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Accusations will be so general that they cannot be disproved. They will also be nurtured by rumor and slander. (d) Finally, this precrowd phase or period will be used o a subversive element or group to acquire and store weapons—guns, Molotov cocktails, explosives, and anything else they decide to use in the civil disturbance phase. This Jo. if they do not already have it, the acquisition of printing equipment and paper and the establishment of routes of escape for important subversive individuals. Meetings and rallies are also arranged to assist in the preconditioning of the target groups. Mr. McNAMARA. What are the characteristics, Mr. Jones, of the crowd phase in the development of a riot? Mr. JoNEs. This phase, of course, is indispensable. You cannot have a riot without a crowd that is turned into a mob which throws aside all restraint and engages in collective social violence. A crowd may assemble for any number of reasons. For example, a sporting event, a political rally, an automobile accident, a fire, or an arrest. Subversive elements bent on starting a riot may plan to take advantage of a crowd assembled under any of these circumstances, or they may themselves insure that a crowd will be present at a certain place and time by planning a meeting or rally that will attract people or by staging an incident in a certain area at a time when they know a crowd will immediately collect. Once the crowd is assembled, the subversives deploy their personnel in the crowd to agitate and excite it and to increase its hostility. Slogans will be shouted, rumors circulated, speeches made, all of which are designed to arouse the emotions of the crowd and thus direct it to acts of violence. The most vulnerable crowd, of course, is one which through the processes I have o mentioned has been preconditioned to react emotionally to certain slogans, phrases, and accusations. Mr. McNAMARA. What are the characteristics, Mr. Jones, of the civil disturbance or actual riot phase? Mr. JoNEs. Briefly, this is the period when the crowd, agitated and highly excited over some issue, has been turned into a mob which through a kind of emotional contagion engages in large-scale, collective social violence. Again, if there is no subversive element involved, analysis may reveal that this collective violence developed more or less spontaneously or naturally. No evidence, usually, can be found of any individual or group intent to spark the violence. The picture is different, however, if there has been subversive manipulation. Analysis will usually reveal deliberate effort to incite the mob to violence by the chanting of slogans or songs, by exhortations to violent acts, and other devices which raise the emotional excitement of the mob to the point of violence. A booster incident will be initiated—rocks will be thrown, windows broken, a fire or fight started. There may also be sniping or looting. A martyr will be exploited or perhaps even created—someone who has been arrested, wounded, or killed by the riot-control forces or intentionally injured or killed by the subversives. When a riot is subversively manipulated there is often evidence of deliberate attempts to block the effectiveness of the police or other riot-control forces in order to impair their ability to end the violence. Mr. McNAMARA. May I ask this question, Mr. Jones? Have you also found it to be a characteristic of this phase that sometimes the subversive elements will utilize guards of strong-arm men to protect certain of the leaders in triggering these acts of violence? Mr. JoSEs. Yes. There is evidence that there is a formal organization that attempts to protect the very important subversive manipulators in order to preclude their being arrested. Mr. McNAMARA. What about the post-civil disturbance phase? Mr. Jon Es. Briefly, this is the period when the violence is ended and social order has been restored. . . If there has been no subversive manipulation, this period is usually characterized by the contending groups' or elements' efforts to avoid further violence. There is a reaction against the damage, destruction, injury, and so forth, that has taken place. A certain sense of shame and realization that things have gone too far. . . Once more the picture is very different if subversives are involved. Evidence will be found of deliberate efforts to inflame further violence. Propaganda and agitation will be continued in an effort to keep the issue which sparked the violence alive. There will be a campaign to exploit the riot through leaflets, rallies, rumors, martyrs, and so forth. emands which the Government cannot possibly meet will be made. The unwarranted ouster of a certain official will be called for. The intent of the subversive is to make the Government appear uncompromising and thereby undermine the confidence and respect of the target groups in the power structure. The intent is to maintain the interest and emotional excitement of the community, to prevent the calming of emotions and the elimination of resentment. Mr. McNAMARA. Your studies, Mr. Jones, have also involved the question of countermeasures to the rioting. What have they indicated on this subject? Mr. JoNEs. Let us keep in mind that community conflicts which become riotous involve a struggle for favorable public opinion between dissidents and the civil police and other internal security forces. Action of