be an eye-witness of what was contriving against him. His constancy, however, was not shaken. He was very sensible, that though his authority in the command was divided, yet his skill in the art of war was not so.* This soon be came manifest. Minucius, grown arrogant with the advantage he had gained over his colleague, proposed that each should command a day alternately, or even a longer time. But Fabius rejected this proposal, as it would have exposed the whole army to danger while under the command of Minucius. He therefore chose to divide the troops, in order that it might be in his power to preserve, at least, that part which should fall to his share. Hannibal, fully informed of all that passed in the Roman camp, was overjoyed to hear of this dissention of the two commanders. He therefore laid a snare for the rash Minucius, who accordingly plunged headlong into it, and engaged the enemy on an eminence, in which an ambuscade was concealed. But his troops, being soon put into disorder, were just on the point of being cut to pieces, when Fabius, alarmed by the sudden outcries of the wounded, called aloud to his soldiers, "Let us hasten to the assistance of Minucius; let us fly and snatch the victory from the enemy, and extort from our fellow-citizens a confession of their fault." This succour was very seasonable, and compelled Hannibal to sound a retreat. The latter, as he was retiring, said, "That the cloud which had been long hovering on the summit of the mountains, had at last burst with a loud crack, and caused a mighty storm." So important and seasonable a service rendered by the dictator, opened the eyes of Minucius. He accordingly acknowledged his error, returned immediately to his duty and obedience, and showed that it is sometimes more glorious to know how to atone for a fault, than to have committed it, THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN SPAIN. In the beginning of this campaign, Cn. Scipio having suddenly attacked the Carthaginian fleet, commanded by Hamilcar, defeated it, and took twentyfive ships, with a great quantity of rich spoils. This victory made the Romans sensible that they ought to be particularly attentive to the a fairs of Spain, because Hannibal could draw considerable supplies both of men and money from that country. Accordingly they sent a fleet thither, the command of which was given to P. Scipio, who, after his arrival in Spain, having joined his brother, did the commonwealth very great service. Till that time the Romans had never ventured beyond the Ebro. They then were satisfied with having gained the friendship of the nations situated between that river and Italy, and confirming it by alliances; but under Publius, they crossed the Ebro, and carried their arms much farther up into the country. The circumstance which contributed most to promote their affairs, was the treachery of a Spaniard in Saguntum. Hannibal had left there the children of the most distinguished families in Spain, whom he had taken as hostages. Abelox, (for so this Spaniard was called,) persuaded Bostar, the governor of the city, to send back these young men into their country, in order, by that means, to attach the inhabitants more firmly to the Carthaginian interest. He himself was charged with this commission; but he carried them to the Romans, who afterwards delivered them to their relations, and by so acceptable a present, acquired their amity. THE BATTLE OF CANNE. THE next spring, C. Terentius Varro, and L. Æmilius Paulus, were chosen consuls at Rome. In this campaign, which was the third of the second Punic war, the Romans did what had never been practised before, viz. they composed the army of eight legions, each consisting of five thousand men, Satis fidens haudquaquam cum imperii jure artem imperandi æquatam.-Liv. l. xxii. n. 26. A. M. 3789, A. Rome, 533. Polyb. 1. iii. p. 255–268. I.iv. l. xxii. n. 84—54. exclusive of the allies. For, as we have already observed, the Romans never raised but four legions, each of which consisted of about four thousand foot, and three hundred horse.* They never, except on the most important occasions, made them consist of five thousand of the one, and four hundred of the other. As for the troops of the allies, the number of their infantry, was equal to that of the legions, but they had three times as many horse. Each of the consuls had commonly half the troops of the allies, with two legions, that they might act separately; and all these forces were very seldom used at the same time, and in the same expedition. Here the Romans had not only four, but eight legions, so important did the affair appear to them. The senate even thought proper that the two consuls of the foregoing year, Servilius and Attilius, should serve in the army as proconsuls; but the latter could not go into the field, in cousequence of his great age. Varro, at his setting out from Rome, had declared openly that he would fall upon the eneiny the very first opportunity, and put an end to the war; adding, that it would never be terminated, as long as men of the character of Fabius should be at the head of the Roman armies. An advantage which he gained over the Carthaginians, of whom near seventeen hundred were killed, greatly increased his boldness and arrogance. As for Hannibal, he considered