18 Ohio, 221; Coble v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100; Bonsall v. State, 35 Ind. 460; Sutton v. Johnson, 62 Ill. 209; Baker v. People, 105 Ill. 452; State v. Miller, 47 Wis. 530; People v. Barnes, 48 Cal. 551; Cesure v. State, 1 Tex. App. 19; State v. Boyland, 24 Kan 186; Cole v. Com. 5 Gratt. 696; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dec. 54.

The above authorities conclusively show that it is beyond the countenance of either precedent or statute to disturb this rule.

It is said by the court, in Shaffner v. Com. 72 Pa. 60, 13 Am. Rep. 651: "Logically the commission of an independent offense is not proof of itself of the commission of another crime. Yet it cannot be said to be without influence on the mind, for, certainly, if one be shown to be guilty of another crime equally heinous, it will prompt a more ready belief that he might have committed the one with which he is charged; it, therefore, predisposes the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner guilty." It tends to give undue prominence, force and weight to all the other evidence in the case for the prosecution. It detracts, in like manner, but in double portion, from all the evidence in his defense. It prejudices the jury against him, and inclines them to look with suspicion on all who come forward to testify in his favor. Hence, it is "not only unjust to the prisoner to compel him to acquit himself of two offenses instead of one, but it is detrimental to justice to burden a trial with multiplied issues, that tend to confuse and mislead the jury." State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245.

§ 154. An Exception Noted to the Above Rule.-It is familiar knowledge that few postulates of law are without exception. And to the general rule, which excludes evidence of another felony than the one under review, we find an exception in cases where several felonies are connected together. This view is upheld in Rex v. Ellis, 6 Barn. & C. 145, where the court says: "Generally speaking, it is not competent for a prosecutor to prove a man guilty by proving him guilty of another unconnected felony; but where several felonies are connected together, and form part of one entire transaction, the one is evidence to show the character of the other." Mr. Roscoe (Roscoe, Crim. Ev. 86) cites a case referred to by Lord Ellenborough in Rex v. Whiley, 2 Leach C. C. 985, where a man committed three burglaries in one night, and stole a shirt in one place and left it in another, and they were all so connected that the court heard the history of all

three burglaries, and Lord Ellenborough remarked that "if crimes do so intermix, the court must go through the detail." See also Pierce v. Hoffman, 24 Vt. 527; Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story, 142; Baalam v. State, 17 Ala. 433; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 243, 35 Am. Dec. 54; Com. v. Call, 21 Pick. 522, 32 Am. Dec. 284; Rex v. Dunn, 1 Moody, C. C. 150; Rex v. Wylie, 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 92; Rex v. Long, 6 Car. & P. 179; Rex v. Mogg, 4 Car. & P. 364; Rex v. Egerton, 1 Russ. & R. 375; Tharp v. State, 15 Ala. 757.

It is never competent upon a criminal trial to show that the defendant was guilty of an independent crime not connected with or leading up to the crime for which he is on trial, except for the purpose of showing motive, interest or guilty knowledge. Earle, J., in People v. Greenwall, 108 N. Y. 301.

It has been reasoned, but on grounds that will not be everywhere admitted, that, under certain indictments, evidence of previous crimes may be shown. Judge Rapallo says: "The cases in which offenses other than those charged in the indictment may be proven, for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge or intent, are very few." People v. Corbin, 56 N. Y. 363, 15 Am. Rep. 429. The very language employed indicates that there are cases where such evidence is relevant.

"To make one criminal act evidence of another, a connection. between them must have existed in the mind of the actor, linking them together for some purpose he intended to accomplish; or it must be necessary to identify the person of the actor, by a connection which shows that he who committed the one must have done the other. Without this obvious connection, it is not only unjust to the prisoner to compel him to acquit himself of two offenses instead of one, but it is detrimental to justice to burden a trial with multiplied issues that tend to confuse and mislead the jury. The most guilty criminal may be innocent of other offenses charged against him, of which, if fairly tried, he might acquit himself. From the nature and prejudicial character of such evidence, it is obvious it should not be received, unless the mind plainly perceives that the commission of the one tends, by a visible connection, to prove the commission of the other by the prisoner. If the evidence be so dubious that the judge does not clearly perceive the connection, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the prisoner, instead of suffering the minds of the

jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact, carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular guilt." Shaffner v. Com. 72 Pa. 60, 13 Am. Rep. 649 (Agnew, J.).

In the case of Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story, 135, that eminent jurist said: "In all cases where the guilt of the party depends upon the intent, purpose, or design with which the act is done, or upon his guilty knowledge thereof, I understand it to be a general rule, that collateral facts may be examined into, in which he bore a part, for the purpose of establishing such guilty intent, design, purpose, or knowledge. In short, wherever the intent or guilty knowledge of a party is a material ingredient in the issue of a case, these collateral facts [that is other acts and declarations of a similar character] tending to establish such intent or knowledge, are proper evidence."

