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nature of things; directly contrary to the present order of the whole creation: 'tis making the fame rule fuit beings in all circumstances; which is equally abfurd, as to prescribe the fame food and phyfic to all constitutions.

To ftile this religion of nature abfolutely perfect, or its light fufficient; can only mean, that every one may be as be as perfect here as God intended him to be, and able to do all that his maker will require of him; or so much as is fufficient to excufe him from punishment: which is very true, but nothing to the purpose: for this kind of perfection is far from implying an universal, unchangeable equality in the law of nature, or excluding greater light; fince it may be very confiftent with that diversity of talents abovementioned, and thofe different degrees of happiness and perfection, which are founded in, and naturally consequent upon it.

As therefore all the gifts of nature are distributed in this partial and unequal manner, how unreasonable is it to object against revealed religion, for its being conveyed in the very fame manner! One who believes any thing of a God and his providence, will naturally suppose, that if any revelation were to be made, it would be made according to the fame method which is obferved in the government of the natural and moral world; at least, he that allows this method to be confiftent with the belief of a deity in the one, cannot furely on that account reject the other.*

Thus

Chubb in his difcourfe on Miracles, p. 48, c. endeavours to invalidate this obfervation, by afferting, that the two cafes are not

A 4

parallel,

Thus much may be fufficient to fhew, that natural and revealed religion are upon the fame foot in point of univerfality; and that the objection holds equally against both of them. And I have been the more brief on this head, as it has been fully difcuffed of late by abler writers.*

II. Let us proceed therefore in the second place, to point out the wisdom and goodness of the divine conduct in both these difpenfations.

ift. Of Natural Religion; which, as we have feen, is proportionable to the different abilities and attainments of mankind; as these are also to their different stations and conditions; both which we shall find exquifitely fuited to the wellbeing of the world.

For in the first place, fociety is requifite in order to fupply the conveniences, the comforts, and the neceffaries of life, as well as to fecure the quiet ufe, and safe poffeffion of them. To preserve society, among such frail fallible creatures,

there

parallel, becaufe the one could not have been better constituted; which he thinks cannot be made appear concerning the other. But if it be fhewn that the like, or greater inconveniences would flow from any other affignable way of conveying revelation (which will be attempted in the following part of this difcourfe;) then we have as much reafon to affert, that it could not upon the whole have been conveyed in a better way; and confequently the objection drawn from its want of Univerfality, will be of no more force than that from Inequality is in the common course of nature; and the two cafes will still be exactly parallel. Nor can I find the leaft proof of the contrary in Ld. Bolingbroke's declamation, (Works, Vol.iv. p. 293, &c.) except what arifes from the arbitrary fuppofition of fome few divines, and is fufficiently obviated near the end of Part II.

See Conybeare's, Fofter's, or S. Browne's Defence of Revelation; or Denne's Sermon on the Propagation of the Gofpel; or more at large in Butler's Analogy, &c. p. 181, 215, &c. 8vo. or Sykes on Miracles, P. 204, &c.

there is need of government, which implies different stations and conditions; as these again call for different abilities and qualifications. All, 'tis plain, cannot be governours, nor enjoy the benefits which attend some posts of wealth and power: the many have nothing left them but to obey, to execute the will of their fuperiors, and undergo the drudgeries of life.*

The fame holds in the body politic, as in the natural; there must be many inferior and more feeble members, which yet are necessary; neither can the head fay to the feet, I have no need of you.

But now, if all these different members of the world had naturally the self-fame sense and relish of things; if each man had originally and unchangeably the highest degree of understanding and acuteness; the greatest strength of reason, and fineness of imagination, that is to be met with in any of the species; how very unequal and incongruous must this unavoidable diverfity of orders prove! How hard would be the cafe of them, whofe lot is to fill the worst and lowest offices, and yet who find themselves as well qualified for, and as highly deferving too of the best, (fince on this fuppofition, which leaves it fo very little in any one's power to benefit either himfelf or others, there could fcarce be any real defert at all) as thofe that hold them; and who likewife

can

Illi ergo omnes conditi funt ut hæc opera præftent, quibus in civitate opus eft; conditus eft autem vir fcientia præditus fui gratia: [i. e. ob finem quem adeptus eft, fc. fcientiam.] atque ita fimul colitur terra, et reperitur fapientia. Quam fcite ergo dixit ille, quifquis fuit, Nifi effent ftulti, defolaretur terra! Maimon. Porta Mof. p. 41. Vid. Ecclxxxviii. 32, 34. & Holberg N. Klim. p.133.

cannot but be as deeply fenfible of all that mifery and hardship which arises from the want of them! The common intellect and apprehenfion of man would be but ill placed in an ox or afs; nor would the genius and temper of fome philofophic mind be any better fuited to him that driveth them, and is occupied in all their labours.

