversation with Sir Erskine Perry, our philosopher regretted that Humanity is unfortunately not omnipotent, otherwise it might not only ameliorate the terrestrial régime, but also correct the Order of the Heavens. (Nineteenth Century, Nov., 1877.) According to Comte, nature is everywhere wrong, frightfully, irreparably wrong; yet our gratitude is due to the laws of nature, and we must reward her with our confidence and love! Without committing ourselves to this wild and impious philosophy, which speaks of the universe as a 'blundering contrivance,' we may allow with Professor Owen, The present is confessedly an "imperfect world"; i.e., we are able,

I would rather say "enabled," to conceive of a better.' (Fraser, October, 1867.)

'That type of Perfect in his mind In Nature man can nowhere find. He sows himself on every wind.' But if nature has these imperfections or limitations, can we yield her faith and reverence and love? We may indeed submit to nature, seeing we have no alternative: but to believe in an Order which is full of grave and increasing imperfection, according to Comte's showing, is a mean and servile idolatry. If we are so much better than our god in everything but power, let us not worship. the blind, blundering giant-that were the veriest devil-worship. And even if nature be far more perfect and glorious than Comte allows, which she most assuredly is,* yet we cannot implicitly trust and rationally worship her; we have the consciousness that there is a diviner element in us than there is in her, and that the imperfections or limitations by which she is characterized precludes her ever becoming the object of our confidence and hope. There is nothing in this visible creation as fair as our dream; as high as our aspiration; as perfect as our hope; and therefore we look above and beyond creation. There is in us an intelligence, a freedom, a grandeur that there is not in the physical universe, and therefore we cannot worship this universe. The superior cannot bow to the inferior, the greater cannot rest in the less, the more perfect cannot love and serve the painfully imperfect. M. Comte is right in recognizing the intrinsic superiority of man to nature, but having done this he must find us a Deity above nature. Christianity postulates a living, intelligent, wise and loving God; and so far sets before us a grander ideal of worship than the Positivism which demands our

confidence and affection for a lifeless and disordered universe.

So far as Humanity is concerned, is the ideal of worship presented by Positivism superior to that of Revelation? Comte maintains that human nature is terribly and hopelessly imperfect, and Humanity itself, idealized to the utmost, is still faulty and insecure. 'The great Organism, superior though it be to all beings known to us, is yet under the dominion of inscrutable laws, and is in no respect either absolutely perfect or absolutely secure from danger.' (Vol. i., p. 284.) Society, made up as it is of frail and faulty members, in its loftiest apotheosis is still below the God Who is Light, Who is Love, Who is Righteousness. Humanity, however sublimated and transfigured in the most free and brilliant imagination, is yet infinitely inferior to the glorious Being Who sits upon the throne, and Who has been made known to us in the Incarnation. There is a soul of truth in this doctrine of Humanity, but in Jesus Christ we have already the true anthropomorphism in Him alone is that ideal Humanity found which Comte seeks in vain elsewhere. After all eliminations and idealizations, Humanity is felt to be a defective thing but in the centre of the Christian Church stands the ideal Man, speaking with a wisdom which is never at fault, revealing a love which hesitated not at the costliest sacrifices, breathing a pity which melts the hardest hearts, shining in a beauty of holiness which has charmed unfriendliest eyes, creating, in successive generations, a new sense of the vast possibilities of human nature, and infusing a grace which transfigures the most fallen members of humanity into the fairest and noblest of her sons. We see Jesus...crowned with glory and honour'; and to substitute an idealization of sinful society for the sublime and spotless character of Christ, would be to substitute the red

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moon of the Apocalypse for a sun on whose disc is no stain and in whose light is no darkness at all. It would be an infatuation indeed to turn from that glorious historical Pattern, in Whom all the deepest aspirations of our nature are satisfied, to love and worship the stained phantom of M. Comte, which, like the ghost of Elsinore, comes in such a questionable shape.'

Does this new religion give us any larger freedom and joy in life? It is commonly supposed that such is the case, and Miss Martineau speaks with rapture of the hour in which she felt herself finally emancipated from the idea of God; she had a sense of infinite liberty and peace. But what in Comte's system replaces the God of Revelation? External, resistless fatalities. It is true that Comte speaks of 'modifiable fatalities,' but this is a simple contradiction, and a specimen of the general confusion which marks his treatment of this subject. The mirage in Mongolian deserts renders it almost impossible for the sportsman to use his rifle, for the game appears to float in the air, shifting and indefinite; some such mirage spreads over the pages of Comte, and the reader must often be doubtful as to the real nature and limits of his views. In one section of: his writings you have the most naked fatalism, and then again he urges the modificability of the external necessity' with such insistance that you might easily confound him with the champions of human freedom. The Oriental proverb runs: 'When the birds are taxed, the bat says, "I am a rat"; when the rats are taxed, the bat says, "I am a bird.”” One feels in studying Comte that he is perpetually playing off a similar tricknow he is a severe necessitarian, and anon, desirous to do honour to human nature, he asserts the sovereignty of man. He talks of society 'learning to admit no other Providence than its

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