The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free WorldRowman & Littlefield, 2006 M04 1 - 304 páginas If the experts could point to any single book as a starting point for understanding the subject of intelligence from the late twentieth century to today, that single book would be Allen W. Dulles's The Craft of Intelligence. This classic of spycraft is based on Allen Dulles's incomparable experience as a diplomat, international lawyer, and America's premier intelligence officer. Dulles was a high-ranking officer of the CIA's predecessor--the Office of Strategic Services--and was present at the inception of the CIA, where he served eight of his ten years there as director. Here he sums up what he learned about intelligence from nearly a half-century of experience in foreign affairs. In World War II his OSS agents penetrated the German Foreign Office, worked with the anti-Nazi underground resistance, and established contacts that brought about the Nazi military surrender in North Italy. Under his direction the CIA developed both a dedicated corps of specialists and a whole range of new intelligence devices, from the U-2 high-altitude photographic plane to minute electronic listening and transmitting equipment. Dulles reveals much about how intelligence is collected and processed, and how the resulting estimates contribute to the formation of national policy. He discusses methods of surveillance, and the usefulness of defectors from hostile nations. His knowledge of Soviet espionage techniques is unrivaled, and he explains how the Soviet State Security Service recruited operatives and planted "illegals" in foreign countries. He spells out not only the techniques of modern espionage but also the philosophy and role of intelligence in a free society threatened by global conspiracies. Dulles also addresses the Bay of Pigs incident, denying that the 1961 invasion was based on a CIA estimate that a popular Cuban uprising would ensue. This account is enlivened with a wealth of personal anecdotes. It is a book for readers who seek wider understanding of the contribution of intelligence to our national security. |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 27
Página
... responsibilities—that came later—but it was a period in which spies at home were as important as spies abroad, all of them manipulated by the same hand. One of the masters of both arts was Sir Francis Walsingham, who spent most of his ...
... responsibilities—that came later—but it was a period in which spies at home were as important as spies abroad, all of them manipulated by the same hand. One of the masters of both arts was Sir Francis Walsingham, who spent most of his ...
Página
... responsibility for its collection to be taken over by the army itself. In the period up to the outbreak of World War I, under the aegis of the General Staffs of most European armies a single military intelligence agency developed and ...
... responsibility for its collection to be taken over by the army itself. In the period up to the outbreak of World War I, under the aegis of the General Staffs of most European armies a single military intelligence agency developed and ...
Página
... responsibilities in intelligence work in the face of the threat of the dictatorships. The silent warfare between the intelligence services of both sides in World War II supplies many of the examples and case histories to which I shall ...
... responsibilities in intelligence work in the face of the threat of the dictatorships. The silent warfare between the intelligence services of both sides in World War II supplies many of the examples and case histories to which I shall ...
Página
... responsibility for it was assigned to Major (later General) George H. Sharpe, who appears to have been a fair-to-middling bureaucrat but is not known to have conceived or mounted significant intelligence operations on his own. However ...
... responsibility for it was assigned to Major (later General) George H. Sharpe, who appears to have been a fair-to-middling bureaucrat but is not known to have conceived or mounted significant intelligence operations on his own. However ...
Página
... has since remained the designation for intelligence in the American Army. This early G-2, however, from lack of interest and responsibility dwindled almost to the point of disappearance, with the result that World War I found us again.
... has since remained the designation for intelligence in the American Army. This early G-2, however, from lack of interest and responsibility dwindled almost to the point of disappearance, with the result that World War I found us again.
Contenido
CollectionEnter the Machine | |
Planning and Guidance | |
The Main OpponentThe Communist Intelligence Services | |
Confusing the Adversary | |
How Intelligence is Put to | |
The Man on the | |
Myths Mishaps and MischiefMakers | |
The Role of Intelligence in the Cold | |
Security in a Free Society | |
The Intelligence Service and Our Freedoms | |
Bibliography Photographs | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Términos y frases comunes
abroad action activities Agency agent Allied American appear areas Army attack authority become British called Central close collection Communism Communist course dangerous Defense Department developed direct early East effect embassy enemy espionage established estimates example executive fact field force foreign German give given hand important intelligence officer intelligence service interest internal Italy keep kind known later major matter means messages military missile Moscow nature never operations organization particularly party passed period personnel persons plans political position possible practice prepared President question reasons received responsibility result Russia secret Secretary sent side situation sometimes sources Soviet Soviet intelligence Soviet Union story success task technical turned United usually Washington West Western World