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them, as the Senses of the most Learned and Thinking Men: Which proves that Ideas do not enter in at the Eyes or Fingers Ends; and that the Mind has no immediate Power upon external Impressions, of making its Ideas, no more than of fee. ing them, without Instruction.

This, I suppose, Mr. Lock will not pretend, That our Ideas enter in from without: For he knows very well, that there are no Ideas out of a Mind; and that the external Impressions which are made from without, which can be nothing else but Motion and Figure, have nothing in them like those Ideas which are raised in our Minds : But then he thinks, that a Knowing and Reasoning Faculty, without any Connate Ideas, can form its own Ideas from such external Impressions, though they can convey no Ideas into the Mind, because they have none. . Now besides what I have already discoursed of this Matter, I must observe, That no Faculty makes its Object, but only perceives it ; and then the Knowing Faculty must not make its Ideas, but only see and know them. A Knowing Faculty supposes that there are Ideas to be known; as a Seeing Faculty supposes that there is Light and Colours to be seen ; and if these Ideas cannot come from without, and the Mind can't make them, the Mind can contemplate only-such Ideas as it finds in its self, and which some external Impressions do not make, but only bring into View.

I think Mr. Lock will allow it as credible and intelligible, that we should know by Innate Ideas, as that all our Sensations should be Innate Phantasms: And yet this he must allow, accord. ing to his own Principles; for he grants, that P. 59, 60, such Secondary Qualities, as he calls them, as Light and colours, and Sounds, and Heat, and H


Cold, Sweet and Bitter, &c. are no real Qualities
in the Things without us, but only a Power to operate
in a peculiar Manner on any of our Senses. Now
if there be no such Qualities as Light, or Colour,
or Sounds, Heat or Cold, &c. without us, then
these Ideas of Light and Colours must be Innate
to the Visive Faculty, and the Ideas of all other
Qualities muft be Innate to our other Senses ; for
if they be not without us, they must be within,
for we have very real and fenfible Ideas of them.
There is nothing in the Things without us, like
those Ideas we have of Light and Colours, and
other sensible Qualities, and therefore they cannot
paint those Ideas and Phantasms on our Minds ;
the most they can do is, by the wonderful and un-
accountable Order of Nature, by fome certain
kind of Motions, to raise fuch fenfible Ideas. in us,
of Light and Colours, &c. which they could not
raife in the Soul, if they were not in it. It is
the Soul only that sees, and hears, and feels, as
well as understands; and as Sense is, and can be
nothing else, but Innate Sensible Ideas, put into
Act by external Impressions.; fo Understanding is
nothing else but the Perception of its Innate Ideas,
excited also, and brought into View, by external
Objects. This represents the Soul, as a true Mi-
crocosm, or Intellectual Image of the World, im-
prefs?d with all thofe Marks and Signatures, which
are not actual Knowledge, but a Capacity of know.
ing, because they are capable of being brought
into act.

Plato called Knowledge Reminiscence ; for being sensible that the Soul could not get its Ideas merely from external Impressions, he supposed that it

had an actual Knowledge of them in a former : State, and by degrees recover'd that Knowledge

again in this State; as Men recollect fuch Matters as they had forgot. And to bring thofe Ideas in


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to Act, which were originally imprinted on the Mind, but not known before, is not unlike to Plato's Reminiscence; for it is a Discovery and Recollection of such Ideas as were in the Mind, but not actually perceived. It is certain, all those ancient Philofophers, who believed Præexistence, who were both the greatest Numbers, and the wiseft Men, whether Jews or Heathens, could not believe that the Soul came into the World stript of all Ideas: Nor did any Philosophers of old teach this, but those who niade the whole world, and the Souls of Men, nothing but Matter; and then there could be no higher Principle of Knowledge, than external Impressions. Mr. Lock will not own that all Knowledge is owing to external Impressions, but requires a Knowing Intelligent Principle to form its Ideas ; but such a Knowing Principle, as has no Innate Ideas, or Seeds of Knowledge: And let this be either Spirit or Matter, if it have nothing within, it must have it from without. And thus all the Objections against the Old Atheistick Hypothesis, are .chargeable upon him ; though I will not charge them upon him, because he disowns those Atheistick Principles, for the sake of which this Hypothesis was originally invented, and without which, it is worth nothing, and serves no End. And I am afraid our modern Atheists will own and magnify his Hypothesis ; and whether he will or no, make use of his Hypothesis, or as much of it as they please, to confute those Principles of Religion and Virtue which he owns. For after all, there is not a more formidable Objection against Religion, than to teach, That Mankind is made without any Connate Natural Impreffions and Ideas of a God, and of Good and Evil: For if all the Knowledge we have of God, and of Good and Evil, be made by our felves," Atheists will easily conclude, that it is only the H 2 .


Effect of Education, and Superstitious Fears; and satisfy themselves, that they can make other Notions, more for the Ease and Security of Life. This is certain, no Man who believes that the Ideas of God, and of Good and Evil, were originally impress'd on our Minds when they were first made, can doubt whether there be a God, or an essential Difference between Good and Evil. Those who believe thefe Notions were made, and not born with us, are more at Liberty to question their Truth. And the general Reason why Men are so zealous against these Ideas being Innate, is to deliver themselves from the Necessity of Believing any Thing of God or Religion. Batte

Batterierteteatetriabratite Butritike This may be thought a very long Digression, and very improper for common Readers : And I grant it is so ; and those who are not accustomed to such Philosophical Speculations, may easily pass it by ; but it was necessary to make good my prefent Argument against such Pretences. For if the Soul of Man has no Inbred Knowledge, it is in vain to talk of the Light, and Voice, and Sense of Nature ; if it has, then the universal Consent of Mankind can be reasonably attributed to no other Cause ; and then the Immortality of the Soul must be the Voice and Sense of Nature. There have been indeed a great many wicked and abfurd Practices that have prevail'd in the World; such as Polytheisin and Idolatry, and the idle and fabulous Stories concerning the different States of good and bad Men in the next Life. But these are manifest Corruptions of our Natural Notions. of God, and Religion, and another Life: And therefore when all the World, excepting the Jews, were Idolaters, yet they did not agree in the Gods they worshipped, nor in the Rites and Ceremo

Funiversal. Pracii. And the

nies of their Worship, nor in their Accounts of the other World: And therefore such corrupt DoEtrines and Practices cannot pretend to such an Universal Consent, as the Being of a God, and a Future State, and therefore cannot pretend neither, to be the Voice of Nature.

3. And now I need add but a very few Words, to prove that the Voice of Nature is a Natural Proof of Immortality. For if Nature teaches the Immortality of the Soul, that is certainly a Natural Proof. And if we believe that God made us, that he is the Author of our Nature, and of all Natural Impressions and Notions, this gives great Strength to this Argument: For we cannot believe that God, who is Eternal Truth, would deceive us, by any such Natural Impression, into the Belief of our Immortality, had he made us Mortal. I'm sure this ought to be a very persuasive Argument to those who talk so much and so highly of Natural Reason: For if they will act agreeably with themselves, they must believe and disbelieve, chuse and refuse with Nature. To believe against Nature, is to put off Nature ; and when they cease to reason and believe aś Men, it is Tiine to leave difputing with them, for we have no common Principles to Reason on.

S E C T. IV. :) The Immortality of the Soul proud, from the · Natural Depres of Immortality, and the

Justice of the Divine Providence.

3. A Nother Natural and Moral Argument for the Immortality of the Soul, is chat Deнз


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