this loss as a real advantage, being persuaded that it would serve as a bait to the consul's rashness, and urge him on to a battle, which he anxiously desired. It was afterwards known, that Hannibal was reduced to such a scarcity of provisions, that he could not possibly have subsisted ten days longer. The Spaniards were already meditating to leave him. So that there would have been an end of Hannibal and his army, if his good fortune had not thrown a Varro in his way. Both armies, having often removed from place to place, came in sight of each other near Cannæ, a little town in Apulia, situated on the river Aufidus. As Hannibal was encamped in a level, open country, and his cavalry much superior to that of the Romans, Æmilius did not think proper to engage in such a place. He was for drawing the enemy into an irregular spot, where the infantry might have the greatest share in the action. But his colleague, who was . wholly inexperienced, was of a contrary opinion. Such is the disadvantage of a divided command; jealousy, a difference of disposition, or a diversity of views, seldom failing to create a dissention between the two generals. The troops on either side were, for some time, contented with slight skir mishes. But at last, one day when Varro had the command, for the two consuls took it by turns, preparations were made on both sides for battle. Emilius had not been consulted; yet, though he extremely disapproved the conduct of his colleague, as it was not in his power to prevent it, he seconded him to the utmost. Hannibal, after having pointed out to his soldiers that being superior in cavalry, they could not possibly have pitched upon a better spot for fighting, had it been left to their choice, thus addressed them: "Return thanks to the gods for having brought the enemy hither, that you may triumph over them; and thank me also for having reduced the Romans to the necessity of coming to an engagement. After three great victories, won successively, is not the remembrance of your own actions sufficient to inspire you with courage? By former battles, you are become masters of the open country, but this will put you in possession of all the cities, and, I presume to say it, of all the riches and power of the Romans. It is not words that we want, but actions. I trust in the gods that you shall soon see my promises verified." The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Romans, including the allies, a:nounted to fourscore thousand foot, and a little more than six thousand horse, and that of the Carthaginians consisted but of forty thousand foot, all well disciplined, and of ten thousand horse. Æmilius com Polybius supposes only two hundred horse in each legion; but J. Lipsius thinks that this is a mistake, either of the author or transcriber manded the right wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius, one of the consuls of the last year, was posted in the centre. Hannibal, who had the art of taking all advantages, had posted himself so that the wind Vulturnus,* which rises at certain stated times, should blow directly in the faces of the Romans during the fight, and cover them with dust; then keeping the river Aufidus on his left, and posting his cavalry in the wings, he formed his main body of the Spanish and Gallic infantry, which he posted in the centre, with half the African heavy armed foot on their right, and half on the left, on the same line with the cavalry. His army being thus drawn up, he put himself at the head of the Spanish and Gallic infantry; and having drawn them out of the line, advanced to begin the battle, rounding his front as he advanced nearer the enemy; and extending his flanks in the shape of a half-moon, in order that he might leave no interval between his main body and the rest of the line, which consisted of the heavy-armed infantry, who had not moved from their posts. The fight soon began, and the Roman legions that were in the wings, seeing their centre warmly attacked, advanced to charge the enemy in flank. Han nibal's main body, after a brave resistance, finding themselves furiously attacked on all sides, gave way, being overpowered by numbers, and retired through the interval they had left in the centre of the line. The Romans having pursued them thither with eager confusion, the two wings of the Afri-can infantry, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order, wheeled about on a sudden towards that void space in which the Romans, who were already fatigued, had thrown themselves in disorder, and attacked them vigorously on both sides, without leaving them time to recover themselves, or leaving them ground to form. In the mean time, the two wings of the cavalry, having defeated those of the Romans, which were much inferior to them, and, in order to pursue the broken and scattered squadrons, having left only as many forces. as were necessary to keep them from rallying, advanced and charged the rear of the Roman infantry, which, being surrounded at once on every side by the enemy's horse and foot, was all cut to pieces, after having fought with unparalleled bravery. Æmilius, being covered with the wounds he had received in the fight, was afterwards killed by a body of the enemy, to whom he was not known; and with him two quæstors, one and twenty military