he would not have promised, and in due time given up, his beloved Son to die for them. The atonement, therefore is the effect and not the cause of Divine compassion towards sinners: God ever has been as compassionate as he now is; and would have been so, had he not designed to make an atonement. The obstacles, which opposed their pardon, without an atonement, were of a nature very different from all this: they were such as respected the law, the kingdom, and the character of God. As Mr. B. has stated them, they are these : "1st. If God had pardoned sinners without an atonement," he would have been unjust to his holy law." For, as the law was perfectly just and good in itself, and as it condemned the sinner to eternal mis ery; so its penalty must be executed or its honor must be given up. And to give up the penalty of a just and good law, it is to do injustice to that law: it is treating it, as a just being would treat an unjust law it would be saying, the law is not just, and its penalty ought not to be executed, even on transgressors. : Besides, if God pardoned sinners without an atonement, he would give up the authority of his law. Remove its penalty, and it ceases to be a law it loses all its authority over the disobedient. So that an atonement was necessary, that sinners might be pardoned, and the justice of the law be maintained. "2d. If God had pardoned sinners without an atonement, he must have been unjust to his kingdom." The kingdom of God, is composed of moral beings, who are governed by law, and not by mechanical influence. And as the law itself is just and good, and is therefore fit to be obeyed, if God does not enforce obedience, or does not punish the disobedient, he must be unjust to his moral kingdom. If one transgressor is pardoned without an atonement, others may be. it will thus become impossible to deter them from disobedience, or to secure the interests of the kingdom. But, to give the au- . thor's views on this subject more clearly, we will state his last obstacle more at large. "3d. If God had pardoned sin ners, without any atonement, he would have been unjust to himself. A "Every good being, in order to do justice to his own character, must manifest his goodness. wise being, in order to do justice to his character, must manifest his wisdom; or, at least, he must not manifest any thing, which is opposite to wisdom. All must allow, that, if one being should knowingly give a wrong representation of the character of another, who is wise and good, he would be very unjust. But, if a good and wise being should give a wrong representation of his own character, fore, that in this way, he could not have manifested any regard for holiness, nor hatred of sin. {if this were possible,) there would be the same injustice done, which there would,if the representation were made by another. Hence, he would have done inThe injury done to the good finite injustice to his own characcharacter, would be the same, in ter. He never could have apthe one case, as in the other.- peared an object of holy love and Hence it must be evident, that, if reverence. Holy beings never God is good, if he is wise, and if could have felt safe in his hands. he is consistent in his conduct, he They must have lost that confimust manifest his goodness and dence and delight in his character, his wisdom, or be very unjust to which resulted from contemplat his own character. But if God ing him as a being, who loved had pardoned sinners, without any righteousness and hated iniquity. atonement, he could not have But, manifested either his goodness, wisdom, or consistency of conduct. This may clearly appear from the following considerations. "First. In this way, he could not have manifested any regard for holiness, or hatred of sin. By God's pardoning a sinner, is meant his receiving him to favor, and treating him as if he had never sinned. If, therefore, he had pardoned sinners, without any atonement, it must have been impossible, in the nature of things, for him to have given intelligent beings any reason to believe that he is more opposed to sin, than to holiness. For, in this case, he would have treated sinners in the same manner that he treats holy beings. He would have put no difference between the holy, and the profane. He would have manifested no more disapprobation of the disobedient, than of the obedient; nor any more complacency in the obedient, than in the disobedient. It is plain, there "If when mankind sinned, God had executed the penalty of his law upon them, this would have manifested his hatred of sin. By this, therefore, he would have appeared just to his own character. But in no other way, could he be just to himself, unless it were by something, which, as a substitute for the execution of the penalty of the law, would make an equally bright display of his ha tred of sin. If any thing of this kind could be done, which would manifest the divine hatred of sin, as fully as would the just punishment of it, this would be a satisfactory atonement. Out of re spect to such an atonement, God might pardon sinners, and still be just to his own character. His pardoning sinners, on account of such an atonement, would not lead holy beings to distrust the integrity of his character. But, if God should pardon sinners, without such an atonement, his character must appear, at least, doubt fuses, or, at least, entirely neglects to support. ful, if not decidedly bad. Holy law to his creatures, which he rebeings, perceiving that he treated the holy and wicked alike, would be utterly unable to determine, from his conduct towards them, which acted most agreeably to his mind. In this situation, being unable to learn his character, they could not feel safe. His treating the unholy as holy beings ought to be treated, would, at least, lead them to suspect, that he might treat his holy subjects as unholy ones deserves to be treated. And thus, in their perplexity, they might fear him, but they could never love or trust him. But, if they perceived that he would never pardon sinners, without an atonement, this would show them his regard for holiness, and his hatred of sin, and would thus secure their confidence, and inspire their love. "Secondly. If God had pardoned sinners without an atonement, he could not have manifested any wisdom in giving the law but would have been chargeable with the greatest inconsistency of conduct. It is evidently impossible for God to manifest any wisdom in giving a law, which could answer no valuable purpose. But, certainly, if he had entirely neglected to execute the law which he has given, this law must have been utterly useless. Nor would he have appeared merely destitute of wisdom, but his conduct would have involved glaring inconsistency. This inconsistency might have been thus stated: God has given a This law is either good or not good. If it is not good, why did he give it? If it is good, why does he not execute it? In either case he must be chargeable with imperfection. If God has given a law to his creatures, which is not good, it must be because he either could not devise, or did not choose a good one. In the one case, he must be deficient in wisdom; in the other, he must be destitute of goodness.