unfpeakable and eternal happiness is better than extreme and endless mifery. So that, if the arguments for and against a God were equal, and it were an even question, Whether there were one or not? yet the hazard and danger is fo infinitely unequal, that, in point of prudence and intereft, every man were obliged to incline to the affirmative; and, whatever doubts he might have about it, to chufe the fafelt fide of the queftion, and to make that the principle to live by. For he that acts wifely, and is a thoroughly prudent man will be provided against all events, and will take care to fecure the main chance, whatever happens. But the Atheist, in cafe things fhould fall out contrary to his belief and expectation, hath made no provifion for this cafe. If, contrary to his confidence, it fhould prove in the iffue, that there is a God, the man is loft and undone for ever. If the Atheist, when he dies, fhould. find that his foul remains after his body, and has only quitted its lodging, how will this man be amazed and blanked, when, contrary to his expectation, he thall find himself in a new and strange place, amidst a world of fpirits, entered upon an everlasting and unchangeable: ftate? How fadly will the man be disappointed, when he finds all things otherwife than he had stated and de-termined them in this world? When he comes to ap. pear before that God whom he hath denied, and a-gainst whom he hath spoken as defpiteful things as he could, who can imagine the pale and guilty looks of this man, and how he will fhiver and tremble for the fear of the Lord, and for the glory of his majesty ? How will he be furprised with terrors on every fide, to find himself thus unexpectedly and irrecoverably plunged into a state of ruin and defperation! And thus things may happen for all this man's confidence now. For our belief or disbelief of a thing does not alter the nature of the thing. We cannot fancy things into being, or make them vanith into nothing, by the ftubborn confidence of our imaginations. Things are as fullen as we are, and will be what they are, whatever we think. of them. And if there be a God, a man cannot, by an obftinate disbelief of him, make him ceafe to be, any more than a man can put out the fun by winking.

And thus I have, as briefly and clearly as I could, endeavoured

D. 3.

deavoured to fhew the ignorance and folly of fpeculative Atheism in denying the exiftence of God. And now it will be lefs needful to speak of the other two principles of religion, the immortality of the foul, and future rewards. For no man can have any reasonable fcruple about those who believe that there is a God; becaufe no man that owns the existence of an infinite fpirit, can doubt of the poffibility of a finite fpirit; that is, fuch a thing as is immaterial, and does not contain any principle of corruption in itself. And there is no man that believes the goodness of God, but must be inclined to think, that he hath made fome things for as long a duration as they are capable of. Nor can any man, that acknowledgeth the holy and juft providence of God; and that he loves righteoufnefs, and hates iniquity, and that he is a magiftrate and governor of the world, and confequently concerned to countenance the obedience, and to punish the violation of his laws; and that does withal confider the promifcuous difpenfations many times of God's providence in this world: I fay, no man that acknowledges all this, can think it unreafonable to conclude, that after this life good men fhall be rewarded, and finners punished. I have done with the first fort of irreligious perfons, the fpeculative Atheift. I fhall fpeak but briefly of the other.

:

Secondly, The practical Atheist, who is wicked and irreligious, notwithstanding he does in fome fort believe that there is a God, and a future ftate, he is likewife guilty of prodigious folly. The principle of the fpeculative Atheist argues more ignorance, but the practica of the other argues greater folly. Not to believe a God, and another life, for which there is so much evidence of reafon, is great ignorance and folly but it is the higheft madness, when a man does believe these things, to live as if he did not believe them; when a man does not doubt but that there is a God, and that, according as he demeans himfelf towards him, he will make him happy or miferable for ever, yet to live as if he were certain of the contrary, and as no man in reason can live, but he that is well affured that there is no God. It was a fhrewd faying of the old monk, That two kind of prifons would ferve for all offenders in the world; an inquifition, and a bedlam: if any man fhould deny

the

the being of a God, and the immortality of the foul, fuch a one fhould be put into the first of these, the inquifition, as being a defperate heretic; but if any man fhould profefs to believe these things, and yet allow himself in any known wickedness, fuch a one fhould be put into bedlam; because there cannot be a greater folly and madness, than for a man, in matters of greateft moment and concernment, to act against his best reafon and understanding, and by his life to contradict his belief. Such a man does perish with his eyes open, and knowingly undoes himself: he runs upon the greatest dangers which he clearly fees to be before him, and precipitates himself into those evils which he profefles to believe to be real and intolerable; and wilfully neglects the obtaining of that unfpeakable good and happiness which he is perfuaded is certain and attainable. Thus, much for the fecond way of confirmation.

Thirdly, The third way of confirmation fhall be, by endeavouring to vindicate religion from thofe common imputations which feem to charge it with ignorance or imprudence. And they are chiefly thefe three..

