SERMON CXLIII. THE ORDINARY MEANS OF GRACE.-THE OBJECTIONS TO PRAYER CONSIDERED. JOB XII. 15.-What is the Almighty, that we should serve him; and what profit shall we have, if we pray unto him? THE five first subjects, originally proposed as themes of discourse concerning the duty of prayer, have been examined at length in the four preceding Sermons. The sixth, viz. Objections against this duty, will now occupy our attention. In the Text, a general objection is made against all obedience to God; and is professedly founded on his character. What is the Almighty, that we should serve him? There is nothing in the character of God, nor in our relation to him, which requires our obedience to his will. We are neither obliged by any duty, nor drawn by any interest, to his service. This impious sentiment is exhibited in the context as the sentiment of abandoned men only; and is plainly of a nature too impious to be uttered by any other. The following one, proceeding from the same mouth also, is with perfect propriety exhibited to us as resulting from the same spirit. Yet there are multitudes, who are far from deserving the character of profligacy, who yet say concerning God, What profit shall we have, if we pray to him? This objection, it will be observed, is an universal one. What profit shall we have? that is, we shall not be profited at all, either in our minds, or in our circumstances. We shall not be profited by the proper influence of prayer on ourselves, nor by its efficacy in procuring blessings from God. All objections against prayer may be justly regarded as being summed up in this single question. It cannot, however, be expected, that on this occasion every objection, which an irreligious mind can devise against this duty, will be taken up, and refuted. Several such objections have been anticipated in the preceding discourses. Of such as remain, I shall examine those only, which may be supposed to have some real weight in the mind of a sober man. These, so far as I recollect them, respect the Predetermination, Wisdom, of God; and, The supposed Vanity, and Presumption, of prayer. I shall consider them in their order. The two first of these subjects are commonly united in the scheme of the objector: and may, therefore, with propriety, be here considered together. If God be a changeable being; although he may have predetermined all things, yet he may be supposed to alter his plans in consequence of requests, presented to him by his Intelligent creatures; and may, therefore, be addressed as a changeable being. On the other hand, if God be immutable, and yet have formed no system of things in his own mind; he may, perhaps, constitute his designs, from time to time, with some degree of conformity to their supplications. The first objection, which I shall mention, and which is derived from these sources, is usually stated in terms like the following. "Prayer is fruitless, or in the language of the Text, unprofitable, because all things are determined from everlasting by an immutable God, and will, therefore, take place according to his determination. Hence our prayers, making no alteration in any thing, must be an idle, perhaps an impious, service: idle, because they can effect nothing; impious, because they are expressions of our desires for blessings, which God has not chosen to give. If God has determined to give us these blessings; we shall receive them without prayer. If he has determined not to give them, we shall not receive them, however fervently we may pray. So far, then, as we pray for things, which God has determined to give, our prayers are useless. So far as we pray for those, which he has determined not to give, our prayers are directly opposed to his pleasure." I have endeavoured to state this objection at full length, because I wish to present it with all the force, which it has, or can have, in the mind of the objector. To the several things, contained in it, I answer, 1. There cannot possibly be any impiety in prayer, offered up in the manner stated in these discourses. The original definition, which I gave of prayer, and with which all the subsequent accounts of it have accorded, is that of the Westminster Assembly of Divines: That prayer is an offering up of our desires to God for things agreeable to his will. To desire that, and that only, which is agreeable to the will of God, cannot be impious. Evangelical prayer supposes in its very nature, that we ask either for those things for which the Scriptures have expressly permitted us to pray; or for those which we professedly submit to his will in our petitions. In this conduct, impiety cannot exist. On the contrary, no human being was ever the subject of piety, who did not pursue this conduct. The objection is now reduced to a single article; viz. The fruitlessness of prayer; or its inefficacy to change the purposes of God, and therefore to procure blessings. To this I answer, 2. This objection lies, with exactly the same force, against every other human effort, as against prayer. If the predetermination and immutability of God render it improper for men to pray, because their prayers cannot change his purposes; then the same things must render it equally improper for men to plough, sow, reap, or make any other effort for any end whatever. All these, without the divine blessing, will be in vain; and can no more change the purpose of God, than prayer. With just the same propriety and force, may the farmer say, "It is in vain for me to plough, or sow, or reap: since, if God has determined to give me a crop, I shall have it without either of these efforts. On the contrary, if he has determined not to give me a crop; I shall not have it, however faithfully I may labour. My ploughing, sowing, and reaping, therefore, must be all idle, because they will all be fruitless." In the same manner may the Student say, " If God has determined that I should possess learning, I shall possess it without study: but if he has determined that I shall not possess learning, I shall not acquire it, although I study with ever so much diligence." In the same manner, may every man say concerning his exertions. This reasoning, were we governed by it, would plainly put an end to all human exertions at once; and we should neither plough, nor build, nor collect food, or fuel; nor teach, nor study, nor make any other attempt to promote the good, either of ourselves or others. Conclusions, so evidently false as these, and so fraught with necessary mischief, cannot flow from sound principles. Safely, therefore, may we pronounce the proofs, by which they are professedly established, to be hollow and deceitful. 