tribunes, many who had been either consuls or prætors; Servilius, one of the last year's consuls, Minucius, the late general of horse to Fabius, and fourscore senators. Above seventy thousand men fell in this battle ; and the Carthaginians, so great was their fury,‡ did not give over the slaughter, till Hannibal, in the very heat of it, called out to them several times, Stop, soldiers; spare the vanquished. Ten thousand men, who had been left to guard the camp, surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle. Varro, the consul, retired to Venusia, with only seventy horse; and about four thousand men escaped into the neighbouring cities. Thus Hannibal remained master of the field, he being chiefly indebted for this, as well as for his former victories, to the superiority of his cavalry over that of the Romans. He lost four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred horse. Maharbal, one of the Carthaginian generals, advised Hannibal to march directly to Rome, promising him, that within five days they should sup in the capitol. Hannibal answering, that it was an affair which required mature examination, "Isee," replied, Maharbal, "that the gods have not endowed the same man with every talent. You, Hannibal, know how to conquer, but not to make the best use of a victory."§ A violent burning wind, blowing south south-east, which, in this flat and sandy country, raised clouds of hot dust, and blinded and choked the Romans. Livy lessens very much the number of the slain, making them amount but to about forty-three thousand. But Polybius ought rather to be believed. Duo maximi exercitus cæsi ad hostium satietatem, donec Annibal diceret militi suo, Parce ferro.-Flor. I. i. c. 6. Tum Maharbal: Non omnia nimirum eidem Dii dedere. Vincere scis, Annibal, victoriâ uti nescis.Liv. I. xxii. n. 51. It is pretended that this delay saved Rome and the empire. Many authors, and among them Livy, charge Hannibal, on this occasion, with being guilty of a capital error. But others, more reserved, are not for condemning, without evident proofs, so renowned a general, who, in the rest of his conduct, was never wanting, either in prudence to make choice of the best expedients, 1 or in readiness to put his designs in execution. They are, moreover, inclined to judge favourably of him, from the authority, or at least the silence of Polybius, who, speaking of the memorable consequences of this celebrated battle, says, that the Carthaginians were firmly persuaded, that they should possess themselves of Rome at the first assault; but, then, he does not mention how this could possibly have been effected, as that city was very populous, warlike, strongly fortified, and defended with a garrison of two legions; nor does he any where give the least hint that such a project was feasible, or that Hannibal did wrong in not attempting to put it in execution. And, indeed, if we examine matters more narrowly, we shall find, that, according to the common maxims of war, it could not be undertaken. It is certain that Hannibal's whole infantry, before the battle, amounted but to forty thousand men; and as six thousand of these had been slain in the action, and doubtless many more either wounded or disabled, there could remain but six or seven-and-twenty thousand foot for service. Now this number was not suffi cient to invest so large a city as Rome, which had a river running through it; nor to attack it in form, because they had neither engines, ammunition, nor any other things necessary for carrying on a siege. For want of these, Hannibal, even after his victory at Thrasymene, miscarried in his attempt upon Spoletum; and, soon after the battle of Cannæ, was forced to raise the siege of Casilinum, though a city of little note or strength. It cannot be denied, that, had he miscarried on the present occasion, nothing less could have been expected, than that he must have been irrecoverably lost. However, to form a judgment of this matter, a man ought to be a soldier, and should perhaps have been upon the spot. This is an old dispute, on which none but those who are perfectly well skilled in the art of war should pretend to give their opinion, Soon after the battle of Cannæ, Hannibal despatched his brother Mago to Carthage, with the news of his victory ;t and at the same time to demand succours, in order that he might be enabled to put an end to the war. Mago, on his arrival, made, in full senate, a lofty speech, in which he extolled his brother's exploits, and displayed the great advantages he had gained over the Romans. And, to give a more lively idea of the greatness of the victory, by speaking in some measure to the eye, he poured out in the middle of the senate a bushel of gold rings, which had been taken from the fingers of such of the Roman nobility as had fallen in the battle of Cannæ. He concluded with demanding money, provisions, and fresh troops. All the spectators were struck with an extraordinary joy, upon which Imilcon, a warm advocate for Hannibal, fancying he now had a fair opportunity to insult Hanno, the chief of the opposite faction, asked him, whether he was still dissatisfied with the war they were carrying on against the Romans, and was for having Hannibal delivered up to them? Hanno, without discovering the least emotion, replied, that he was still of the same mind, and that the victories they so much boasted, supposing them real, could not give him joy, but only in proportion as they should be made subservient to an advantageous peace; he then under took to prove, that the mighty exploits, on which they insisted so much, were wholly chimerical and imaginary. "I have cut to pieces," says he, continuing Mago's speech, "the Roman armies; send me some troops. What more could you ask, had you been conquered? I have twice seized upon the enemy's camp, full, no doubt, of provisions of every kind.