tinguish a ship, a plough, a printing-press, or a musical instrument, do not solely afford us the perception of cer tain colours or forms, but along with this perception, bring with it the conception of the different uses or pleasures which such compositions of material qualities produce, and excite in us the same emotion with the uses or pleasures thus signified. As, in this manner, the utilities or pleasures of all external objects are expressed to us by their material signs of colour and of form, such signs are naturally productive of the emotions which properly arise from the qualities signified.

2. The qualities of design, of wisdom, of skill, are uniformly expressed to us by certain qualities of form, and certain compositions of forms, colours, and sounds. Such qualities, therefore, or compositions of qualities, become the signs of design, or wisdom, or skill, and, like all other signs, affect us with the same emotion we receive from the qualities signified.

3. All our knowledge of the minds of other men, and of their various qualities, is gained by means of material signs. Power, strength, wisdom, fortitude, justice, benevolence, magnanimity, gentleness, tenderness, love, &c. are all known to us by means of the external signs of them in the countenance, gesture, or voice. Such material signs are therefore very early associated in our minds with the qualities they signify; and as they are constant and invariable, become soon productive to us of the same emotions with the qualities themselves.

In the same manner, the characters, the dispositions, the instincts of all the various tribes of animals, are known to us by certain signs in their frame, or voice, or gesture. Such signs become therefore expressive to us of these characters, or instincts, or dispositions, and af, fect us with all the emotions which such qualities are fitted to produce.

4. Besides these immediate expressions of qualities of mind by material signs, there are others which arise from resemblance, in which the qualities of matter become significant to us of some affecting or interesting quality of mind. We learn from experience, that certain qualities of mind are signified by certain qualities of body. When we find similar qualities of body in inanimate matter, we are apt to attribute to them the same expression, and to conceive them as signifying the same qualities in this case, as in those cases where they derive their expression immediately from mind. Thus, strength and delicacy, boldness and modesty, old age and youth, &c. are all expressed by particular mate1 rial signs in the human form, and in many cases by similar signs in the forms of animals. When we find similar appearances in the forms of inanimate matter, we are disposed to consider them as expressive of the same qualities, and to regard them with similar emotions. The universality of such associations is evident from the struc ture of the rudest languages. The strength of the oak, the delicacy of the myrtle, the boldness of a rock, the modesty of the violet, &c. are expressions common in all languages, and so common, that they are scarcely in any considered as figurative; yet every man knows, that strength and weakness, boldness and modesty, are qualities, not of matter, but of mind, and that without our knowledge of mind, it is impossible that we should ever have had any conception of them. How much the effect of descriptions of natural scenery arises from that personification, which is founded upon such associations, I believe there is no man of common taste who must not often have been sensible.

5. We are led by the constitution of our nature, also, to perceive resemblances between our sensations and

emotions, and of consequence between the objects that produce them. Thus, there is some analogy between the sensation of gradual ascent, and the emotion of ambition-between the sensation of gradual descent, and the emotion of decay-between the lively sensation of sunshine, and the cheerful emotion of joy-between the painful sensation of darkness, and the dispiriting emotion of sorrow. In the same manner, there are anologies between silence and tranquillity-between the lustre of morning, and the gaiety of hope-between softness of colouring, and gentleness of character-between slenderness of form, and delicacy of mind, &c. The objects, therefore, which produce such sensations, though in themselves not the immediate signs of such interesting or affecting qualities, yet in consequence of this resemblance, become gradually expressive of them, and if not always, yet at those times at least, when we are under the dominion of any emotion, serve to bring to our minds the images of all those affecting or interesting qualities, which we have been accustomed to suppose they resemble. How extensive this source of associa tion is, may easily be observed, in the extent of such kinds of figurative expression in every language.

6. Besides these, language itself is another very important cause of the extent of such associations. The analogies between the qualities of matter, and the qualities of mind, which any individual might discover or observe, might perhaps be few, and must of course be limited by his situation and circumstances; but the use of language gives, to every individual who employs it, the possession of all the analogies which so many ages have observed, between material qualities, and qualities capable of producing emotion. Of how much consequence this is, may be discovered in the different impressions

which are made by the same objects on the common people whose vocabulary is limited by their wants, and on those who have had the advantage of a liberal educa tion.

7. To all these sources of association is to be added, that which is peculiar to every individual. There is no man, almost, who has not, from accident, from the events of his life, or from the nature of his studies, connected agreeable or interesting recollections with particular col. ours, or sounds, or forms, and to whom such sounds or colours, &c. are not pleasing from such an association. They affect us, in some measure, as the signs of these interesting qualities, and, as in other cases, produce in us the same emotion with the qualities they signify.

These observations are probably sufficient to show the numerous and extensive associations we have with matter, and its various qualities, as well as to illustrate some of the means by which it becomes significant or expressive to us of very different, and far more interesting qualities than those it possesses in itself. By means of the connexion, or resemblance, which subsists between the qualities of matter, and qualities capable of producing emotion, the perception of the one immediately, and very often irresistibly, suggests the idea of the other; and so early are these associations formed, that it requires afterwards some pains to separate this connexion, and to prevent us from attributing to the sign, that effect which is produced alone by the quality signified.

Whatever may be the truth of these observations, it cannot at least be doubted, that the qualities of matter are often associated with others, and that they affect us in such cases, like all other signs, by leading our imaginations to the qualities they signify. It seems to be equally obvious, that in all cases where matter, or any of

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its qualities, produces the emotions of sublimity or beauty, this effect must arise either from those material quali ties themselves, from their being fitted by the constitu* tion of our nature to produce such emotions; or from some other qualities with which they are associated, and of which they operate as the signs or expressions.

It should seem, therefore, that a very simple, and a very obvious principle is sufficient to guide our investigation into the source of the sublimity and beauty of the qualities of matter. If these qualities are in themselves fitted to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty (or, in other words, are in themselves beautiful or sublime), I think it is obvious that they must produce these emotions, independently of any association. If, on the contrary, it is found that these qualities only produce such emotions when they are associated with interesting or affecting qualities, and that when such associations are destroyed, they no longer produce the same emotions, I think it must also be allowed, that their beauty or sublimity is to be ascribed, not to the material, but to the associated qualities.

That this is in reality the case, I shall endeavour to show, by a great variety of illustrations. It is necessary, however, for me to premise, that I am very far from considering the inquiries which follow, as a complete examination of the subject. They are indeed only detached observations on the sublimity and beauty of some of the most important classes of material qualities, but which, however imperfect they may severally be, yet seem to possess considerable weight from ther collective evidence.