3. There is a radical, and gross, error in this objection; viz. that God has predetermined the end, and not the means. The means, This opinion is equally contradictory to the Scriptures, and to common sense. St. Paul, a little before his shipwreck, was informed by an Angel, that God had given him all them, that sailed with him. Yet afterwards, when the shipmen were about to flee out of the ship; when they had let down the boat into the sea; Paul said to the centurion, and the soldiers, except these abide in the ship ye cannot be saved. Acts xxvij. 22, 30, 31. The end here determined, was the preservation of the ship's company. indispensable to this end, were the continuance of the seamen in the ship, and their exertions to bring it to land. These were predetermined equally with the end; and were absolutely necessary to its existence. Equally necessary are ploughing and sowing, rain and sunshine, to the existence of a crop; studying, to the acquisition of knowledge; and all other efforts of men, to the purposes, which they actually accomplish. All these are equally predetermined with the ends accomplished; and equally parts of the divine system. Another error is involved, also, in the same objection; viz. that God bestows blessings upon mankind, which are not given in answer to prayer. Of such a determination there is not, and there cannot, be any evidence. The Scriptures decisively teach us, that the only condition of receiving is asking. Prayer, therefore, as means to the end, that is, the reception of blessings, is itself a part, and an inseparable part, of the predetermined plan of God. When any man considers how useful prayer is to form us into a fitness for the reception of blessings; he will easily discern one great and solid reason of this divine constitution of things. There is no moral subject, concerning which mankind appear to have fallen into more, and greater, errors, than concerning this. The character of God, with respect to both these subjects, is undoubtedly far removed, in many particulars, above our comprehension. In several others, it seems to be capable of a satisfactory illustration to a sober mind, not unwilling to be satisfied. Nothing is more certain, than that, if God ever was, is, or will be, the subject of any determinations, he must have formed them from eternity. In him there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning. Of course, he can never be the subject of any new determinations. He can have no new ideas, thoughts, or views. All his works were known to him from the beginning. This is certain even to Reason; for all his works were contrived by him, and therefore were unquestionably known. Hence, no being, and no event, can be any thing, but what he contrived, and knew. As he is perfectly the same; as the being, and the event, in each case is, also, invariably the same, as when originally contemplated by him; whatever choice, or preference, he originally experienced, must for ever be his invariable choice, or preference. If, therefore, he did not originally determine, choose, or prefer, he certainly never will. Further; The existence of God is one unvarying present existence; and his duration an eternal Now, without past, or future; nearer in its nature to one indivisible moment of our existence, than to any thing else, which we experience, or know. He literally inhabits eternity, or fills it all at once; just as he fills immensity at once, and not, successively, its several parts. When, therefore, we say, that God predetermined all things, it is as true, in the metaphysical sense, that he determines them after, as before, their existence. In strict truth, there is no proper comparison between our successive being, and the unchanging existence of God. One thing only is present to us at any present time. Every thing, and every time, is absolutely present to God. His creaation and providence, together with all their beings and events, are always before his view, as a picture containing many images is present before ours. VOL. IV. 18 Every part of God's predetermination is founded on exactly the same reason with those, on which the same determination would be founded, if all beings and events had already existed; and God, in the possession of the same omniscience, should then survey them with a perfect discernment of their natures and relations, form his own determinations concerning them, and pronounce, with respect to every one, his unerring judgment. Of course, his predeterminations are exactly the same with such determinations, as would exist in his mind, after every thing had taken place; and are all exactly just, and right; such as perfect wisdom and goodness, understanding them entirely, would dictate, and approve. Nor is the immutability of God at all more liable to objections. God from everlasting was exactly what all beings ought to wish him to be; possessed of every excellence in an infinite degree, and the subject of no imperfection either natural or moral. He knows, and ever knew, all things, both actual and possible. He can do all things; and is infinitely disposed to do every thing, and that only, which is absolutely right and good. Consequently there is nothing, there never has been, there never will be, any thing, which, considered merely as a work of God, is not exactly right. In that vast kingdom, which fills immensity and eternity, there will never exist a single being, or event, which perfect wisdom and goodness could wish not to have existed. Who can rationally desire a change in such a character as this? What would the change be? A change from perfection to imperfection; from knowledge to ignorance; from truth to falsehood; from justice to injustice; from kindness to cruelty; from universal excellence to universal turpitude. Perfection can be changed into nothing but imperfection. The immutability of God is indispensable to the glory of his character; and is itself a part of his perfection: for no mutable being can be perfect in the same sense with one who is immutable. Equally is it the corner-stone, on which the universe rests. Were this support taken away, the immense fabric would tumble into ruin. To his creatures there would be neither safety, nor hope: but immensity, and eternity, would be filled with suspense, terror, and anguish. Particularly, there would not, in this case, be the least foundation for encouragement in prayer. If all the determinations of God were not settled in heaven; who could divine what new decisions would exist? what new laws? what new systems of administration? Prayer, commanded to-day, might be forbidden to-morrow. Prayer, acceptable to him to-day, might be hateful to him to-morrow. The things, for which we now ask with certain assurance of being heard, might speedily be denied. He, who at one season did his duty, might, at another, by the very same conduct, be only exposed to punishment. Nothing in this case, could be known by creatures to be permanently agreeable to his will, and finally secure of a reward. The government of the universe |