1. Credulity.

2. Singularity.

3. Making a foolish bargain.

I. Credulity. Say they, The foundation of religion is the belief of those things for which we have no fufficient reason, and confequently of which we can have no good affurance; as, the belief of a God, and of a future ftate after this life; things which we never faw, nor did experience, nor ever spoke with any body that did. Now, it feems to argue too great a forwardness and ea finefs of belief, to affent to any thing upon infufficient grounds.

To this I anfwer,

1. That if there be fuch a being as a God, and fuch a thing as a future ftate after this life, it cannot, as I faid before, in reafon be expected, that we should have the evidence of fenfe for fuch things: for he that believes a God, believes fuch a being as hath all perfections; among which this is one, that he is a fpirit, and, confequently, that he is invisible, and cannot be feen. He likewife that believes another life after this, profeffeth to believe a ftate of which in this life we have no

trial and experience. Befides, if this were a good objection, That no man ever saw these things, it trikes at the Atheist as well as us: for no man ever faw the world to be from eternity; nor Epicurus his atoms, of which notwithstanding he believes the world was made. 2. We have the best evidence for these things which they are capable of at prefent, fuppofing they were.

3. Those who deny thefe principles must be much more credulous; that is, believe things upon incomparable lefs evidence of reafon. The Atheist looks upon all that are religious as a company of credulous fools: but he, for his part, pretends to be wifer than to believe any thing for company; he cannot entertain things up. on thofe flight grounds which move other men; if you would win his affent to any thing, you must give him a. clear demonftration for it. Now, there is no way to deal with this man of reason, this rigid exacter of strict. demonftration for things which are not capable of it, but by fhewing him, that he is an hundred times more credulous, that he begs more principles, takes more things for granted, without offering to prove them, and affents to more strange conclufions, upon weaker grounds than those whom he fo much accufeth of credulity.

And, to evidence this, I fhall briefly give you an account of the Atheist's creed, and prefent you with a ca talogue of the fundamental articles of his faith. He believes that there is no God, nor poffibly can be; and, confequently, that the wife, as well as the unwife, of all ages, have been mistaken, except himself, and a few more. He believes, that either all the world have been frighted with an apparition of their own fancy, or that they have most unnaturally confpired together to cozen. themfelves; or that this notion of God is a trick of policy, though the greatest princes and politicians do not at this day know fo much, nor have done time out of mind. He believes, either that the heavens, and the earth, and all things in them, had no original cause of their being, or elfe that they were made by chance, and happened, he knows not how, to be as they are; and that in this laft fhuffling of matter, all things have, by great good fortune, fallen out as happily and as regularly as if the greatest wisdom had contrived them;. but yet he is refolved to believe, that there was no wif

dom

He believes, that

dom in the contrivance of them. matter of itself is utterly void of all fenfe, understanding, and liberty; but for all that he is of opinion, that the parts of matter may now and then happen to be fo conveniently difpofed, as to have all thefe qualities, and moft dexterously to perform all thefe fine and free operations which the ignorant attribute to spirits.

This is the fum of his belief. And it is a wonder, that there fhould be found any perfon pretending to reason or wit that can affent to fuch a heap of abfurdities; which are fo grofs and palpable, that they may be felt. So that if every man had his due, it will certainly fall to the Atheist's fhare to be the most credulous perfon; that is, to believe things upon the flighteft reafons: for he does not pretend to prove any thing of all this; only he finds himself, he knows not why, inclined to believe fo, and to laugh at those that do not. II. The fecond imputation is, fingularity; the affec tation whereof is unbecoming a wife man.

To this charge I anfwer,

1. If by religion be meant the belief of the principles of religion, That there is a God, and a providence; that our fouls are immortal; and that there are rewards to be expected after this life: these are so far from being fingular opinions, that they are and always have been the general opinion of mankind, even in the moft barbarous nations; infomuch that the histories of ancient times do hardly furnifh us with the names of above five or fix perfons who denied a God. And Lucretius acknowledgeth that Epicurus was the firft who did oppofe thofe great foundations of religion, the providence of God, and the immortality of the foul: Primum Grajus bomo, &c. meaning Epicurus.

2. If by religion be meant a living up to those principles, that is, to act conformably to our beft reafon and understanding, and to live as it does become those who do believe a God and a future ftate; this is acknowledged, even by those who live otherwise, to be the part of every wife man, and the contrary to be the very madnefs of folly, and height of diftraction; nothing being more ordinary than for men who live wickedly to ac knowledge that they ought to do otherwise.

3. Though, according to the common courfe and practice