-Send me provi † Liv. 1. xxiii. n. 11-14. Liv. 1. xxii. n. 9. Ibid. 1. xxiii. n. 18. Pliny, 1. xxxiii. c. 1, says, that there were three bushels sent to Carthage. Livy observes, that some authors make them amount to three bushels and a half, but he thinks it most probable that there was bul one, ¿ xxxiii. n. 12.-Florus, l. ii. c. 16, makes it two bushels. sions and money. Could you have talked otherwise, had you lost your camp" He then asked Mago, whether any of the Latin nations were come over to Hannibal, and whether the Romans had made him any proposals of peace? To this, Mago answering in the negative; "I then perceive," replied Hanno "that we are no farther advanced than when Hannibal first landed in Italy.' The inference he drew from hence was, that neither men nor money ought to be sent. But Hannibal's faction prevailing at that time, no regard was paid to Hanno's remonstrances, which were considered merely as the effect of prejudice and jealousy; and accordingly, orders were given for levying the supplies of men and money which Hannibal required. Mago set out immediately for Spain, to raise twenty-four thousand foot, and four thousand horse, in that country; but these levies were afterwards stopped, and sent another way, so eager was the opposite faction to counteract the designs of a general whcin they utterly abhorred. In Rome, a consul who had fled was thanked because he had not despaired of the commonwealth; but at Carthage, people were almost angry with Hannibal for being victorious.* Hanno could never forgive him the advantages he had gained in this war, because he had undertaken it in opposition to his counsel. Thus, being more jealous for the honour of his own opinions than for the good of his country, and a greater enemy to the Cartha ginian general than to the Romans, he did all that lay in his power to prevent future successes, and to frustrate those already acquired. HANNIBAL TAKES UP HIS WINTER-QUARTERS IN CAPUA. THE battle of Cannæ subjected the most powerful nations of Italy to Hannibal,t drew over to his interest Græcia Magna,‡ with the city of Tarentum ; and so wrested from the Romans their most ancient allies, among whom the Capuans held the first rank. This city, by the fertility of its soil, its advantageous situation, and the blessings of a long peace, had risen to great wealth and power. Luxury, and a flow of pleasures, the usual attendants on wealth, had corrupted the minds of all its citizens, who, from their natural disposition, were but too much inclined to voluptuousness and all excesses. Hannibal made choice of this city for his winter-quarters.§ Here it was that his soldiers, who had sustained the most grievous toils, and braved the most formidable dangers, were overthrown by delights and a profusion of all things, into which they plunged with the greater eagerness, as they, till then, had been strangers to them. Their courage was so greatly enervated in this bewitching retirement, that all their after efforts were owing rather to the fame and splendour of their former victories, than to their present strength. When Hannibal marched his forces out of the city, they would have been taken for other men, and the reverse of those who had so lately marched into it. Accustomed, during the winter season, to commodious lodgings, to ease and plenty, they were no longer able to bear hunger, thirst, long marches, watchings, and the other toils of war; not to mention, that all obedience, all discipline, were entirely laid aside. I only transcribe on this occasion from Livy, who, if he may be credited, thinks Hannibal's stay at Capua a reproach to his conduct; and pretends that there he was guilty of an infinitely greater error, than when he neglected to march directly to Rome after the battle of Cannæ. For this delay, says Livy, might seem only to have retarded his victory; whereas this last misconduct rendered him absolutely incapable of ever defeating the enemy. In a word, * De St. Evremond. † Liv. 1. xxiii. n. 4-18. + Cæterum quum Græci omnem fere oram maritimam coloniis suis e Græciâ deductis, obsiderent, &c. But after the Greeks had, by their colonies, possessed themselves of almost all the maritime coast, this very country, together with Sicily, was called Græcia Magna, &c.-Cluver. Geograph. 1. iii. c. 30. Ibi partem majorem hiemis exercitum in tectis habuit; adversus omnia humana mala sæpe ac diu do rantem, bonis inexpertum atque insuetum. Itaque quos nulla mali vicerat vis, perdidere nimia bona ac voluptates immodica, et co impensidus, quo avidius ex insolentiâ in eas se merserant.-Liv. 1. xxiii. n. 18. Illa enim cunctatio distulisse modo victoriam videri potuit, hic error vires ademisse ad vincendum Liv. 1, xxiii. n. 18. VOL. I. 15 K2 |