That in all cases or questions wherein the sovereign | the different counties, their wants, their abilities, ties of the individual states may be affected, or whereby their authority over their own citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the general government within the several states augmented, each state shall have equal suffrage. That in the appointment of all civil officers of the general government, in the election of whom the second branch may by the constitution have part, each state shall have equal suffrage. their dispositions, and the characters of the principal people, respecting their integrity, capacities, and qualifications for offices? Does not the present construc tion of our executive provide well for these particu. lars? And during the number of years it has existed, have its errors or failures in answering the end of its appointment been more or greater than might have been expected from a single person? But an individual is more easily watched and controlled than any greater number." That in fixing the salaries of such officers, in all allowances for public services, and generally in all appropriations and dispositions of money to be drawn out of the general treasury, and in all laws for supply-him? ing the treasury, the delegates of the several states shall have suffrage in proportion to the sums their respect ive states had actually contributed to that treasury from their taxes or internal excises. That in case the general duties should be laid by impost on goods imported, a liberal estimation shall be made of the amount of such impost paid in the price of the commodities by those states that import but little, and a proportionate addition shall be allowed of suffrage to such states, and an equal diminution of the suffrage of the states importing. REMARKS. The steady course of public measures is most probably to be expected from a number. A single person's measures may be good: the suc cessor often differs in opinion on those measures, and adopts others: often is ambitious of distinguishing himself, by opposing them, and offering new projects: one is peaceably disposed; another may be fond of war, &c. Hence foreign states can never have that confidence in the treaties or friendship of such a government, as in that which is conducted by a number. The single head may be sick; who is to conduct the public affairs in that case? When he dies, who are to conduct till a new election? If a council, why not continue them? Shall we not be harassed with factions for the election of successors? become, like Poland, weak from our dissensions. On this I would ask, who is to watch and control And by what means is he to be controlled? Will not those means, whatever they are, and in whatever body vested, be subject to the same inconveniences of expense, delay, obstruction of good intentions, &c., which are objected to the present executive? II. THE DURATION OF THE APPOINTMENT. "This should be governed by the following principles, the independency of the magistrate, and the stability of his administration: neither of which can be secured but by putting both beyond the reach of every annual gust of folly and of faction." On this it may be asked, ought it not also to be put beyond the reach of every triennial, quinquennial, or septennial gust of folly and faction, and in short beyond the reach of folly and of faction at any period whatever? Does not this reasoning aim at establishing a monarchy at least for life, like that of Poland? or, to prevent the inconveniences such as that king. dom is subject to in a new election on every decease? Are the freemen of Pennsylvania convinced from a view of the history of such governments, that it will be for their advantage to submit themselves to a government of such construction? III. ON THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH. · A plural legislature is as necessary to good government as a single executive. It is not enough that your legislature should be numerous, it should also be divided. Numbers alone are not a sufficient barrier against the impulses of passion, the combinations of interest, the intrigues of faction, the haste of folly, or the spirit of encroachment. One division should watch over and con. trol the other; supply its wants, correct its blunders, and cross its designs, should they be criminal or erroneous. Wisdom is the specific quality of the legislature, grows out of the number of the body, and is made up of the portions of sense and knowledge which each member brings to it." On this it may be asked, may not the wisdom brought to the legislature by each member be as effectual a barrier against the impulses of passion, &c., when the members are united in one body as when they are divided? If one part of the legislature may pulses of passion, the combinations of interest, the incontrol the operations of the other, may not the imtrigues of faction, the haste of folly, or the spirit of en Consider the present distracted condition of Holland: they had at first a stadtholder, the prince of Orange, a man of undoubted and great merit; they found some inconveniences, however, in the extent of powers an nexed to that office, and exercised by a single person. On his death, they resumed and divided those powers among the states and cities; but there has been a constant struggle since between that family and the nation. In the last century the then prince of Orange found means to inflame the populace against their magistrates, excite a general insurrection, in which an excellent minister, Dewit, was murdered, all the old magistrates displaced, and the stadtholder re-invested with all the former powers. In this century the father of the present stadtholder, having married a British princess, did, by exciting another insurrection, force from the nation a decree, that the stadtholdership should be thenceforth hereditary in his family. And now his son, being suspected of having favoured Eng-croachment in one of those bodies obstruct the good land in the late war, and thereby lost the confidence of the