procure us the esteem of our fellow creatures; which are, in general, the fame that are dictated by the principles of benevolence and the moral fenfe, and also by a regard to the will of God.

But though, by this account, the love of fame is an useful ally to virtue, the gratification of it ought by no means to be made our primary purfuit; because, if it were known that fame was the fole end of a man's actions, he would be fo far from gaining this end, that he would be despised by mankind in general; and efpecially if he were advanced in life, when it is commonly expected that men fhould be governed by higher and better principles. For no actions are looked upon by the bulk of mankind as properly praife worthy, but thofe which proceed from a principle of disinterested benevolence, obedience to God, or a regard to confcience.

2. Befides, humility is a principal subject of praife; and, indeed, without this, no other virtue is held in much efteem. Now

this humility fuppofes fuch a diffidence of one's felf, fuch a readiness to acknowledge the fuperiority of others, and alfo so small a degree of complacence in the contemplation of our own excellencies, as must be inconfiftent with our making this pleasure our chief purfuit, and the fource of our greatest happiness.

3. In another respect, also, the love of fame, as a primary object of pursuit, tends to defeat itself. We are not pleased with praise, except it come from perfons of whofe judgment, as well as fincerity, we have a good opinion; but the love of fame, as our fupreme good, tends to beget fuch a degree of felf fufficiency, and conceit, as makes us defpife the rest of mankind; that is, it makes their praise of little value to us; so that the fprightly pleasures of vanity naturally give place in time to all the fullennefs and morofenefs of pride.

4. If a man have no other object than reputation, or popularity, he will be led to dwell frequently upon the fubject of his

own merit, of which he will, confequently, entertain an over-weening and unreasonable opinion; and this can hardly fail to produce, befides a most ridiculous degree of conceit, fo much envy and jealoufy, as will make him insufferable in fociety, and subject him to the most cutting mortifications.

5. If a man's principal object be those qualifications and actions which usually dif tinguish men, and make them much talked of, both in their own and future ages, fuch as eminence with respect to genius, excellence in the polite arts, difcoveries in fcience, or great atchievements in the arts of peace or war, his chance of fucceeding is very small; for it is not poffible that more than a few perfons, in comparison, can draw the attention of the rest of mankind upon them. And befides that the qualifications which are the foundation of this eminence are very rare among mankind, fuccefs depends upon the concurrence of many circumftances, independent on a man's felf. It is plain, therefore, that very few perfons can reasonably hope to distinguish themselves

themselves in this manner, and it would certainly be very wrong to propofe that as a principal object of purfuit to all mankind, which the bulk of them cannot poffibly obtain, or enjoy.

The proper ufe of this love of fame, as of the principle of felf intereft, is to be a means of bringing us within the influence of better and truly virtuous principles, in confequence of begetting a habit of doing the fame things which better principles would prompt to. If, for inftance, a man should, first of all, perform acts of charity and beneficence from oftentation only, the joy that he actually communicates to others, and the praises he receives for his generofity, from those who are ftrangers to his real motive, cannot but give him an idea of the purer pleasures of genuine benevolence, from which, and not from a defire of applaufe only, he will for the future act.

The pleasures that accrue to us from the purfuit of fame, like thofe of felf intereft,

are

are best gained by perfons who have them not directly in view. The man who is truly benevolent, pious, and confcientious, will, in general, fecure the most folid and permanent reputation with mankind; and if he be fo fituated as that the practice of any real virtue fhall be deemed unfashionable, and fubject him to contempt and infult, he will have acquired that fuperiority of mind, which will fet him above it; fo that he will not feel any pain from the want of fuch esteem, as must have been purchased by the violation, or neglect of his duty. But he will rather applaud himself, and rejoice that he is not esteemed by perfons of certain characters, be they ever fo numerous, and diftinguished on certain accounts; finding more than an equivalent recompence in the approbation of his own mind, in the esteem of the wife and good, though they be ever so few, and especially in the favour of God, who is the fearcher of hearts, the best judge, and moft munificent rewarder of real worth.