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and again, and fresh miracles worked for the conviction of each unbeliever in every age.

In the fecond of these methods the inconveniences are very obvious: for Firft, This influence, of what kind foever it be, must either be abfolutely efficacious and irresistible, i. e. so strong as to fubvert the natural powers of man, and take away his freedom of thinking and acting; and confequently destroy all virtue, merit, praise, reward; i. e. all that is good and valuable in religion: — or else it would not be fufficient to answer the ends propofed; nor could it certainly and effectually fecure the intereft and falvation of mankind.

As an illumination, it must either be distinguishable from the prefent effects of reason and the ordinary operations of the divine spirit, or not; if the former, this must be by ftriking us more forcibly, and working a more affured, infallible conviction in the mind: but fo much as is added to that, above what may arise from the present conftitution of things, just so much must be taken from the present choice, and merit of believing; and the concomitant delight and fatisfaction which we feel, and ought to feel, in giving our affent to truth (d). Such evidence must either fuper

(d) See ABp. King's Origin, N. 19. p. 108, &c. 4th Ed. compared with N. 59. p. 310. Whence it appears, that though in fome cafes and refpects the affent be unavoidable, and we merely paffive in the attainment of many useful parts of knowledge; which muft be attended with fatisfaction in degree proportioned to the apprehenfion of that ufefulness, and of a kind perhaps very com plex, as arifing from variety of caufes accidentally affociated; yet

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fuperfede all action and enquiry of our own, and overbear the judgment beyond poffibility of doubt, (which yet, from the manner of our acquiring and affociating ideas, and forming judgments, is impoffible to be conceived, without reverfing the whole frame of the human mind; neither would that appear to be at all defirable, as we have feen above) it muft, I fay, either be inconfiftent with the exercise of our other moft valuable faculties,

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neither is the kind, nor the degree of this delight fo intense, and exquifite, as that which ufually accompanies thofe points which we work out ourselves; which we properly make our own, by a free, fair investigation. Thefe truths, though of no more importance in themselves, or their confequences, than any others that are either forcibly obtruded on us, or fortuitoufly thrown into our way; yet are attended with a fort of felf-approbation, and complacency, which both accompanies the firft difcovery, the transporting iugna; and will continue after it, and bear reflection; and which makes them infinitely exceed all others in our eftimation. The fame thing, as it is come at in the one or other of these ways, is evidently not the fame to us: which I can afcribe to nothing more than a consciousness that in the former cafe we have contributed fomewhat to the acquifition of it, and to our own improvement by that acquifition; or an idea of merit, conftantly affociated with this kind of acquifitions; and which is perhaps the very strongest, and the most agreeable of all our affociations.

From whence alfo we may collect how neceffary it is to the happinefs of man, that he fhould appear to himself to be free, in the exercife of the faculties of his mind, as well as the powers of his body; to be in fome degree active in the attainment of his knowledge, as well as any other attainments; and how far this will go towards proving him to be really fo, I leave to be confidered. If he has any real liberty, there will be a good reafon for annexing this double pleafure to the exercife of it, both to excite him to action in cafes of difficulty, and afterwards to justify him for engaging in fuch; and enable him to go through all the toil, and hazard that attends them. If he has none, won't it be a little hard to point out, either the rife or reasonableness of this fo conftant, and fo general a delufion; and to account for fuch ideas as those of merit, esteem, reward, &c. which are intirely founded in it?

Whether the refolving all, with a late author, into the deceitful feeling of liberty, be attended with lefs difficulties, than those which this hypothefis is calculated to remove, muft be fubmitted to the thoughtful reader. See Hume on Liberty and Neceffity, Effays on the Principles of Mor, and Nat. Rel. Part I.

or it would come to the fame thing with the prefent use of them; and prove alike capable of being equally neglected or opposed, córrupted or destroyed: it would have no higher evidence than in some cases the common principles of reafon have; nor could it lay any stronger obligation on us to obey its dictates.

The fame will be the cafe with it confidered as an impulse, or impreffion on the mind, inciting it to follow each determination of the judgment, and phyfically connecting thought with action; fince this connection, if much altered from that which is obfervable in the present state, or increased to any confiderable degree above that harmony which now fubfifts among our natural powers, would be attended with the very fame consequences *.

Farther; as all this must be tranfacted in a man's own breast, and so long as it is limited as above, or he retains the least degree of liberty, is capable of being stifled there; every one might, and most probably would foon disregard it, as much as he does now the many good thoughts, motions, and fuggeftions, which arife daily in his mind. Nor is there less likelihood of its being perverted to the worst purposes, as interest, vice, or vanity might direct: of its foon filling the world with rank enthusiasm, or the most wicked and abfurd impostures; and when it is thus once perverted, there seems to be no room for any re

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See Hutchefen on the Paffions, p. 179, 200, &c. or King, N. 28,

medy upon this fcheme; no means are left us to detect the fraud, or folly of any religious pretences whatsoever; no method for mankind to refcue themselves from perpetual delufion (e).