But this must neceffarily be the state of things, if all men were by nature furnished with all those rational or intellectual accomplishments, which adorn fome few of them at prefent. Three parts in four of the world must be unfit for their particular circumstances, and at odds with their condition.

How inconfiftent also would it be in nature to implant those various fenfes, appetites, and tastes in all men, which not one in a thousand would have power to gratify! - that fublime degree of reafon and reflection, which could only prove its own tormentor!

Not to mention what ill influence such a scheme would have on government itself; how difficult it must be to rule, where every one has the fame strength and skill; how hard to obey, when all have equal abilities, and therefore (as they might imagine) an equal right to be their own direct

ors.

*In fhort, how much more wife and be

neficial

Si omnes ingenio pares effent, omnefque in eofdem affectus proclives, aut iifdem virtutibus ornati; non effet qui alius imperiis parere vellet, aut ei quidpiam concedere, aut qui varietati minifteriorum et artium omnium generum aptus effet. Cum omnes omnia curare nequeant, fingulos in Societate fuo munere, in gratiam aliorum, fungi oportet; nec viliffima munera minus funt neceffaria interdum quam fublimiora. Itaque effe oportuit omnibus fuum ingenium, ut quifque quod fuum eft ad Societatis felicitatem conferret, et quod cæteris deest suâ industriâ fuppleret. Cleric. Silv. Philol. ad fchin. Socr. p. 170, 171.

neficial is the prefent conftitution of things! where all is left to mankind themselves, who have both the forming and disposing of each other; nay, where men are at liberty in a great measure to frame their own natures, and difpofitions: where they have no inconvenient or pernicious principle to lay to nature's charge*; no properly innate notions, or implanted inftincts; no truly natural appetite or affection, to sway or byass them; except that univerfal fenfe, and strong defire of happiness, which was so absolutely necessary to their prefervation (a).

By

* See Ibbot's Boyle's Lect. 2d fett, Serm. 5. p. 143, &c. or King's Origin of Evil, Note 38, p. 189. 4th Edit.

+ See Prelim. Diff. to King and Rem. i. p. 75. 4th Edit. (a) To fuch as are defirous of forming more exact, philofophical notions on the prefent Subject, let it be obferved, that when the first foundation of a diverfity of fenfe and intellect is once laid in a greater or less fufceptibility of pleasure or pain, by a perception of ideas more acute or dull, more quick or flow, and a proportioned reflection on them, (which proportion, by the bye, between thefe two powers [of perceiving and reflecting] is, I believe, in each Perfon pretty exactly kept up, as to the pitch of their vivacity in both the abovenamed refpects) - from hence the whole tribe of affections, &c. and the feveral degrees in each, are very apparently deducible: fuppofing only this, I fay, which feems to lie in the original stamina of the body, and is fo far not to be accounted for, at least by me; which therefore, and which only I should term innate or ftrictly natural; fince every thing befides, that is comprehended under the name of natural appetite, &c. is properly fo far from being fuch, that it is evidently pofterior in the order of nature, and entirely grounded on the ideas which themselves arife from hence, and whofe innatenes in all fenfes of that word is now generally given up: - fuppofing then this one foundation laid by nature, a difference herein will be enough to conftitute the being more or lefs fenfible, or rational in general; and tend to make it more or less paffionate or mild, eager or indolent, &c. in whatfoever it applies itfelf to: But can this ever actually determine it to any one peculiar fett of objects, or have any tendency towards giving what we mean by a particular genius, tafte, or temper? That, and the whole conftitution of the human mind, or its predominant qualities, feem to arife afterwards from the particular affociations which we form ourselves, or learn of

others,

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