nation, is forming an internal faction to support his power, and reinstate his favourite the duke of Brunswick; and he holds up his family alliances with England and Prussia to terrify opposition. It was this conduct of the stadtholder which induced the states to proposed by the other, and frustrate its advantages to when a province under the government of the proprie. the public? Have we not experienced in this state, tors, the mischiefs of a second branch existing in the proprietary family countenanced and aided by an aristocratic counsel? How many delays and what great recur to the protection of France and put their troops business; and what a train of mischiefs, even to the expenses were occasioned in carrying on the public under a French, rather than the stadtholder's German general, the duke of Brunswick: and this is the source preventing of the defence of the province during seve of all the present disorders in Holland, which if theiquitous demand that the proprietary property should ral years, when distressed by an Indian war, by the instadtholder has abilities equal to his inclinations, will, probably, after a ruinous and bloody civil war, end in establishing an hereditary monarchy in his family. QUERIES and REMARKS on a Paper, entitled, HINT I. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. be exempt from taxation! The wisdom of a few members in one single legislative body, may it not frequently stifle bad motions in their infancy, and so prevent their being adopted? whereas if those wise men, in case of a double legislature, should happen to be in that branch wherein the motion did not arise, may it not, after being adopted by the other, occasion long disputes and contentions between the two bodies, expen sive to the public, obstructing the public business, and promoting factions among the people, many tempers naturally adhering obstinately to measures they have once publicly adopted? Have we not seen in one of our neighbouring states, a bad measure adopted by one branch of the legislature, for want of the assistance of some more intelligent members who had been packed into the other, occasion many debates, conducted with much asperity, which could not be settled but by an expensive general appeal to the public? And have we not seen in another neighbouring state, a similar difference between the two branches, occasioning long debates and contentions, whereby he state was prevented for many months enjoying the advantage of having senators in the congress of the United States? And has our present legislative, in one assembly, committed any errors of importance, which they have not remedied, or may not easily remedy; more easily probably than if divided into two branches? And if the wisdom brought by the members to the assembly is divided into two branches, may it not be too weak in each, to support a good measure or obstruct a bad one? The division of the legislature into two or three branches in England, was it the product of wisdom, or the effect of necessity, arising from the pre-existing prevalence of an odious feudal system? which govern ment, notwithstanding this division, is now become, in fact, an absolute monarchy; since the KING, by brib ing the representatives with the people's money, carries, by his ministers, all the measures that please him; which is equivalent to governing without a parliament, and renders the machine of government much more complex and expensive, and from its being more complex, more easily put out of order. Has not the famous political fable of the snake with two heads and one body, some useful instruction contained in it? She was going to a brook to drink, and in her way was to pass through a hedge, a twig of which opposed her direct course; one head chose to go on the right side of the twig, the other on the left: so that time was spent in the contest, and before the decision was completed, the poor snake died with thirst. Hence it is that the two branches should be elected by persons différently qualified; and in short, that, as far as possible, they should be made to represent different inter. ests. Under this reasoning, I would establish a legisla. ture of two houses. The upper, should represent the property; the lower, the population of the state. The upper should be chosen by freemen possessing in lands and houses one thousand pounds; the lower, by all such as had resided four years in the country, and paid taxes. The first should be chosen for four, the last for two years. They should be in authority co-equal." Several questions may arise upon this proposition. 1st. What is the proportion of freemen possessing lands and houses of one thousand pounds value, compared to that of freemen whose possessions are inferior? Are they as one to ten? Are they even as one to twenty? I should doubt whether they are as one to fifty. If this minority is to choose a body expressly to control that which is to be chosen by the great majority of the freemen, what have this great majority done to forfeit so great a portion of their right in elections? Why is this power of control, contrary to the spirit of all democracies, to be vested in a minority, instead of a majority? Then is it intended, or is it not, that the rich should have a vote in the choice of members for the lower house, while those of inferior property are deprived of the right of voting for members of the upper house? And why should the upper house, chosen by a minority, have equal power with the lower chosen by a majority? Is it supposed that wisdom is the necessary concomitant of riches, and that one man worth a thousand pounds must have as much wisdom as twenty who have each only nine hundred and ninety-nine; and why is property to be represented at all?