they raise our ideas toward their great Creator, when we consider that all these were created from nothing, by a word, by a mere volition of the Deity. "Let them be," said God, and they were. "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth." "For he spake and it was done. He commanded and it stood fast." h What must be that power which so formed worlds on worlds; worlds, in comparison of which, this earth which we inhabit sinks into utter nothingness. Surely when we thus lift up our thoughts to the heavens, the moon and the stars which he hath ordained, we must feel, if we can ever feel, how stupendous and incomprehensible is that Being who formed them all: "that the heavens" do indeed "declare the glory of God: and the firmament sheweth his handy work."

h Psalm xxxiii. 6, 9.

B

LECTURE II.

THE WISDOM OF GOD DISPLAYED IN THE HEAVENS.

Psalm XIX. 1—6.

The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech; and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words unto the end of the world. In them hath he set a tabernacle for the sun; which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race. His going forth is from the end of the heaven, and his circuit unto the ends of it; and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof.

The heavens, which declare the glory of God, by displaying his power, also shew forth his wisdom, by affording evident proofs of design.

It is needless to embarrass a discussion of this nature with the consideration of the general question, whether reason and experience enable us to infer the existence of design from any observation of effects. The mind is so constituted, that when we see a number of circumstances, in each of which there is room for

choice, so arranged that a certain effect is produced, we cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that the effect was contemplated. And our conclusion will be more or less forcible, in proportion to the number of independent circumstances which combine in producing the effect. The most superficial observer might discover that an eye would answer the purpose of vision. But when he came to examine its various parts, when he discovered that each of them was placed at the precise distance, and disposed in the exact order, which are necessary in order to produce a beneficial result; and that, if that distance or order were changed, the desired effect would not be produced; when he came to notice the various means employed to move the eye, to protect it from injury, to cleanse it from impurities, to adapt it to vision under different circumstances; he must conclude, with a degree of assurance which leaves no doubt,

In this instance,

that the eye was made to see. then, as in other instances without number, there is sufficient proof of contrivance. And our conviction that contrivance exists, immediately directs us to a contriver. The arguments of the sophist may bewilder our reasoning powers, but they cannot unsettle this conviction.

There are some branches of natural philo

sophy, in which the proofs of beneficent design are more obvious than those which the study of astronomy affords: and they are so, principally, for this reason. The objects of which they treat are brought more immediately into contact with ourselves. They are such as we can more readily examine, and compare with other objects of a similar kind. In order to infer design, we must be able to perceive indications of a choice. And this we shall be able to do more clearly, by comparing together a number of instances, in which we can trace a general similarity, with partial variations from a common principle.

If, for instance, we were acquainted with the anatomical structure and with the wants and habits of one animal only, we might, no doubt, argue reasonably and forcibly from an attentive consideration of its frame, and the evident adaptation of suitable means to a beneficial end, that it was the work of an intelligent and benevolent contriver. But such a conclusion will receive additional confirmation, if we can direct our attention to the numerous other animal frames which the study of nature presents to our view: if we observe how the limbs are increased in number, lengthened or contracted, disposed in a varied order, or enveloped with a different covering; how the innate pro

pensities of animals correspond with their subsequent manner of life; how precisely their bodily frames are adapted to their several ends. In an investigation of this nature, every fresh fact strengthens the argument. But in the study of astronomy we are in a great measure deprived of the assistance which might be derived from direct observation upon instances corresponding with that which we are examining. We doubt not, we have indeed reason to believe, that, if our observation could be extended to other worlds and other systems, we should behold fresh instances of our Creator's wisdom and power; new and unheard of modifications of matter; beings perhaps endued with senses of which we have no conception : physical and moral phenomena, which would throw altogether a new light upon much which is now obscure. But all this must, at present, be inferred by means of a less comprehensive analogy, instead of serving as the base of one more extended. At one entrance, therefore, our knowledge and evidence of contrivance, as drawn from the contemplation of the heavens, are quite shut out. From the deficiency of our information, we must often consider the visible world as one great isolated instance; an object, which, because it is considered as a whole, can

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