the reason why we are influenced by it, and act upon it, in any particular cafe, is that, from our knowledge of human nature, we have found that, fo circumftanced, it never has deceived us; fo that human nature muft be changed before fuch teftimony could be fallacious. For the fame reason, all histoical evidence is ultimately an appeal to prefent appearances. For if things in time past had not been as they reprefent, the information we now receive concerning them, could not have been conveyed to us.

The argument from prophecy is of a mixed nature, refting, in general, upon the teftimony of the friends of revelation, that fuch prophecies were actually delivered a fufficient time before the event, and upon the teftimony of general hiftory, and the prefent ftate of things, for the accomplishment of them. Many of the scripture prophecies, however, even in the Old Teftament, and almost all thofe of the New, are univerfally acknowledged to have been published prior to the events to which they correfpond.

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Thefe

These three kinds of evidence for the Jewish and chriftian revelations, viz. from teftimony, from prefent appearances, and from prophecy, I fhall confider in the order in which they are here mentioned.

SECTION III.

Of the importance of teftimony, and the credibility of miracles.

SINCE

INCE one principal evidence of revelation depends upon human teflimony, I shall first consider the importance of it, and then lay down fome general rules for eftimating the value of it.

The greatest part of our knowledge has no other foundation than teftimony; and even when the proper foundation is of a different kind, our faith is much ftrengthened by means of it. For instance, when we ourfelves form any rational conclufion from appearances,

appearances, as that there is a God, we are much confirmed in our belief, by finding that many other perfons have drawn the fame conclufion, either from the fame appearances, or from any other.

Befides, the knowledge on which we act every day depends chiefly upon memory, or our recollecting and believing that we once faw the evidence of the truths which may not now be obvious to us. For no perfon can pretend to be able at all times clearly to demonftrate every propofition to which he gives his firmeft affent. Now belief, which depends upon recollection, is fomewhat fimilar to that which depends upon teftimony. In one cafe we believe that we ourfelves have feen a thing to be what we now apprehend it to be, and in the other cafe we believe that other perfons have feen it to be fo.

We ought not, therefore, to think lightly of the nature of faith in revelation, because it is an hiftorical faith, and depends upon human teftimony; for the fame is the foundaS 4

tion

tion of the greatest, and most valuable part of human knowledge.

If we appeal to experience, to determine the actual weight and effect of different kinds of evidence, we fhall be convinced that the evidence of teftimony is adapted to give as much fatisfaction to the mind of man as any other kind of evidence. No person, I believe, who has read history, has any more doubt of there being fuch a city as Rome, of there having been fuch a perfon as Julius Cæfar, or of his having been killed there, than he has of the truth of the propofition that 2 and 2 make 4. At least, if there be any difference in the fullness of perfuafion in these two cafes, it is altogether imperceptible; and any perfon would, in fact, venture as much upon the truth of the one, as upon that of the other.

Though it be true, indeed, in theory, that there is fome fmall degree of uncertainty in every single teftimony, which can never be wholly removed by any fubfequent teftimony (fince this, alfo, must be liable to

the

the fame kind of uncertainty) yet there is alfo a degree of uncertainty, and a fource of mistake, in drawing conclufions from selfevident truths, and especially when the chain of deduction is of confiderable length.

Confidering the great weight which teftimony naturally has with mankind, we cannot but conclude that any thing may be proved by it, except such things as are contradicted by fuperior evidence, and fuch is, certainly, that of our own fenfes, comprehending not only our immediate perceptions, but even neceffary conclufions from thofe perceptions. How incredible, therefore, foever, any fact may be a priori, fince, if it be not abfolutely impoffible, it may be true, fo alfo a certain degree of historical evidence must be fufficient to prove the truth of it.

We judge of other perfons, and of the connection between their fentiments, language and conduct, by ourfelves; and knowing, by our own confcioufnefs, that a regard to truth is a natural, and very strong

principle

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