-Suppose one of our Indian nations should now agree to form a civil society; each individual would bring into the stock of the society little more property than his gun and his blanket, for at present he has no other; we know that when one of them has attempted to keep a few swine, he has not been able to maintain a property in them, his neighbours thinking they have a right to kill and eat them whenever they want provision, it being one of their maxims, that hunting is free for all: the accumulation therefore of property in such a society, and its security to individuals in every society, must be an effect of the protection afforded to it by the joint strength of the society, in the execution of its laws. Private property, therefore, is a creature of society, and is subject to the calls of that society whenever its necessities shail require it, even to its last farthing; its contributions, therefore, to the public exigencies, are not to be considered as conferring a benefit on the public, entitling the contributors to the distinctions of honour and power; but as the return of an obligation previously received, or the payment of a just debt. The combinations of civil society are not like those of a set of merchants who club their property in different proportions for building and freighting a ship, and may therefore have some right to vote in the disposition of the voyage in a greater or less degree, according to their respective contributions: but the important ends of civil society, and the personal securities of life and liberty, there remain the same in every member of the society; and the poorest continues to have an equal claim to them with the most opulent, whatever difference time, chance, or industry may occasion in their circumstances. On these considerations I am sorry to see the signs this paper I have been considering affords, of a disposition among some of our people to commence an aristocracy, by giving the rich a predominancy in government, a choice peculiar to themselves in one half the legislature to be proudly called the UPPER house, and the other branch chosen by the majority of the people, degraded by the denomination of the LOWER, and giving to this upper house a permanency of four years, and but two to the lower. I hope therefore, that our representatives in the convention will not hastily go into these innovations, but take the advice of the Prophet,-" Stand in the old ways, view the ancient paths, consider them well, and be not among those that are given to change." Speech of Dr. Franklin in the Convention on the subject of Salaries. SIR, It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan, for which we are so much obliged to the honourable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the executive branch, I happen to differ; and as my opinion may ap pear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine. I think I see inconveniencies in the ap pointment of salaries, I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary great advantages. Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence in the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power and the love of money. Separately, each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men, a post of honour that shall at the same time be a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is, that renders the British government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true source of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the nation, distracting its coun cils, hurrying it sometimes into fruitless and mischiev ous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonourable terms of peace. And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of charac ters? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions.and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your govern. ment, and be your rulers. And these, too, will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation; for their vanquished competitors of the same spirit and from the same motives, will perpetually be endeavour. ing to distress their administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people. Besides these evils, sir, though we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations; and there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them. Hence, as all history informs us, there has been in every state and kingdom, a constant kind of warfare between the governing and the governed; the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the princes or enslaving of the people. Generally, indeed, the ruling power carries its point, and we see the revenue of princes constantly increas ing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but al- | is not seconded or accepted, I must be contented with ways in want of more. The more the people are dis- the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly, contented with the oppression of taxes, the greater and done my duty. need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans, and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred who would not if he could, follow the example of Pharaoh,-get first all the people's money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children servants for ever. It will be said, that we do not propose to establish kings.-I know it. But there is a natural inclination in man kind to kingly government. It sometimes relieves them from aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among citizens; and that they like. I am apprehensive, therefore,-perhaps too apprehensive, that the government of these states, may in future times end in a monarchy. But this catastrophe, I think, may be long delayed, if in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction, and tumult, by making our posts of honour places of profit. If we do, I fear, that though we employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number will in time be set aside; it will only nourish the foetus of a king, (as the respectable gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it,) and a king will the sooner be set over us. It may be imagined by some, that this is an Utopian idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the executive department, without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The high sheriff of a county in England is an honourable office, but