It is certainly true that, in a criminal trial, evidence may be received of any one of a system of crimes, mutually dependent, but there must be a system established between the offense on trial, and that introduced, to connect it with the defendant. Hester v. Com. 85 Pa. 139. To make one criminal act evidence of another, some connection must exist between them; that the connection must be traced in the general design, purpose or plan of the defendant, or it may be shown by such circumstances of identification as necessarily tends to establish that the person who committed one must have been guilty of the other. The collateral or extraneous offense must form a link in the chain of circumstances or proofs relied upon for conviction; as an isolated or disconnected fact it is of no consequence; a defendant cannot be convicted of the offense charged simply because he is guilty of another offense.

In the case of Goerson v. Com. 99 Pa. 388, Mercur, J., giving the result of all the cases upon the admissibility of such testimony, says: "Yet, under some circumstances, evidence of another offense by the defendant may be given. Thus, it may be to establish identity; to show the act charged was intentional and willful, not accidental; to prove motive; to show guilty knowledge and purpose, and to rebut any inference of mistake; in case of death by poison, to prove the defendant knew the substance administered to be poison; to show him to be one of an organization banded together to commit crimes of the kind charged, and to connect the other offense with the one charged as part of the same transaction." Swan v. Com. 104 Pa. 218.

Where it is necessary to prove a particular intent in order to establish the offense charged, proof of previous acts of the same kind is admissible for the purpose of proving guilty knowledge or intent. In cases of uttering forged instruments; "receiving stolen property; passing worthless bank bills,-these, and many other cases might be referred to." See People v. Schweitzer, 23 Mich. 310, and note. See marginal note appended to the case of People v. Wakely, 62 Mich. 297.

If a prisoner upon trial for one offense does call out facts on cross-examination, without objection, tending to show that he is not guilty of another offense, this does not justify evidence on the part of the prosecution to prove that he is guilty of the other offense. The accused can only be tried for the crime charged; and this rule cannot be abrogated by evidence which may have been called out in relation to another crime. If a person on trial for stealing a horse gives evidence, without objection, that he did not on some other occasion steal other property, it would not be competent for the prosecution to introduce evidence that he was in fact guilty of the other crime; and especially not, if the evidence as to the other property came out incidentally upon crossexamination. A party does not acquire the right to give immaterial evidence because his adversary has done the same thing. The rule involved would apply when a party had given secondary evidence of a material fact, but does not unless the evidence itself is material. Otherwise, the parties could make every trial interminable, by litigating collateral questions. Coleman v. People, 55 N. Y. 81.

Another exception to the general rule that independent crimes cannot be proved, is found in that class of cases where acts are shown to have been done as part of the same plan or scheme of fraud. Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457. Where an act is shown to have been done by a party entrusted with money, and the inquiry is whether it was an act of embezzlement, other acts in the conduct of the same business are admissible as showing his criminal intent. Rex v. Ellis, 6 Barn. & C. 145; Com. v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 173; Com. v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575; Reg. v. Richardson, 2 Fost. & F. 343.

So where there is evidence of a conspiracy between the defendant and a deputy collector to defraud the revenue, by entering goods at an undervaluation, evidence of other transactions in the

conduct of the criminal enterprise is admissible. Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story, 135. Where a conspiracy to defraud is alleged, other fraudulent purchases than those set out in the indictment, made about the same time and in pursuance of the conspiracy, are admissible for the purpose of showing the intent with which the goods were purchased. Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 189, 48 Am. Dec. 596; Rex v. Roberts, 1 Campb. 399. In this class of cases the acts done are connected by unity of plan and motive, and therefore bear upon the purpose, the criminality of which is in question.

Judge Dixon in State v. Raymond, 53 N. J. L. 260, tabulates a series of exceptions to this general rule in the manner following: "One arises, where the circumstances of the crime indicate that they were both committed by the same person-as if two buildings should be fired by similar novel contrivances (Com. v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451) or, perhaps, the notorious Whitechapel murders. Another, when the defendant's perpetration of an extraneous crime shows that he had the opportunity of committing the crime in issue. Reg. v. Cobden, 3 Fost. & F. 833. Another, when the several crimes may have sprung from a single motive, aiming at the accomplishment of the same end. People v. Wood, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 681. Another exception exists, when the commission of a different offense discloses a motive for the commission of the offense charged; e. g., the defendant's adultery with a wife may be relevant on his trial for the murder of her husband. Com. v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386. Another, when one crime may have been perpetrated for, or means of committing, concealing or escaping from another. Rex v. Clewes, 4 Car. & P. 221. Exception is made also, when the acts charged to be criminal may reasonably be innocent, and are criminal only when performed with a certain intent or with knowledge of a certain fact; in such case, other acts of the defendant, though criminal, may be adduced to prove that he had such specific intent or knowledge. In this category stand the decisions with regard to the utterance of counterfeits, the making of false pretenses, the reception of stolen goods, the publication of libels, and, probably, occurrences claimed by the defendant to be accidental." Whart. Crim. Ev. § 50 and notes; Reg. v. Francis, L. R. 2 C. C. 128.

His honor concludes in the following language:

"And in general it may be said that whenever the defendant's