internal security forces must be based upon this fact. The basic objective of internal security forces is to restore order, the corollary is to reestablish respect for law and order and public safety. Some of the things that the internal security forces must consider are the nature of the crowd and the emotional factors involved. One of the techniques of controlling crowds is very solidly based upon the specific panic response which is expressed by individuals in the desire to escape or take flight from an immediate threatening area. Chemical munitions or streams of water develop this response; they cause people who are acting in concert in a mob to immediately start to thinking about themselves as individuals again, about their own protection. The use of force, and the alternatives to the use of force, present one of the most difficult problems faced by riot-control forces. I think it is indicated that force is probably more properly used against a spontaneous and unorganized crowd. Force has not historically been so effective against groups that had formal leadership, that is, who have leaders that have psychological control of the members of the crowd. Subversives attempt to capitalize on the police use of force in order to further alienate dissident segments of the population. Yet we find that the show of force is certainly essential and, in addition to the show of force, the force of the state sometimes has to be used and there has to be a willingness to commit this force of the state under the appropriate circumstances. In controlling crowds and mobs, internal security forces are cautioned to avoid emotional involvement by being overly identified with dissident segments of the community. This identification, or lack of identification, usually results in overreaction against crowds with whom, for example, the majority of the civil police force does not identify. It usually results in underreaction against crowds composed of segments of the community with which they overidentify. But more dangerous than anything, it causes vacillation before action is taken. The use of the military in the control of crowds and riots does have Some value. Usually military units are highly trained and highly respected. They are outsiders who are not emotionally involved in the community conflict and once the riot is ended they usually leave the community. And if any hostility has been generated against them it usually dissipates. Mr. McNAMARA. Do your studies also indicate, Mr. Jones, that there are various countermeasures that are particularly adapted to the different phases of rioting, the precrowd phase, crowd phase, and so on ? Mr. JoxEs. Yes. Mr. MCNAMARA. What are the countermeasures that you would suggest, based on your studies, for the precrowd phase? Mr. Jon Es. I feel that a vital countermeasure here is the creation and use of an intelligence information collection system. Now I would like to point out that combating subversive manipulation of civil disturbances requires the collection of political intelligence. This is a function which must be performed regardless of what it is called. Among actions that can be taken in the precrowd phase is maintenance of contact with dissident groups. This allows for the surveillance of not only these groups, but also of subversive elements. It allows for the surveillance of known troublemakers likely to join in disturbances. One of the other countermeasures that can be taken during this time is to give people information to counter the subversives' preconditioning propaganda and agitation. People apparently have a psychological need to be informed during a time of crisis. I feel that the internal security forces can demonstrate the readiness to use force. Sometimes this is enough. It apparently aids in building public respect if the show of force is efficient and immartial. Another technique that can be used is the infiltration of subversive groups. Now in terms of organizing and planning countermeasures, training internal security forces personnel and making prearrangements for mutual assistance with other internal security forces are important. Mr. McNAMARA. During this period, Mr. Jones, are there definite clues to the plotting of a riot? Mr. JoNEs. Yes. Mr. McNAM \R.A. What are they Mr. Jon Es. Some of them are the observation of known subversives moving into an area, the discovery of arms caches, the circulation of propaganda, attempts to hire demonstrators, attempts to train and orient agitators, arrangements for safe houses and escape routes, an increase in hostility toward the police, infiltration of known subversives into nonsubversive groups. Mr. McNAMARA. What countermeasures would you suggest based on your studies during the crowd phase? Mr. Jon Es. This is a very important time. If countermeasures fail during this phase, a riot will ensue. If countermeasures are successful, there will be no riot. One of the basic objectives is either to disperse the crowd or to bring the crowd under control, to maintain contact sh the leaders, and possibly to give the dissidents some sort of outet. For example, let them state their grievances, try to use the leaders in order to control the crowd. Another countermeasure that can be taken during this specific time is to prepare and station riot-control forces to handle any situation, to utilize a clear show of force, to arrest agitators if there are legal grounds, and to identify