not a profitable one. It is rather expensive, and therefore not sought for. But yet it is executed, and well executed, usually by some of the principal gentlemen of the county. In France, the office of counsellor, or member of their judiciary parliament, is more honourable. It is there fore purchased at a high price: there are indeed fees on law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more than three per cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore, as legal interest is there at five per cent., they in fact pay two per cent., for being allowed to do the judiciary business of the nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not, however, mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our judiciary department. I only bring the instance to show that the pleasure of doing good and serving their country, and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction. Another instance is that of a respectable society, who have made the experiment, and practised it with success, now more than a hundred years.-I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them that they are not to go to law, but in their controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences. In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty; and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honourable to be so employed, but it was never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites. And indeed in all cases of public service, the less the profit the greater the honour. To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen the greatest and most important of our offices, that of general of our armies, executed for eight years together, without the smallest salary, by a patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and distresses, in common with the other brave men his military friends and companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? and shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the United States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful council, for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed? Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute, well and faithfully, the office in question. Sir, the saving of the salaries, that may at first be proposed, is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is that I move the amendment. If it Speech of Dr. Franklin in a Committee of the Convention, on the Proportion of Representation and Votes. MR. CHAIRMAN,-It has given me great pleasure to observe that till this point, the Proportion of Representation, came before us, our debates were carried or with great coolness and temper. If any thing of a contrary kind has on this occasion appeared, I hope it will not be repeated; for we are sent hither to consult, not to contend, with each other; and declarations of a fixed opinion and of determined resolutions never to change it, neither enlighten nor convince us: positiveness and warmth on one side naturally beget their like on the other; and tend to create and augment discord, and division, in a great concern, wherein harmony and union are extremely necessary, to give weight to our councils, and render them effectual in promoting and securing the common good. I must own, that I was originally of opinion it would be better if every member of congress, or our nationa council, were to consider himself rather as a representative of the whole, than as an agent for the interests of a particular state, in which case the proportion of members for each state would be of less consequence, and it would not be very material whether they voted by states or individually. But as I find this is not to be expected, I now think the number of representa tives should bear some proportion to the number of the represented, and that the decisions should be by the majority of members, not by the majority of states. This is objected to from an apprehension that the greater states would then swallow up the smaller. I do not at present clearly see what advantage the greater states could propose to themselves, by swallow. ing the smaller, and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recollect that in the beginning of this century, when the union was proposed of the two kingdoms, England and Scotland, the Scotch patriots were full of fears, that unless they had an equal number of representatives in parliament, they should be ruined by the superiority of the English. They finally agreed, however, that the different proportions of im portance in the union, of the two nations, should be attended to; whereby they were to have only forty members in the house of commons, and only sixteen of their peers were to sit in the house of lords; a very great inferiority of numbers! And yet to this day I do not recollect that any thing has been done in the parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland; and whoever looks over the lists of public officers civil and military of that nation, will find, I believe, that the North Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of emolument. But, sir, in the present mode of voting by states, it is equally in the power of the lesser states to swallow up the greater; and this is mathematically demon. strable. Suppose, for example, that seven smaller states had each three members in the house, and the six larger to have, one with another, six members. And that upon a question, two members of each smal ler state should be in the affirmative, and one in the negative, they will make Affirmatives And that all the larger states 14 Negatives 7 Negatives 36 In all 43 It is then apparent, that the 14 carry the question against the 43, and the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the common practice of assemblies in all countries and ages. The greater states, sir, are naturally as unwilling to have their property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller are to leave theirs in the disposition of the greater. An honourable gentleman has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of