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THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY

ASTOR, LENOX

TH DEN FOUNDATIONB

should have said to the Lord, that it was herself, her passions, which had beguiled her, instead of the Nachash. But Moses has given the account as handed down to him by the tradition of the antedeluvian patriarchs-and especially as given by Melchesidek to Abraham-who gave it to Isaac, and Isaac to Jacob, and from him it descended to all the branches of his race, as well as to the Egyptians, among whom Moses was brought up; as well as among the Hebrews, then living in Egypt. If there was no animal used in the case, it is certainly an uncalled for addition to the accourt, when Moses said, that Eve said the Nachash had deceived her; when, according to Universalist writers, it was wholly the invention of Moses, merely to illustrate by the serpent, as a figure, the horrid condition of Eve's mind at the time when she did just what God wanted her to do, by the means of her lusts, as implanted in her soul by himself.

Universalists, in their ridicule of the belief which orthodox people hold about the being of Satan, as having entered the organs of the subtilist beast of all the field, to deceive Eve; inquire with much archness, and certainty of not being answered, why God should have cursed the poor animal, as it could not have been to blame, having been only a passive instrument in the hands of this fallen angel? To this it is answered, that the curse did the creature no harm, as it does not appear that it was put in pain on that account, or that it ever knew any thing about it; being of necessity ignorant that any change had passed upon it. Why then was it cursed at all? simply for this reason, is our reply: by that act of God, a perpetual momento of the Divine Being's dipleasure against the sin of Eve, was established, which not only subjugated the woman to pain and death, with all her offspring, but extended to the very instrument of that sin, as descriptive of the Supreme Being's displeasure at the act. The same may be said of the earth, whose soil was also cursed; the meaning of which, is doubtless, that a great change was allowed, or caused to take place in the atmosphere of the globe, so that the very elements fell into conflict, producing more heat, humidity, and more cold, than otherwise would have been, if the soil had not been thus cursed, or changed for the worse, on account of Adam's sin. The Divine Being could have sustained the earth and the elements in its first perfection and beauty; there was no necessity, following as a consequence of sin, that the earth should be thus affected; but God, to show his marked displeasure at sin, has, as it were, almost abandoned his support of the earth, and allowed it to fall into a state of partial confusion, that man may have forever before his eyes the signs of his sin, stamped on the very circumstances which minister to his natural life; yet of all this the earth knows nothing, and is not wronged any more than was the animal. But if it be insisted still, that there was no animal in the case, but Eve's lust only, we should

like to be informed what part, or on which side of her lust it is considered the belly was situated, because it was said, on thy belly shalt thou go; a belly therefore, should somewhere, or somehow be accounted for, or the language of inspiration in this case seems to have no meaning. But if we receive the account as it is written, and allow the existence of a fallen angel, now known to Scripture as the devil, who made use of an animal, so as to bring himself into a tangible situation in relation to Eve, then all the language of that account, as given in Genesis, is consistent, and easy to be understood, and not otherwise.

Some have imagined, that by this account of the sinning angels, as given by St. Jude, is meant the apostacy of some of the early ministers of Christianity, and that the chains of darkness, and the hell into which they were cast, was their ignorance and misery of mind; and that the judgment for which they were reserved, was the destruction of the city and nation of the Jews, by the Romans under Titus. This idea, is as foolish and as lame a solution, perhaps as can well be invented; because it is impossible to show, that any of the first angels or ministers of the gospel apostatized at all, except Hymenus and Philetus; and even if there were others, and the account is not given us, yet it is impossible to show that they did not return again; or if it be supposed they did not, yet still it is impossible to show that they lived till the time of the destruction of that city. And unless that can be proved, this notion is without the shadow of a foundation, while the belief that they were superhuman angels, who thus fell, as stated by St. Jude, St. Peter, and St. John, as alluded to in many other parts of the New Testament remains steadfast. If then we have succeeded in showing that those angels were superhuman beings, and fell from a superhuman condition, and state of happiness, called their own habitation and first estate, we shall now proceed to examine the manner of their fall, the cause of Satan, and how it may have taken place.

Fall of the Angels, and Cause of Satan's Being; with other Subjects connected therewith.