the riot leaders and to remove them if possible. Mr. McNAMARA. What about the actual riot or civil disturbance phase ? Mr. JoSEs. Once this particular phase is started, it is very difficult to avoid the use of the force of the state. This force is sometimes applied through batons, riot-control formations, police dogs, and chemical munitions. The procedure of the United States Army is to first use a show of force; then to use riot-control formation; then to consider the use of streams of water; then the use of chemical agents; then fire by selected marksmen; and finally, under very extreme conditions, full fire power. Firmness is very essential. Looters, as has been shown, are normally stopped by the threat of injury or arrest if these measures are taken before the looting becomes widespread. Mr. McNAMARA. What countermeasures would you suggest for the postdisturbance period? Mr. Jon Es. The danger here is the spread or the revival of violence. This danger is much greater when there is subversive manipulation. Again intelligence is important to identify the subversive agitators. Another very important thing is for the authorities involved to listen to the complaints of members of dissident groups whether they feel these complaints are based on factor fiction. The judicious use of prohibitions is apparently very important. It is important to get information to the public to undercut the lies, half-truths, and rumors of subversives. This can be done through the use of the press, the radio, television, and statements by officials. Measures can be taken to calm and to relieve tensions and emotions. Riot-control forces in this particular phase are cautioned to avoid commitments that can't be lived up to. An example would be the imposition of a curfew in an area so o that the available riot-control forces could not enforce that curfew. Another possible technique here is to arrange meetings, set up committees to talk over the particular problems involved in the social situation that led to the riot. Effective countermeasures are almost wholly dependent upon intelligence. In other words, the riot-control forces must know what subversives are doing. Only then can effective countermeasures be planned. Mr. McNAMARA. Do your studies indicate, Mr. Jones, that a riot can be predicted? Mr. Jon Es. There are indications that this must be done in terms of probability, and not in terms of will or will not happen. Much of what passes for prediction is actually “postdiction” or after the fact. It involves what I have previously identified as validation by selected example, and in this sense it is very unsystematic. Mr. McNAMARA. What element in a community plays a major role in determining the outcome of a riot? Mr. Jon Es. I think that in determining the outcome of a community conflict that involves riotous social violence that what we call the audience or the uncommitted members of the community play a very vital and significant role. Sometimes it is very difficult to get these uncommitted members involved in the conflict on one side or the other. Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. Jones, current investigation and research of the committee indicate that there are some groups in the United States today which are actually advocating guerrilla warfare and insurgency in this country. I believe your study of riots was related largely to their relationship to insurgency and guerrilla warfare in other countries of the world. Based on your broad study of this subject, what relationship do you see between subversively manipulated riots and insurgency or guerrilla warfare? Mr. JoSEs. Based upon the research I have been engaged in, I feel that subversively manipulated riots are definitely a part of the political weapon system of the international Communist movement. Other elements of this political weapons system are assassination, sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. Mr. McNAMARA. May I ask this question, Mr. Jones, again based on your studies: Do you think there is a tremendous problem or a very difficult problem for a subversive element—granted that certain underlying factors that you have described exist in that community—to launch or trigger a riot? Mr. Jon Es. No, I do not. I feel that the possibilities of manipulation of riots apparently haven’t been exploited to the extent that my research indicates they can be exploited. Mr. McNAMARA. Would you say that with fairly good knowledge of mob psychology, group behavior, and sociology, a group or element, if it so desired, could emotionally work up a community to a point— through the processes you mentioned before—of psychological conditioning, propaganda, and agitation, to bring members of a community to a point where even though they were not initially on the spot, shall I say, a riot could be triggered by some precipitating incident such as arrest by a policeman : Mr. Jos Es. Yes: I would say that is certainly possible if one were careful in identifying the community concerned to make sure that some very deep social, racial, or political cleavages existed. I would say, however, in my opinion if a subversive individual wanted to make sure that the riot ensued, he would not leave anything to chance. He would not depend on a spontaneous incident. He would attempt to create this incident himself. Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, that concludes the staff interrogation of Mr. Jones.