equalizing the states. It appears to me an equitable one; and I should, for my own part, not be against such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province had a different con stitution, some with greater, others with fewer privi leges, it was of importance to the borderers, when their boundaries were contested, whether by running the division lines they were placed on one side or the other. At present, when such differences are done away, it is less material. The interest of a state is made up of the interests of its individual members. If they are not injured, the state is not injured. Small states are more easily, well, and happily governed than large ones. If, therefore, in such an equal division, it should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to the giving a part of it to New Jersey, and another to Delaware; but as there would probably be considerable difficulties in adjusting such a division; and however equally made at first, it would be continually varying by the augmenta tion of inhabitants in some states, and their more fixed proportion in others; and thence frequent occasion for new divisions; I beg leave to propose for the consideration of the committee another mode, which appears to me to be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and more permanent in its nature. Let the weakest state say what proportion of money or force it is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the union. Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal proportion. The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the disposition of congress. The congress in this case to be composed of an equal number of delegates from each state: And their decisions to be by the majority of individual members voting. happened, sir, that we have not hitherto once thought of humbly applying to the Fatl er of Lights to illuminate our understandings?-In the beginning of the contest with Britain, when we were sensible of danger, we had daily prayers in this room for the divine protection! Our prayers, sir, were heard-and they were graciously answered. All of us, who were engaged in the struggle, must have observed frequent instances of a superintending Providence in our favour. To that kind Providence we owe this happy opportunity of consulting in peace on the means of establishing our future national felicity. And have we now forgotten that powerful friend?--or do we imagine we no longer need its assistance.-I have lived, sir, a long time; and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth, That GOD governs in the affairs of men! And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground with out his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid?-We have been assured, sir, in the Sacred Writings, that "except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it." I firmly be lieve this; and I also believe, that without his concurring aid, we shall succeed in this political building no better than the builders of Babel: we shall be divided by our little partial local interests, our projects will be confounded, and we ourselves shall become a reproach and a by-word down to future ages. And what is worse, mankind may hereafter, from this unfortunate instance, despair of establishing government by human wisdom, and leave it to chance, war, and conquest. I therefore beg leave to move, If these joint and equal supplies should on particular That henceforth prayers, imploring the assistance occasions not be sufficient, let congress make requisi- of Heaven, and its blessing on our deliberations, be tions on the richer and more powerful states for fur-held in this assembly every morning before we proceed ther aids, to be voluntarily afforded; so leaving each state the right of considering the necessity and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or less as it should be found proper. to business; and that one or more of the clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that service. [Note by Dr. Franklin.]" The convention, except three or four persons, thought prayers unnecessary!!" Tais mode is not new; it was formerly practised with success by the British government, with respect to Ireland and the colonies. We sometimes gave even more than they expected or thought just to accept; and in the last war, carried on while we were united, they gave us back in five years a million sterling. We Dr. Franklin's private sentiments with resshould probably have continued such voluntary con- pect to this new constitution, may be gathertributions, whenever the occasion appeared to require them for the common good of the empire. It was noted from the following extracts from letters till they chose to force us, and to deprive us of the he wrote about this time to some of his friends. merit and pleasure of voluntary contributions, that we refused and resisted. Those contributions, however, were to be disposed of at the pleasure of a government in which we had no representative. I am therefore persuaded that they will not be refused to one in which the representation shall be equal. My learned colleague has already mentioned, that the present mode of voting by states, was submitted to originally by congress, under a conviction of its im propriety, inequality, and injustice. This appears in the words of their resolution. It is of Sept. 6, 1774. The words are, - Resolved, That in determining questions in this Congress, each colony or province shall have one vote: the congress not.being possessed of, or at present able to procure, materials for ascertaining the importance of each colony" "To M. Veillard, Passy. "PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 17th, 1788. "I sent you with my last a copy of the new constitution proposed for the United States, by the late general convention. I sent one also to our excellent friend the duke de la Rochefoucault. "I attended the business of the convention faithfully for four months. Inclosed you have the last speech I made in it.. Six states have already adopted the constitution, and