The assertion of duty or obligation is one of those assertions of which men like to soften the expression: should, ought.

So is the expression of power, as denoted by may or can— might, could.

Very often when we say you should (or ought to) do this, we leave to be added by implication-but you do not.

Very often when we say I could (or might) do this, we leave to be added by implication-but I do not exert my

power.

Now, what is left undone by the present element in this assertion, viz. the duty to do it, or the power of doing it, constitutes a past element in it; since the power (or duty) is, in relation to the performance, a cause-insufficient, indeed, but still antecedent. This hypothesis is suggested, rather than asserted.

By substituting the words I am bound, for I ought, we may see the expedients to which this present use of the præterite forces us.

I am bound to do this now I owe to do this now. However, we do not say owe, but ought.

Hence, when we wish to say I was bound to do this two years ago, we cannot say I ought (owed) to do this, &c., since ought is already used in a present sense.

We therefore say, instead, I ought to have done this two years ago; which has a similar, but by no means an identical meaning.

I was bound to pay two years ago, means two years ago I was under an obligation to make a payment, either then or at some future time.

I was bound to have paid, &c., means I was under an obligation to have made a payment.

If we use the word ought, this difference cannot be expressed.

Common people sometimes say, you had not ought to do so and so; and they have a reason for saying it.

The Latin language is more logical. It says not debet factum fuisse, but debuit fieri.

CHAPTER XXIV.

SHALL AND WILL.

§ 520. THE niceties connected with the use of these two words are well known. They are sufficiently numerous and complicated to demand a special notice.

1. The first point to bear in mind is the fact, that although such phrases as I shall speak, and I will speak, are called future tenses, they are, in reality, no such thing. They are combinations of a present tense and an infinitive mood-speak being the infinitive mood, and shall and will the present tenses of should and would. The act that is to be done is future. The state of things on the part of the person who is to do it is present.

2. The next point is one of less importance in the way of Syntax, than it has been in the way of Etymology; being also, a point which has already been elucidated. It is the difference between the two words will and shall as present tenses. The former is a present tense, absolutely and completely, having always been one. The latter was originally a perfect, and is what we have called a præterite-present, or (changing the prefix) a perfect-present.

For the chief purposes, however, of the present chapter (i. e. for the chief purposes of Syntax), they are both equally present. Nevertheless, the original difference requires remembering.

3. The construction of the two words in their relations to the infinitive which follows them is the same, being also the same as those of the words can, may, must, and a few others. are never found except in connection with other verbs. whilst we say.

They Hence,

4. This creates difficulties when we come to the important investigation of their meaning as separate and independent words.

§ 521. The difficulties, however, are fewer with will than they are with shall.

a. Will.-Two facts help us here. combination of sounds in the word will

We have the same
volition.
We may

say, indeed, that we have the same word; the same word used both as a substantive and as a verb.-He has so strong a will that whatsoever he wills he will do.

The classical languages give us the roots vol (in vol-o) and Boud (búl) in Bovλ-ouai (búlomai). Hence, whatever may be the case with shall, its fellow-word will denotes not only the fact that something is predicted to take place, but that the cause by which it will be brought about is an act of volition on the part of the agent who effects it; such an agent being itself the originator of the action rather than the mere instrument through which certain external influences operate.

b. Shall. Our aids here are inconsiderable. All that either comparative philology, or the search for collateral meanings leads to, as a certainty, is an approximate reconstruction of the original form. And here, without going beyond the pale of

* Not, at least, in the senses we say, He will be burnt.

the German family of languages, we learn that the older form was skal-the present h representing, and having grown out of an original k. That the vowel of the original present was i is not so certain. Probably, however, it was so.

Let us deal with the word as if this were certain; the primitive form being skil-. Now

Let its opposition, or contrast, to will lead us towards an inkling of its meaning. If will mean agency determined by the volition of the agent, skil may mean agency determined by causes acting from without upon and through the agent; the agent who may more properly be considered as an instrument.

Let us say that will means having the intention to do so and so, whilst shall means being in the condition to do so and so.

Can we go further? I think we can. The only certainty that comparative philology gives us in the case of shall is the consonant k as the second letter of the root (skal for shall).

But it is highly probable that the substantive skill is as truly a derivative from the same root as shall, as will = volo, is the same word as will in I will speak = loquar.

Now, such expressions as the condition to do so and so, and the bias to do so and so, are by no means widely separated in meaning, inasmuch as the term bias implies external influence rather than internal resolve. These bring us to the participle determined, a word which, at first, suggests ideas akin to will rather than to shall. At first, I say it does this, because when we use such a phrase as a determined fellow, we raise the idea of a man of a strong will-of a wilful man who will have his own way, or, at least, of a man not easily diverted from his purpose by external accidents. On the other hand, however, the connection between bias and determination is close. Often as we use the word determined to express the moral quality of strongwilled, we fully as often use it to denote the effect of external agencies. We do this (for instance) when we talk of the conduct of a weak man being determined by circumstances.

The ideas of determination and decision are visibly allied to each other. A decided man is (in the first instance) one whom

events have brought to a decision, just as a determined man is one whom events have brought to a determination. To keep in this state shows firmness of character, and hence the ordinary power of the word—

Decide, distinguish, differ.-I submit that the sequence of ideas here is transparently clear.

Now sk-l differ, distinguish, separate. It is the Norse word skilja so translated. It is also the English word in the phrase what skills it? = what difference does it make?

Let shall be called the predictive, whilst will is the promissive, future.

The former simply states that a thing which has not yet happened, will happen hereafter; the forces that are to bring it about being indefinite.

The latter states not only that a thing which has not yet happened will happen hereafter, but also implies a certain amount of definitude in respect to the forces which will effect it. They are, by no means, forces brought from the whole universe of possibilities indefinitely, but forces of a specific character. They are engendered in the moral constitution (real or supposed) of the agent-real, when the agent is an actual rational being, supposed, when, without being actually rational, it has a certain amount of rationality attributed to it, in the way of personification on the part of the speaker, either conscious or unconscious.

This is what the two words denote. Prediction is the genus, promise the species. All future things may be predicted; a portion of them only can be promised.

Promise implies a promiser, and a promise is a prediction fulfilling its own accomplishment. Will (volition) is an element in all such ideas.

I do not say that these two words are the best that can be applied. I only add that they are words already used; and that by Wallis, as will soon be seen.

Such are the preliminaries. What is their application?

The ordinary rule of the language of South (though not of North) Britain, the ordinary rule of the English (though not of the Scotch) is as follows: