tion which exists in Spain, and by intrigue close the markets of that country against British merchandize, limited even as they are now. If they cannot create for their own goods a market in Spain, they find no difficulty in inducing the government there to fix prohibition duties upon English goods, and as English enterprise is not to be checked entirely by prohibition duties, the necessary consequence is, that a contraband trade is carried on which daily serves to irritate the mass in Spain against the English, and may eventually produce something more than remonstrance and complaint. The recent affairs at Barcelona and Carthagena are striking illustrations of the success of French intrigue on this point. One of the essential conditions of the pacification of Spain on the part of England, ought to be the admission of the produce and manufactures of all countries on an equitable tariff. This is what the French would consent to reluctantly, as they know well that the English would almost monopolize the Spanish markets by the low price at which they could sell their merchandize; but if France be made a direct party to an European Congress, her single voice would not prevail. Spain may be made a vast field for English enterprise, and she could only gain by the adoption of a system of government, which, whilst it would improve her own means of purchasing the produce and manufactures of other countries, would invite foreign capital for the cultivation of her own natural resources. In her present state she is unable to purchase, because she is unable to sell. She has the finest wool of the Continent; excellent oil, which however she does not know how to purify for foreign markets; corn superior to any in Europe; and wines in abundance, which are now unsaleable for want of proper cultivation. "And even if all this produce were perfect, the means of conveyance are so limited and costly that, before it can reach her ports, the price is so enhanced that it cannot be exported with profit to the grower. Let there once be security for person and property in Spain, and foreign capital will pour in, the necessary improvements will be made in and TOHET HENOL meil france from Proved means of

transport her position, ought perhaps to be considered the natural ally of Spain; but France has not the same interest in promoting the development of her resources as England has. France is also a corn, wine and oil growing country, and French agriculturists can never be brought to believe that the development of agricultural industry in Spain would not be injurious to them. England, and England only, can therefore regenerate Spain. This the French know, and so long as they can prevent the pacification, without which Spanish industry cannot be developed, will they oppose every large and ef

I

Jo stadiem adt azolo supintai vd bas aisa, ani ateizs doidw noit fectual plan for the establishment of establishment of tranquillity and good government in Spain, wo, et not so

u .won There is a third and perhaps greater point of contention between France and England, which can only be settled by a congress of Dach sovereigns the conquest of Algiers. It is asserted that a promise was made by the government of Charles the Tenth, and also by Louis, to abandon the conquest. This assertion may be false, but whether false or true, it is evident from the debates in the French Chambers that no intention of abandonment is entertained. We have very little fear that the conquests of the French in Africa will ever enable them to gain such ground as to create serious uneasiness to Great Britain for her influence in the Mediterranean; but there must be some defined limits to French ambition in that quarter of the globe, France may waste her Der energies in Africa, and eventually rue the day when the conquest was first attempted, as also regret with anguish the sacrifices which she has made even to retain what she has got; but a principle must be established as to the extent to which she is to be permitted to go. To suppose that her object in Africa is to civilize is absurd, and equally absurd is it to suppose that her object is colonization. What she aims at is military, and political influence as regards her position in Europe. She has shown ne a conduct she neither cares for civilization nor knows how to colonize, If she should hould succeed in the in the object for which the e conquest was un dertaken, she will create a formidable barrier there to English enterprise, and eventually obtain an influence in the Mediterranean which would be incompatible with our security that st she has no prospect of success is no argument against the propriety of rendering success impossible. If she lacks means, she does not lack will, and contrary to expectation she may perhaps suc

in Africa that

and what she is endeavouring to do. Her position in Algeria obviously aids her views in this respect, and is convenient and suitable for their realization. Neither is the attempt of the French to excite hostile feelings towards England amongst the people of Spain confined to any particular party. On the contrary, all parties in France appear to have, as regards England, the same object in view. The legitimists look upon the English as the first movers in the change in the succession, and as the abettors of the revolutionary acts to which it has given rise; to weaken the influence of the English in Spain is therefore with the legitimists a duty which they owe to their cause. The republicans are opposed to the intervention of any other influence than their own; and even if this were not the case, they would be dissatisfied with the limited support given by the English government to what they choose to call the constitutional cause; the Bonapartists, shorn as they are of power and influence at home, still labour to exercise influence abroad; and as they hate with fervor every thing that is English, they are not wanting in energy, whatever they may be in means, to prevent British preponderance in Spain. The juste milieu party, still the most numerous in France, are no better disposed to England on this subject than the three which we have named. Indeed one of the most furious organs of this party, the Journal des Debats, not satisfied with declamation against the English, scarcely allows a day to pass without giving currency to some falsehood which is calculated to make Spaniards look with anger and even hatred upon their English allies. True it is, indeed, that the French government entered into an alliance with England, called the quadruple treaty, the declared object of which was the pacification of Spain by the friendly intervention of the two cabinets in favour of the constitutional regime, and with an abnegation on the part of each of all pretensions to power and influence which should not be common to both; but we know how the spirit of that treaty was observed by the French. Let us then look at the question on any side, and we shall find a fixed determination to promote anarchy in Spain on the part of the French, until that moment when, in their opinion at least, the force of circumstances should throw her into their hands.

But we will even suppose Louis Philip and his ministers to be anxious for the pacification of Spain and for the final settlement of the Eastern question, without the existence of selfish views on their part. How will the case then stand? In all diplomatic relations security should be the first object of the British government. This security can only be obtained by one of two guarantees, or both. The first is a well-founded confidence in

the honour of the nation with whose government it treats; the second is confidence in the honour and power of the men who are at the head of affairs. Do these securities, or does either of them exist in France? M. Guizot, who is virtually the prime minister in that country, may be a man of strict honour and integrity. We believe he is; for the simplicity of his mode of life places him above the corruption which has marked the career of most of his predecessors, and there is every reason to conclude that his hands are unstained. We have never heard of his being engaged in any of the infamous traffic which is charged upon M. Thiers, and he is more free from that national vanity which drives men into the commission of absurd acts than the person whom he has succeeded, or indeed any man who has hitherto held the reins of power in France. We know also that he is as free from national prejudice as he is from national vanity. This is high commendation, but it is well deserved, and it is with pleasure that we offer this testimony in favour of a man to whose firmness France at this moment owes her safety, and Europe her peace. But has M. Guizot so much influence over the nation whose destinies have been thrown by unexpected circumstances for a moment into his hands, that he can bind it to the observance of the pledges which he may make in its name? Can he continue to keep down the passions which his predecessor roused? Can he in short at once give to the French nation that moral respect for its engagements which hitherto it has never shown. M. Guizot has had a powerful auxiliary in the prudence, we might almost say cunning, of the king. We will not make it a crime in the minister that he was himself a party to the trick which drove M. Thiers from office, and diverted for a time the gathering storm, for even cunning became a virtue when exercised for such an end; but where parties are playing au plus fin, may not the tricker be eventually out-tricked, and can we have a stronger proof of the utter want of morality and good sense of a nation, than the fact that in order to restrain it from outrage and crime, it was necessary to resort to the fraud and deception which distinguish the character of the mass? When Sebastiani was minister for foreign affairs, he was reproached with some act in opposition to his character and his principles, and asked why he did not openly avow his views and leave the appreciation of them to the good sense of the nation. The questioner was an Englishman. "Because," replied Sebastiani, "there is no possibility of ruling France as other nations are ruled. I defy any man to remain in power here with the application of those general principles, which require only honesty and good sense in the nation to produce the desired effect. All that a French minister can do

is, by indirect means, to restrain the passions for a time, and divert the turbulence which he cannot prevent. If you would have French ministers like those, of any other country, you must give to them the people of another country. You must give them a public opinion such as we see elsewhere, and take away the firebrands who would make that opinion go wrong." The French nation has not improved since this language was used; the national character is still the same, good, beautiful even in its exceptions, detestable in its rule. There is no country in the world in which a greater number of acts of virtue is seen, if we look for them otherwise than in connection with the general observance of morality and good faith from nation to nation. As a people dealing with the people or the government of another country, the French are neither to be trusted nor believed. We have said that M. Guizot has desired to establish in France something like respect for its public engagements, and that he inspires all the confidence which personal character can command. We have said that Louis Philip is prudent, and that he can even resort with effect to the use of the weapons in which M. Thiers was so little skilled. It is a great gain to have got rid of a minister who in the Chamber of Deputies unblushingly scouted the idea of good faith in governments, and declared that no government enters into a treaty with the honest determination of maintaining it for a moment longer than its own ends are served; but what security have we that M. Thiers, or some such profligate states

man, may not be in power a few months hence, or thes

M.

Guizot may be able to render odious the principles thus avowed by M. Thiers? If in England any minister had avowed such doctrines, he would have been hooted by the representatives of the people, and out of doors public indignation would have been loudly expressed; but in France the declaration of M. Thiers excited no indignant remark in the chamber, and beyond its walls it was rather praised than blamed, as the candid avowal of the principles entertained by all rulers, but which others were hypocritical enough to conceal. And if M. Guizot should be all that we are disposed to believe him to be, and more influential as regards his nation than it appears to us possible that he even can be, how long may we expect his power to last? He has now been nine months in office, which is rather beyond the average duration of the cabinets under what is called parliamentary government in France. Will he retain the reins of power for nine months more? Allow that he will, and what are nine months to enable him to change the national character? Will nine months or nine years suffice for such a change, even supposing it to be attempted under the most favourable circumstances, and with the

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