We have supposed already, as the reader may recollect, that the angels were not put on trial or probation immediately after their creation, but were left awhile in an incipient state, or condition, for a purpose which we have before stated, till such time, or times, as the Creator should see fit to reveal himself to them, as the author of their being. But not, however, in such a way and manner, or with such degrees of evidence of that fact, as to

overwhelm their powers, rendering thereby the gift of free agency nugatory and without opportunity of action, so as to prevent their voluntary acceptance of him as their creator and rightful king; as on this point, it was determined, as we believe, that a confirmation and continuance of their happy state should ensue.

This point we have before argued, yet in this place for the sake of perspicuity we will repeat: that to us it appears a material law in the Divine government, not to astound his subjects on probation, with an overwhelming amount of compulsory evidence, in relation to any subject to be presented for their investigation and belief; but rather giving that quantum of evidence to their consideration, which should exactly harmonize with their degree of liberty and free agency; otherwise than this, there could have been no trial whether they would have chosen good or evil, free agency would have been out of the question, as no room under such circumstances, could be found for its exercise, as before remarked.

But, in pursuance of this subject, we wish not to forget, that we are now at an amazing height in theology; even laboring at the point where sin had its origin; and if we ask the question at all, we will ask it here: Why, if God foreknew, as he certainly did, that man, and some angels, would fall, and the latter beyond recovery, while also many of the former would be finally lost; why, we ask, did he create them at all? why not prefer for them an eternal state of nonentity as to their existence, rather than to bring into a conscious condition, beings capable of endless duration, and of endless sufferings? As to this question, we have satisfied our own mind in the following manner, by supposing the Creator may have thus communed with himself, on this very subject, long before he created any thing. Not that we believe in a succession of ideas in the Divine mind, yet as we have no other way to express ourselves on such a point, we have said that he may have thus communed with himself on the subject of intellectual creation, as follows: I AM THAT I AM, the Eternal God, there is none beside me, and shall never be fully known to any but myself; and from the benevolence of my nature, or attributes, I am determined to bring into being innumerable existences of mind, of animals, and of matter. Matter, I know, although I create thousands of systems of worlds of it, yet can it never think, know, love, obey, or fear me, and therefore cannot as mere matter, unaccompanied by other and superior existences, glorify me as its Creator, not having a knowledge even of its own substance or being. And though I were to people as many systems, with innumerable animals, having no rational powers; yet these cannot know, love, fear, or glorify me as their Creator; for neither can these know, that even themselves exist. And, therefore, if I will be known, loved, feared and glorified, as Creator of all things, 1 shall find it neces

sary to bring into being existences, which shall be endowed with a likeness and image of my own moral and eternal intellect, on which account such beings will live to eternity, coeval with myself, and never either become insensible, or cease to be, as it shall relate to their minds. These having in a degree my image, as it relates to moral powers; and as it relates to eternity of being, my full likeness, forth forward from the time of their creation, will, in distinction from all matter, whether animate or inanimate, have a power of perception, so as to be able, not only to know that they themselves exist, but also in proportion as I will reveal myself to them, may know, love, obey and glorify me. By this means, therefore, though I create myriads of systems of matter, in the form of globes, or worlds, and shall people them with as many kinds of animals; yet all these, though they cannot know either themselves or me, shall glorify me, as through them in a measure, my eternal power and Godhead shall be known, to such beings as I shall make in my image and likeness. But I must not only endow them with a measure of rational understanding, but also with the power of moral freedom of will, or they will not be able to make use of their understanding; which if they cannot, will be to them a useless attribute, and a useless attribute is the same as none at all: for as I am a free spirit, a portion of this principle must be given them, as the crown of their intellectual natures, and my peculiar likeness. By this, they will be constituted intellectual free agents, having power to will and to do, in a limited sense; but not so limited, however, as that their acts shall not be their own, and their vice or their virtue their own, not mine. If this is not done, they will not be above that grade of my works comprehending mere animals, and therefore, incapable of moral action and moral accountability, and in such a condition can never know, love, obey, nor glorify me, as their Creator; yet if I shall thus endow them with freedom of will, or in other words constitute them free agents, in the volitions of their mind; then they will most assuredly be liable to fall, and to apostatize from me, and loose the holy, innocent, upright state, in which I, as God, can do no otherwise than create them, as I can never create that which is evil, or having any tendency thitherward, for liability and tendency are two distinct principles. But if I do not thus endow them, then they cannot act freely, and can never be moral agents, nor in any degree be above that scale of existences which will distinguish the brute creation; who can never act, except as the law of instinct and sensation shall direct; for which reason it is impossible for them to be accountable for their acts, as there will be no intellectual moral freedom of choice in their

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