ly versed in the doctrine of inscrutable predestination as to leave this humbling maxim on record; "When I applied my heart to know wisdom, and to see the business that is done upon the earth; then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun; because, though a man labour to seek it out, yet he shall not find; yea, further, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it," Eccles. viii. 16, 17. Melancthon prosecutes the argument much farther; but this may suffice for a specimen. And it is not unworthy of notice, that Luther so highly approved of Melancthon's performance, and especially of the first chapter (from whence the above extract is given ;) that he [Luther] thus writes of it in his epistle to Erasmus, prefixed to his book De Serv. Arb. "That it was worthy of everlasting duration, and to be received into the ecclesiastical canon." Let it likewise be observed, that Melancthon never to the very last retracted a word of what he there delivers; which a person of his piety and integrity would most certainly have done, had he afterwards (as some have artfully and falsely insinuated) found reason to change his judgment on these heads. FINIS FATE, (says Apuleius) according to Plato, is that, "Per quod, inevitabiles cogitationes Dei atque incepta complentur," whereby the purposes and designs of God are accomplished. Hence, the Platonics considered providence under a three-fold distinction; 1. The providentia prima, or that which gave birth to all effects; and is defined by them to be 8 8 8 vonσis, the intention, or will of the Supreme God. 2. The providentia secunda, or actual agency of the secondary or inferior beings, who were supposed to pervade the heavens, and from thence by their influence, to regulate and dispose of all sublunary things; and especially to prevent the extinction of any one species below. 3. The providentia tertia, supposed to be exerted by the Genii, whose office it was to exercise a particular care over mankind, to guard our persons, and direct our actions. But the stoical view of providence, or fate, was abundantly more simple, and required no * Vide Lipsii Physiolog. Stoic. Lib. 1. Dissert. xii. such nicety of distinction. These philosophers did at once derive all the chain of causes and effects from their true and undoubted source, the will of the one living and true God. Hence, with these sages, the words Deity, Fate, Providence, were frequently reciprocated, as terms synonymous. Thus Seneca, speaking of God; "Will you call him fate? You will call him rightly; for all things are suspended on him. Himself is causa causarum, the cause of causes beside.” The laws of the universe are from God; whence the same philosopher elsewhere observes, Omnia certa et in æternum dicta lege decurrere; All things go on according to a certain rule or decree ordained for ever; meaning in the law of fate. So Cicero: "All. things come to pass according to the sovereignty of the eternal law." And Pindar probably had an eye to this, where he says, Noμov avlav Barrλεα, θνατων τε και αθανατων, είναι That the law ruleth all, whether gods or mortals. Manlius most certainly had: Sed nihil in tota magis est mirabile mole. Quam Ratio, & certis quod Legibus omnia parent.. Where, by Ratio, is evidently meant the decree-ing mind of God; and, by Leges, is meant fate,, or that series of causes and effects which is the offspring of his decree. Homer cannot begin his Iliad without assert-ing this grand truth: Ad Eleλebelo Bean. The counsel or decree of Jupiter was fulfilled. The divine poet sets out on this exalted principle; he puts it in the front of the noblest poem in the world, as a testimony both of his wisdom and his faith. It was as if he had said, "I shall sing of numberless events, equally grand, entertaining,. and important; but I cannot begin to unfold them without laying down this, as a first, funda mental axiom, that, though brought to pass by the instrumental agency of men, they were the fruit of God's determining will, and of his all-directing providence." Neither are those minuter events, which seemingly are the result of chance, excluded from this law. Even these do not happen, but come to pass in a regular order of succession, and at their due period of time. "Causa pendet ex causa: privata ac publica longus ordo rerum trahit," says Seneca ; "Cause proceeds from cause: the long train of things draws with it all events, both public and private." Excellent is that of Sophocles; (Aj. Flagell.) "I Έσω μεν &ν και ταυία, και τα παντ' αεί, e. am firmly of opinion, that all these things, and whatever else befall us, are in consequence of the divine purpose: Whoso thinks otherwise is at liberty to follow his own judg ment, but this will ever be mine." The Longus ordo rerum, mentioned by Seneca, is what he elsewhere styles, Causarum implexa series, or a perpetual implication of causes. This, according to Laertius, was called by the Stoics, aria Two goμen, an involved, or concatenate causuality of whatever has any existence for, sign is a chain, or implicate connection. Agreeably to this idea, Chrysippus gives the following definition of fate: 'Espagne Eval, Φυσικην συνταξιν των όλων, εξ αίδιο, των ἕτερων τοῖς ἕξεροις επακαλοθενίων, αμε]αβολς και απαρπβα]8 8σης της τοιαύτης συμπλοκής. "Fate is that natural, established order and constitution of all things from everlasting, whereby they mutually follow upon each other, in consequence of an immutable and perpetual complication.' Let us examine this celebrated definition of fate. 1. He calls it natural vlagis meaning by nature, the great Natura Prima, or God: for by some Stoics, God and nature are used promiscuously. But, because the Deity must be supposed both to decree and to act with wisdom, intelligence, and design, fate is sometimes mentioned by them under the name of ▲oy, or reason. Thus they define fate, (Laert in Zen.) είμαρμένην, λογού, καθ ον ὁ κοσμο διεξαγεται to be that supreme "reason, whereby the world is governed and directed," or more minutely, thus; Λογόν, καθ' όν τα μεν γεγονοία γεγονε, τα δε λινομενα γινεται, τα δε γενησόμενα γενησεται. "That reason, whereby the things that have been, were; the things that now are, have a present existence; and the things that are to be shall be. Reason, you see, or wisdom, in the Deity, is an antecedent cause, from whence both providence and inferior nature are derived. It is added in Stobaus, μεταλαμβανει δε τ8 λοσ8, την αλήθειαν, την αιτίαν, την φυσιν, την ανασκην. i. e. that Chrysippus sometimes varies his terms; and, instead of the word reason, substitutes the words truth, cause, nature, necessity: intimating, that fate is the true, natural, necessary cause of the things that are, and of the manner in which they are. 2. This fate is said to be aids, from everlasting. Nor improperly since the constitution of things was settled and fixed in the divine mind (where they had a sort of ideal existence) previous to their actual creation, and therefore considered as certainly future, in his decree, may be said to have been in some sense co-eternal with himself. 3. The immutable and perpetual complication, mentioned in the definition, means no more than that reciprocal in |