"And this is called a divine union of truth and mercy; being the most precise negation of both, of which any conception can be formed. First, to hang the destinies of all mankind upon a solitary volition of their first parents, and then let loose a diabolic power on that volition to break it down; to vitiate the human constitution in punishment for the fall, and yet continue to demand obedience to the original and perfect moral law; to assert the absolute inflexibility of that holy law, yet all the while have in view for the offenders a method of escape, which violates every one of its provisions, and makes it all a solemn pretence; to forgive that which is in itself unpardonable, on condition of the suicide of a God, is to shock and confound all notions of rectitude, without affording eventhe sublimity of a savage grandeur. This will be called 'blasphemy;' and it is so; but the blasphemy is not in the words but in the thing."

We are surprised that Mr. M. should revive the exploded notion of constructive blasphemy, but he is very angry, and angry men do not always regard so much the propriety, as the strength of expressions. It would not be difficult to construe his language into blasphemy of the faith of his own brethren. He has certainly given a strange view of orthodoxy, and one which, we think, few, besides Unitarians, entertain. Mr. M. is one of the readiest to protest against any misrepresentation of Unitarianism as held by himself, and the perusal of the above passage has therefore impressed our minds with the truth of the common remark, that the same thing appears very different according as it is done to, or done by, us. Indeed, a great deal in these Unitarian lectures is directed against a form of orthodoxy which is seldom maintained, but a form that presents so many points of easy and successful assault, that few confine themselves to matter of more relevant, but more difficult discussion. If Mr. M. thinks the above a just view of the prevalent belief, if the mass of believers in Christianity hold opinions which involve the most precise negation of both truth and mercy, of which any conception can be formed, which violate every one of the provisions of the moral law, and make it all a solemn pretence, which shock and confound all notions of rectitude, which are blasphemous, where, we ask, does he get his notions of God's truth, and mercy, and rectitude from, and which he esteems so clear and certain, that any pretensions of a revelation opposing them, must be necessarily false? They are, evidently, not universal notions, for many men, and many Christian men, hold notions, which, he says, involve their perfect negation-and if not universal, how can he maintain, as he does in another place, that unless God's character is known antecedently to, and independently of, a revelation, there is no security that his revelation is any thing but a seduction and a lie? It is quite clear, that according to his opinion, many minds do not obtain accurate moral conceptions of God from any source, and that therefore, first, they have not derived them from nature, and secondly, have no right to credit the veracity of the Bible.

In the above extract, the Atonement is called a method of escape, which mistates every one of the provisions of the moral law, and

the context explains this violation as consisting in the suffering of the innocent and the liberation of the guilty. "I ask again, whether justice regards only the infliction of suffering, or its quantity, without caring about its direction? Was it impossible for the stern righteousness of God freely to forgive the penitent? And how was the injustice of liberating the guilty mended by the torments of the innocent?" Here is the verdict against sin; "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." And how is this verdict executed? The soul that had sinned does not die; and one that "knew no sin, dies instead." Where is the violation of the moral law in this? Is it in the liberation of the guilty? Does not Mr. M. believe in that? "Unitarians," says he, “are falsely accused of representing God as 'overlooking man's guilt.' They hold that no guilt is overlooked till it is eradicated from the soul; and that pardon proceeds, parri passu, with sanctification." Still there is pardon, however it may proceed. Is the injustice of the Atonement in the suffering of the innocent? Does not Mr. M. believe in that? Does he not admit that Christ was innocent, and that he suffered? "A human being died on the cross, with such suffering as a perfect human being may endure." The difficulty remains. It lies in his suffering at all, and we adopt his own question,-" Does justice regard only the infliction of suffering, or its quantity, without caring about its direction?" The only two things wherein the injustice can reside, are embraced by his own belief. There is, in any case, the infliction of suffering where it is not deserved, and the non-infliction of it where it is-" the soul that had sinned does not die; and one that 'knew no sin' dies'"--and the connexion between the two, however it may be denied as a fact, can scarcely be denounced as a shocking crime.