— But it the law be good, and God does not support it, this must be either because he is not able, or because he does not choose to support it. Here, therefore, must be either a deficiency of power, or, as before, a destitution of goodness. But if God had pardoned sinners without an atonement, all this must have followed. It must have been forever true, that God had given a law, and refused or neglected to support it; and that he had denounced evil against transgressors, and never fulfilled his threatening. In this case, his character could never have been cleared of the most glaring inconsistency and imperfection. "It is necessary, therefore, that God should execute what he has threatened, unless something be done by way of atonement, which, as a substitute, will fully answer the same purpose, in order that his own character may remain unsullied, and he appear glorious in holiness." pp. 52-62. These are the obstacles, which, in the author's view, oppose the pardon of sinners, without an atonement. And they prove clearly, that it had respect to the divine character and government: they seem to "decide the point, respecting the necessity and design of the atonement; that it was to manifest the rectitude of the Divine character; that God might be just in the justification of sin ners." This brings us to the great question"in what does the atonement consist? a question which, if we mistake not, Mr. B. has fairly met and faithfully answered, in the third and fourth chapters of his Essav. In the third chapter, he has met the inquiry, "Whether the sufferings of Christ were sufficient to remove the obstacles, which stood in the way of the pardon of sinners." In doing this, he first observes, that if the obstacles which opposed the pardon of sinners be not kept distinctly in view, we are not prepared to see what Christ has done to remove them. He then states them again and alludes to the difference of opinion among men, in what the atonement consists. And his gen eral statement is, that it must consist in that work of Christ, which did in fact remove these obstacles. The question must be decided, on this principle. He takes, however, the affirmative of his inquiry respecting the sufferings of Christ; he endeavors to show that his sufferings do in fact meet all the necessities of an atonement that they remove all the obstacles, which oppose the pardon of sinners; and thus answer all the purposes which would be answered in executing the penalty of the law. And we see not why he has not established this point. On first perusing his work, our impression was, that he had spoken too exclusively in respect to sufferings. For, although aware that mere sufferings were amply sufficient to remove all the obstacles, which he has pointed out as opposing the pardon of sinners, and which mere obedience is no way calculated to remove, yet we were inclined to ask him, how he knew there were not other obstacles of a different nature existing, for the removal of which, active obedience was necessary But on further reflection, we thought this might be improper. For he no where denies the possible existence of such obstacles, He only asserts his ignorance of their existence, and his belief that others will find it difficult to prove or even describe them. As we understand him he does not mean to deny, that in some way unknown to him, obedience may be necessary to constitute some part of the atonement. But he does mean to deny, that he has ever been able to discover any obstacles to the salvation of sinners, which the obedience of Christ is calculated to remove; or any reasons why an atonement was necessary which do not require it to consist in sufferings; or, at least in something, which in the sight of God, is an evil. By atonement, he evidently means some work of Christ which involves a direct manifestation of Divine displeasure against sin. And we ever have been and still are, unable to see how the active obedience of Christ involves any such manifestation. In pursuing his argument he enquires what Christ did by way of suffering. His inquiry is, whether the sufferings of Christ make it manifest, that God respects his law, his kingdom and himself, that is, whether these sufferings, prove that he shows as much respect for his law, his kingdom, and himself as the execution of the penalty of the law would have shown. Un der the first of these heads of inquiry, he states, that in order to give a satisfactory answer, it is necessary to be able to state clearly how the literal execution of its penalty would have manifested respect for the law; or in what this manifestation of respect would have consisted. His meaning is (and it is well worthy of attention,) that the execution of the penalty, would not have manifested God's respect for the law, unless it had in his view, involved an evil in itself considered. Sin is an evil.-And the execution of the penalty, in view of Divine benevolence, is an evil, in itself consideredHence the sufferings of Christ to constitute an atonement for sinners, must be an evil, in themselves considered. in other words, - if God would manifest respect for his law, he must submit to an evil,* in itself considered, in satisfying the demands of the law. For if he had executed its penalty on every transgressor, the manifestation of respect for it would have consisted not in merely answering its literal demands, but in submitting to an evil, on account of it.— Whatever evil God has submitted to,on account of the law,must manifest his respect for it, whether this be in the execution of its penalty or in the sufferings of Christ. And since Christ was the beloved of the Father, and his sufferings as a Mediator, were so exceedingly dreadful, they were an evil, in the sigh of God peculiarly great; and his manifestation of respect for the law, by these sufferings, was equally great. But do these sufferings manifest on the part of God as much respect for the law, as the execution of its penalty would have done? Or are they as great an evil in themselves considered as the mis ery of mankind would have been? To this question, the author has given a very ingenious, and, as we think, satisfactory answer. The sum of it is, that it is sufficient, if God shows as much respect for his *By God's submitting to an evil is meant, his consenting that a thing should take place, which must be in nevoient heart, if viewed independently its own nature, disagreeable to his beof a.. other things. The misery of effect of the execution of the law, mankind, which would have been the would have been such an evil.” p. 25. |