$1. Of the NATURE of LAWS in general.

38

SECTION THE SECOND.

OF THE NATURE OF LAWS IN GENERAL,

LAW, in it's moft general and comprehenfive fenfer

fignifies a rule of action; and is applied indifcrimi nately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we fay, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action, which is prefcribed by fome fuperior, and which the inferior is bound to obey.

THUS when the fupreme being formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing, he impreffed certain princi ples upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would cease to be. When he When he put that matter into motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all moveable bodies muft conform. And, to descend from the greatest operations to the fmalleft, when a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanifm, he establishes at his own pleasure certain arbitrary laws for it's direction; as that the hand fhall describe a given space in a given time; to which law as long as the work conforms, fo long it continues in perfection, and anfwers the end of it's formation.

If we farther advance, from mere inactive matter to vegetable and animal life, we shall find them ftill governed by laws; more numerous indeed, but equally fixed and invariable. The whole progrefs of plants, from the feed to the root, and from thence to the feed again;-the method of animal nutrition, digeftion, fecretion, and all other branches of vital economy;-are not left to chance, or the will of the creature itself, but are performed in a wondrous involuntary

manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the

great creator.

THIS then is the general fignification of law, a rule of action dictated by fome fuperior being: and, in thofe creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will, fuch laws must be invariably obeyed, fo long as the creature itself fubifts, for it's exiftence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their more confined fenfe (1), and in which it is our

(1) This perhaps is the only fenfe in which the word law can be ftrictly used; for in all cafes where it is not applied to human conduct, it may be confidered as a metaphor, and in every inftance a more appropriate term may be found. When it is used to exprefs the operations of the Deity or Creator, it comprehends ideas very different from thofe which are included in it's fignification. when it is applied to man, or his other creatures. The volitions of the Almighty are his laws, he had only to will yereobw Qws nat EYEVETO. When we apply the word law to motion, matter, or the works of nature or of art, we fhall find in every cafe, that with equal or greater propriety and perfpicuity, we might have used the words quality, property, or peculiarity.-We fay that it is a law of motion, that a body put in motion in vacuo muft for ever go forward in a straight line with the fame velocity; that it is a law of nature, that particles of matter fhall attract each other with a force. that varies inverfely as the fquare of the diftance from each other; and mathematicians fay, that a series of numbers observes a certain law, when each subsequent term bears a certain relation or proportion to the preceding term: but in all these instances we might as well have used the word property or quality, it being as much the property of all matter to move in a straight line, or to gravitate, as it is to be folid or extended; and when we say that it is the law of a feries that each term is the fquare or fquare-root of the preceding term, we mean nothing more than that such is it's property or peculiarity. And the word law is ufed in this fenfe in thofe cafes only which are fanctioned by ufage; as it would be thought a harsh expreffion to fay, that it is a law that fnow fhould be white, or that fire should burn. When a mechanic forms a clock, he establishes. a model of it either in fact or in his mind, according to his pleafure; but if he should refolve that the wheels of his clock fhould move contrary to the ufual rotation of fimilar pieces of mechanifm,

we

prefent business to confider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the nobleft of all fublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.

MAN, confidered as a creature, muft neceffarily be fubje& to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to purfue, but fuch as he prefcribes to himself; but a ftate of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all thofe points wherein his dependence confifts. This principle therefore has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the fuperiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or lefs, abfolute or limited. And confequently, as man depends abfolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is neceffary that he should in all points conform to his maker's will. THIS will of his maker is called the law of nature. as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; fo, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, [ 40 ] whereby that freewill is in fome degree regulated and

For

we could hardly with any propriety established by ufage apply the term law to his scheme. When law is applied to any other object than man, it ceases to contain two of it's essential ingredient ideas, viz. disobedience and punishment.

Hooker, in the beginning of his Ecclefiaftical Polity, like the learned judge, has with incomparable eloquence interpreted law in it's moft general and comprehenfive fenfe. And moft writers who treat law as a science, begin with such an explanation. But the Editor, though it may seem prefumptuous to question fuch authority, has thought it his duty to fuggeft these few obfervations upon the fignification of the word law.

restrained,

reftrained, and gave him alfo the faculty of reafon to discover the purport of thofe laws.

CONSIDERING the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prefcribed whatever laws he pleafed to his creature, man, however unjuft or severe. But as he is alfo a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only fuch laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that exifted in the nature of things antecedent to any poitive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his difpenfations conforms; and which he has enabled human reafon to difcover, fo far as they are neceffary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we fhould live honeftly (2) should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Juftinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law.

a

BUT if the discovery of thefe first principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of right reafon, and could not otherwise be obtained than by a chain of metaphyfical difquifitions, mankind would have wanted fome inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the world would have refted content in mental indolence, and ignorance it's infeparable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, a Juris praecepta funt haec, bonefte vivere, alterum nan laedere, fuum cuique tribuere. Inft. I. 1. 3.

(2) It is rather remarkable that both Harris, in his translation of Juftinian's Inftitutes, and the learned Commentator, whofe profound learning and elegant taste in the claffics no one will quef'tion, fhould render in English, honeftè vivere, to live honeftly.-The language of the Inftitutes is far too pure to admit of that interpretation; and befides, our idea of honefty is fully conveyed by the words fuum cuique tribuere. I should prefume to think that honestè wivere fignifies to live honourably, or with decorum, or bienfeance; and that this precept was intended to comprize that clafs of duties, of which the violations are ruinous to feciety, not by immediate but remote confequences, as drunkenness, debauchery, profaneness, extravagance, gaming, &c.

and

and wisdom, but alfo of infinite goodness, he has been pleased fo to contrive the conftitution and frame of humanity, that we should want no other prompter to inquire after and purfue the rule of right, but only our own felf-love, that univerfal principle of action. For he has fo intimately connected, fo infeparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by obferving the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In confequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a [ 41 ] multitude of abftracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as fome have vainly furmifed; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept," that man fhould purfue his own “true and substantial happiness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For the several articles into which it is branched in our fyftems, amount to no more than demonftrating, that this or that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very juftly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is deftructive of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.

THIS law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course fuperior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in ail countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this (3); and fuch of them as are valid derive all their

(3) Lord chief juftice Hobart has alfo advanced, that even an act of parliament made against natural justice, as to make a man a judge in his own caufe, is void in itself, for jura naturae funt immutabiha, and they are leges legum. (Hob. 87.) With deference to thefe high authorities, I fhould conceive that in no cafe whatever can a judge oppofe his own opinion and authority to the clear will and declaration of the legislature. His province is to interpret and obey the mandates of the fupreme power of the flate. And if an act of parliament, if we could fuppofe fuch a case, should, like the