The Atonement is not the only thing against which are brought moral objections. Every peculiarity of Trinitarianism is condemned on the same ground. We are rejoiced to see this kind of argument becoming so prevalent and earnest. It is vastly more noble, and to the point, than discussions about Greek articles and Hebrew nouns. At the same time, it does not appear quite consistent, to lay so great a stress on the moral character and tendency of doctrines as a disproof of them, and yet treat the belief of them as a matter of no responsibility. The Unitarian lecturers seem to have forgotten that their opponents consider the reception of religious truth so important and necessary, just because they agree with themselves in respecting greatly its moral nature and influence. They often represent their adversaries most unfairly as making mere intellectual judgments, apart from moral qualities, essential to salvation. It is, no doubt, convenient so to do, but we protest against the injustice of it. It is the moral character of these judgments which is the basis of the importance attached to them by Trinitarians, as it is also of the objection, by Unitarians, against them. Mr. Giles, one of the lecturers, says "The popular taste, as it has yet been

developed or nurtured, has been coarse and ferocious, and if any thing could prove to me the doctrine of universal depravity, it would be the toleration of the horrors of Calvinistic orthodoxy." We thank Mr. Giles for this avowal. The toleration of opinions may then prove the universality of depravity, if any thing can—that is, may be as certain an indication of it, as moral acts. This is quite as strong a mode of asserting responsibility for faith, as any tolerator of "the horrors of Calvinistic orthodoxy" would wish or like to employ. It is thus that the doctrine of the innocency of error is carried out. The Unitarian lecturers may believe it, and think it of great consequence to believe it, and ascribe many of the evils that have afflicted and disgraced the church to the denial of it, but they often treat their opponents in a manner utterly inconsistent with it, and thus, to use their own words in another connexion, exhibit a “strange preference of faith before works.”

The moral objections to orthodoxy, though presented with a prominence and frequency proving the high estimation in which they are held, are not the only ones advanced. Metaphysical reasonings are employed to show that its absurdity is as great as its immorality, and equally puts it beyond the sphere of all possible proof. Mr. Martineau is especially severe upon its perfect irrationality. He is satisfied with nothing less than a mathematical demonstration of its inherent inconsistency, so that what with holding notions that shock and confound all conceptions of equity, and notions that are necessarily contradictory, the marvel is that the professors of orthodoxy should still be considered as wise and good. The triangle is frequently referred to for the purpose of illustration, it is struck again and again by the theological musician, as if its tones were passing sweet. He intimates that to assert the doctrine of a Trinity is as foolish as to affirm that "each of the sides of this figure has an angle opposite to it, yet are there not three angles but one angle;" he says that the heterodox think with Le Clerc, that the doctrine of the communication of properties between the two natures of our Lord, is as intelligible, as if we were to say, that there is a circle so united with a triangle, that the circle has the properties of the triangle, and the triangle those of the circle;" he declares that "the ideas which we have of these words ('person,' 'substance,' 'being,' ' one,' and 'three,') are as much within ourselves, and as capable of comparison by 'our own consciousness, as the ideas belonging to the words angle and triangle; and when, on hearing the assertion that there are three persons in one mind or being, I proceed to compare them, I find the word 'person' so far synonimous with the word 'mind' or 'being,' that the self-contradiction would not be greater, were it affirmed that there are three angles in one yovia-the mere form of speech being varied to hide the absurdity from eye and ear." Now we are astonished, not that so fine a mind should have the craving, thus indicated, for mathematical certainty, but that it should not perceive the utter irrelevance, of

