The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free WorldRowman & Littlefield, 2006 M04 1 - 304 páginas If the experts could point to any single book as a starting point for understanding the subject of intelligence from the late twentieth century to today, that single book would be Allen W. Dulles's The Craft of Intelligence. This classic of spycraft is based on Allen Dulles's incomparable experience as a diplomat, international lawyer, and America's premier intelligence officer. Dulles was a high-ranking officer of the CIA's predecessor--the Office of Strategic Services--and was present at the inception of the CIA, where he served eight of his ten years there as director. Here he sums up what he learned about intelligence from nearly a half-century of experience in foreign affairs. In World War II his OSS agents penetrated the German Foreign Office, worked with the anti-Nazi underground resistance, and established contacts that brought about the Nazi military surrender in North Italy. Under his direction the CIA developed both a dedicated corps of specialists and a whole range of new intelligence devices, from the U-2 high-altitude photographic plane to minute electronic listening and transmitting equipment. Dulles reveals much about how intelligence is collected and processed, and how the resulting estimates contribute to the formation of national policy. He discusses methods of surveillance, and the usefulness of defectors from hostile nations. His knowledge of Soviet espionage techniques is unrivaled, and he explains how the Soviet State Security Service recruited operatives and planted "illegals" in foreign countries. He spells out not only the techniques of modern espionage but also the philosophy and role of intelligence in a free society threatened by global conspiracies. Dulles also addresses the Bay of Pigs incident, denying that the 1961 invasion was based on a CIA estimate that a popular Cuban uprising would ensue. This account is enlivened with a wealth of personal anecdotes. It is a book for readers who seek wider understanding of the contribution of intelligence to our national security. |
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... developed countries of the world, Foster early saw grave new dangers to peace in the philosophy and policies of ... develop a comprehensive intelligence service. As the organizer and director of the Office of Strategic Services during ...
... developed countries of the world, Foster early saw grave new dangers to peace in the philosophy and policies of ... develop a comprehensive intelligence service. As the organizer and director of the Office of Strategic Services during ...
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... developed in such a fashion that it would be a serious omission not to bring them up to date; in other instances, cases which had not been publicly disclosed were surfaced in the press as accused spies came to trial, and I was now free ...
... developed in such a fashion that it would be a serious omission not to bring them up to date; in other instances, cases which had not been publicly disclosed were surfaced in the press as accused spies came to trial, and I was now free ...
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... developed and became the major foreign intelligence arm of the country. It was directed by military officers rather than by civilians or cabinet ministers. Political intelligence was left largely to the diplomats. Prussia up to 1871 was ...
... developed and became the major foreign intelligence arm of the country. It was directed by military officers rather than by civilians or cabinet ministers. Political intelligence was left largely to the diplomats. Prussia up to 1871 was ...
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... developed close personal and service relationships which remained intact after the war. In Switzerland I made contact with a group of French officers who had maintained the tradition of the French Deuxième Bureau and who helped to build ...
... developed close personal and service relationships which remained intact after the war. In Switzerland I made contact with a group of French officers who had maintained the tradition of the French Deuxième Bureau and who helped to build ...
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... develop a full-fledged intelligence arm nor did we have to, since we could rely largely on the British and French for military intelligence and particularly for order of battle. But we learned rapidly—due largely to a group of officers ...
... develop a full-fledged intelligence arm nor did we have to, since we could rely largely on the British and French for military intelligence and particularly for order of battle. But we learned rapidly—due largely to a group of officers ...
Contenido
CollectionEnter the Machine | |
Planning and Guidance | |
The Main OpponentThe Communist Intelligence Services | |
Confusing the Adversary | |
How Intelligence is Put to | |
The Man on the | |
Myths Mishaps and MischiefMakers | |
The Role of Intelligence in the Cold | |
Security in a Free Society | |
The Intelligence Service and Our Freedoms | |
Bibliography Photographs | |
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