Nor

(e) The fubtil author of Chriftianity not founded on Argument, seems to adopt this fecond method of communicating a religion to mankind, and carries it fo far as to fuperfede all other means, divine or human, that have ever been made ufe of to fupport it in the world. He contends for a conftant and particular revelation imparted feparately and fupernaturally to every individual, p. 112. This he terms infpiration, and infused evidence, p. 58. feeling and internal fenfe, ib. and of a nature but little differing from that of intuition, p. 59. In short, it is what will dispatch the whole bufinefs of religion at once, without either time or teaching, [p. 17.] reading or reafoning, the ufe of our understanding, or the evidence of our fenfes.

'Tis hard to guefs upon what plan this author would defend himfelf if he were preffed; but for the present he admits one general external revelation to have been made and recorded [though both, upon his principles, must have been extremely unneceffary] and yet labours to diffuade us from examining the contents of it, and moft inconfiftently attempts to fhew, as well from reafon as this very revelation, that we ought not to employ our reafon at all, either in the proof, or the interpretation of it, or in any thing elfe relating to the fabject, p. 7. &c. A felf-deftructive fcheme! which were it really, as he pretends to prove, laid down by Chrift and his apoftles, and in the nature of the thing, or from the practice of mankind ever so neceffary, yet could not poffibly be kept clear of the confequences abovementioned: - of which more hereafter.

39.

But that this is far from being the cafe, may eafily be fhewn.. That Chrift and his apoftles both encourage and enjoin the exercife of reason in religious matters is plain enough from these few texts, Matth. xiii. 19, 23. Mark viii. 17, 18. Luke i. 4. xii. 57. John v. Act. xvii. 11, 17. Rom. x. 17. xi. 1. 1 Cor. x. 15. xiv. 29. 2Cor. xiii. 5. 1 Tim. iv. 13, 14, 15. 2 Tim. iii. 15. 1 John iv. 1. 1 Pet. iii. 15. Do fuch texts as thefe fuppofe Conviction to precede the Evidence? p. 37. to which add 1 Theff. v. 21. where St. Paul, treating of Spiritual Gifts themfelves, exhorts his followers to prove all things [a hopeful talk! fays our author, p. 76.] and Rom. x. 2. where the fame great apoftle is recommending Zeal according to knowledge; though this. writer is pleased to tell us, that such zeal will jcarce ever deferve the name; p. 25.

However, to give this extraordinary fcheme of his a fcriptural air, he lays hold on fome paffages of Scripture-history [of which in. their proper place] and draws in feveral detacht parts of texts about the Spirit of God, or fuch as found that way; which he applies to his point indifcriminately, whether they concern thofe ordinary af fiftances and imperceptible operations that may be expected from the

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Nor, in the third place, would less inconve-niences attend the frequent republication of religion, and working new miracles for the conviction of each particular person that might be fuppofed

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Holy Ghost in every age, or are confined to his extraordinary, miraculous gifts, that were, we think, peculiar to the first publication of the gofpel, and produced thofe wonderful effects which this writer alludes to; and which he, with fome modern fectaries, seems ftill to claim, upon that ever weak foundation of believing strongly that he has the fame, without being able to bring any of the fame proofs in juftification of fuch his belief. Though even here he ought to be reminded, that most of these very fupernatural gifts were fo far from exerting themselves independently on any natural attainments, that they most commonly acted in conjunction with, and were administered conformably to fuch; and were themselves improved by labour, diligence, and ftudy, or impaired and quite extinguished by neglect; [See Whitby and others, on 2 Tim. i. 6.] that all of them were fubject to the will and reafon of those who poffeffed them; and to be by them carefully and prudently applied to the particular exigencies of the church, and the most useful purposes of edifying: fo as to conftitute the whole a reasonable fervice. God,. when he makes the prophet, does not unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties in their natural state, to enable him to judge of his infpirations, whether they be of divine original or no. When he illuminates the mind with fupernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would have us affent to the truth of any propofition, he either evidences that truth by the < ufual methods of natural reafon, or else makes it known to be a truth 'which he would have us affent to, by his authority, and convinces us that it is from him, by fome marks which reafon cannot be miftaken in. Reafon must be our laft judge and guide in every thing.' Locke on Enthufiafm: A chapter which I would beg leave to recommend to this extraordinary writer; and when he fhews us any of the fame infallible marks of Inspiration, that were formerly exhibited; when he communicates fome of that infused evidence which he can make appear not to have been derived from other fources, we may be obliged implicitly to follow his directions; but till then, are, I humbly apprehend, at liberty to fuppofe that he himself is only following his own fpirit, and has feen nothing; and that all these feelings, (if he be in earneft in pretending to them) are no more than the effects of his own warm imagination. For that the ordinary operations of the Spirit do not fuggeft any thing of this kind; that they are never diftinguishable from the natural workings of our minds, much lefs in any refpect fubverfive of them; that they are perfectly confiftent with the most free use of all our rational powers, which are the gift of the fame author, and given to be fo ufed by us; - and that thefe generally attend upon their regular exercise, and were de

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