of mathematical illustrations upon these subjects. We think it sufficiently evident that the theological propositions which he reprobates, are not so necessarily absurd as the mathematical propositions with which he compares them, from the fact that human minds can be found to receive the one but not the other. If the ideas which we have of the words employed in the definition of the Trinity, "are as much within ourselves, and as capable of comparison by our own consciousness, as the ideas belonging to the words angle and triangle," and that the doctrine of the Trinity is as self-contradictory as the affirmation "that there are three angles in one angle," how can the rejection of the one conception be reconciled with the reception of the other? Mr. Martineau says, that "long usage and church authority alone prevent men from perceiving that the propositions, announcing it, (the Trinity) are either simple contradictions, or statements empty of all meaning." Without stopping to show that this explanation of the case, if true, instead of destroying the difficulty, only removes the date of its introduction, we beg to propose the questions which immediately suggest themselves, How did the "usage" of sentiments so mathematically absurd begin? and How could the "church" so generally receive them as to interpose its "authority on their behalf?" The usage and authority can scarcely be the only things that prevent our perception of their inherent and inevi table absurdity, since they must have existed and prevailed over large portions of the Christian mind in order to the long usage and the church authority. But waiving this, Mr. M's. explanation is as little complimentary to mathematical science as to ecclesiastical influence. The peculiar excellence of mathematical science is the obvious and perfect certainty of its conclusions. They cannot be rejected by any who understand the terms employed. To assert then of the Trinity, or any doc. trine so prevailing, that it is as foolish as that three angles are in one angle, is preposterous. It proves too much, by shewing that Mr. M's. opponents do not, and cannot, hold the erroneous notions: a favour seldom conferred by polemics on their antagonists. He saps the foundations of mathematics, even while his argument supposes their inevitable certainty. He confers on the church an extraordinary honour, in assigning to her influence a force superior to infallible science, though he means her disgrace.

We cannot remark, for want of space, upon the critical portions of the volume, and we the less regret it, from the ground upon which Unitarianism is based in this volume. Certainly if orthodoxy is incapable of being proved, though it were in the Bible, which the Unitarian lecturers maintain, it is of little use to show that it is in the Bible.

1

We have already alluded to the extravagant notions of natural religion held by these gentlemen. They maintain that a great deal respecting God may be discovered without a revelation, nearly every thing that can be learned by its help. Among other things, the

unity and moral character of God. Respecting the first, unity of design, as manifested in creation, is the great argument; the conclusive force of which is not readily discernible. Unity of design may make unity of authorship probable, in the absence of opposing evidence, but cannot prove it certain, because it is quite compatible with the supposition that many minds have been exercised on any particular production. This volume of lectures displays unity of design in perfection, and yet three very different minds have co-operated to produce it. Besides, is it fact that men do discover the unity of God from creation? Respecting the moral character of God, Mr. Martineau remarks, "If there be no trace in nature of the moral attributes of God, there can be no disclosure of them in Scripture. The character of the revealer is our only guarantee for the truth and excellence of the revelation and if his character is antecedently unknown, if there is nothing to preclude the idea of his being deceitful and malignant, how can we be assured that his communication is not a seduction and a lie? It is not the præternatural rank, but the just and holy mind, of a celestial Being, that entitles his messages to reception: and surely it is this alone which, in our opponent's own system, makes the whole difference between the suggestions of Satan and the inspiration of God." The question is not, whether we must believe that God is true in order to credit what he says, but whence is the knowledge of his truthfulness to be derived? The above language seems to imply that no man has a right to trust the revelation who does not antecedently, and from other sources, discover the moral excellence of God. But why may not the book itself contain such evidences of moral excellence as to justify faith in its author? If it be said that this supposes the existence of accurate moral conceptions prior to acquaintance with the book, and that they prove the moral character of God, the answer is at hand; moral powers do not necessarily suppose the existence of accurate moral ideas. There may exist the latent power of receiving and approving them when presented to the mind. In the interior of Africa, Moffat and others have met with tribes who were destitute of all conceptions of moral distinctions, but who have received and exhibited the moral influence of Christianity. Mr. Martineau's language requires not only the supposition that it is possible to ascertain the moral excellence of God from creation alone, but that he who does not so ascertain it, cannot have it disclosed to him in the Bible. We ask again, is it fact that men do discover God's moral excellence before they believe in Christianity? We think not.

Nothing is easier than for men born and bred in the midst of all the clear and full discoveries of Christianity, who received it among their first lessons, and felt it among their first impressions, to form exaggerated opinions of the competency of reason to discover religious truth. It is not easy to distinguish between what is obtained from Scripture and