there is now little doubt of its being accepted by a Dr. Franklin's Motion for Prayers in the sufficient number to carry it into execution, Convention. MR. PRESIDENT,-The small progress we have made after four or five weeks' close attendance and continual reasonings with each other, our different sentiments on almost every question, several of the last producing of the imperfection of the human understanding. We indeed seem to feel our own want of political wisdom, as many Noes as Ayes, is methinks a melancholy proof ince we have been running all about in search of it. We have gone back to ancient history for models of government, and examined the different forms of those republics, which, having been originally formed with the seeds of their own dissolution, now no longer exist; and we have viewed modern states all round Europe, bet find none of their constitutions suitable to our arumstances. In this situation of this assembly, groping, as it were, in the dark, to find political truth, and scarce abe to distinguish it when presented to us, how has it if not immediately by the whole.-It has however met with great opposition in some of the states; for we are at present a nation of politicians. And though there is a general dread of giving too much power to our governors, I think we are more in danger from the little obedience in the governed." To the same. "April 22, 1788. "It is very possible, as you suppose, that all the articles of the proposed new government will not remain unchanged after the first meeting of congress. I am of opinion with you, that the two chambers were not necessary, and I disliked some other articles that are in, and wished for some that are not in, the proposed plan: I nevertheless hope it may be adopted, though I shall have nothing to do with the execution of it, being determined to quit all public business with my present employment.* At 83 one certainly has a right to ambition repose." To the same. "Philadelphia, June 8, 1788. “MY DEAR FRIEND,-I received a few days ago your kind letter of the 3d January. "The arret in favour of the non-catholiques gives pleasure here, not only from its present advantages, but as it is a good step towards general toleration, and to the abolishing in time all party spirit among christians and the mischiefs that have so long attended it. Thank God, the world is growing wiser and wiser; and as by degrees men are convinced of the folly of wars for religion, for dominion, or for commerce, they will be happier and happier. which you mentioned did not pass unnoticed in the convention. Many, if I remember right, were for making the president incapable of being chosen after the first four years; but the majority were for leaving the electors free to choose whom they pleased; and it was alleged that such incapacity might tend to make the president less attentive to the duties of his office, and to the interests of the people, than he would be if a second choice depended on their good opinion of him. We are making experiments in politics; what knowledge we shall gain by them will be more certain, though perhaps we may hazard too much in that mode of acquiring it." "To M. Veillard. "Oct. 24, 1788. "Our affairs mend daily, and are getting into good order very fast. Never was any measure so thoroughly discussed as our proposed new constitution. Many objections were made to it in the public papers, and anthere was, and some violent personal abuse. swers to those objections. Much party heat I kept out of the dispute, and wrote only one "Eight states have now agreed to the pro- little paper on the occasion, which I enclose.* posed new constitution; there remain five You seem to be too apprehensive about our who have not yet discussed it; their appoint-presidents being perpetual. Neither he nor ed times of meeting not being yet arrived. Two are to meet this month, the rest later. One more agreeing, it will be carried into execution. Probably some will not agree at present, but time may bring them in; so that we have little doubt of its becoming general, perhaps with some corrections. As to your friend's taking a share in the management of it, his age and infirmities render him unfit for the business, as the business would be for him. After the expiration of his presidentship, which will now be in a few months, he is determined to engage no more in public affairs, even if required; but his countrymen will be too reasonable to require it. You are not so considerate; you are a hard task-master. You insist on his writing his life, already a long work, and at the same time would have him continually employed in augmenting the subject, while the time shortens, in which the work is to be executed. General Washington is the man that all our eyes are fixed on for president, and what little influence I may have, is devoted to him. 66 "B. FRANKLIN." "To the Duke de la Rochefoucault. "PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 32, 1788. "Our public affairs begin to wear a more quiet aspect. The disputes about the faults of the new constitution are subsided. The first congress will probably mend the principal ones, and future congresses the rest. That * President of the state of Pennsylvania. there may be of such an event we are all As to "To Charles Carrol, Member of Congress. "PHILADELPHIA, May 25, 1789. "DEAR FRIEND,-I am glad to see by he papers that our grand machine has at length begun to work. I pray God to bless and guide its operations. If any form of government is capable of making a nation happy, ours I think bids fair now for producing that effect. But after all, much depends upon the people who are to be governed. We have been guarding against an evil that old states are most liable to, excess of power in the rulers; but our present danger seems to be defect of obedi ence in the subjects. There is hope, however, from the enlightened state of this age ard country, we may guard effectually against that evil as well as the rest. "My grandson, William Temple Frankln, * A comparison between the ancient Jews and Antifederalists. |