have feen, are only different modes of the divine agency; but though the divine being has thought proper to act in a perfectly uniform manner, during any given period of time, it cannot follow from thence, that there never can be a reafon for his changing that mode of operation; unless our reafoning concerning him and his agency be quite different from our reafoning concerning other intelligent beings and their agency; and in this cafe there can be no foundation for fuch a difference.

Befides, if there be a God, and if the world, in its prefent ftate, have not been eternal, there must have been a time when the divine being did properly interpose, so as to form both it, and the plants and animals which are peculiar to it; and if there has been but one proper interpofition in any period of time paft, there may, according to Mr. Hume's own method of reasoning, be another.

It would alfo follow from Mr. Hume's principles, that every new fact in philofophy muft

must be abfolutely incredible, till we can fee how it arises from principles, the operation of which we have seen in other cafes; and fo the king of Siam will be justified in giving no credit to the Dutchmen, who informed him that, in their country, water became fometimes fo hard, that it would even bear men and carriages; for, living in an uniformly warm climate, he had never feen any fuch thing, and could not conceive that it was poffible.

The evidence that the courfe of nature has been departed from, is the very fame with that by which we judge when it is not departed from, and must be equally competent in both cafes. For certainly the eyes, ears, and other fenfes of men, are equally capable of judging concerning all things which they are equally capable of perceiving. If a number of perfons could diftinguish their friend from all other men before he died, they must, being poffeffed of the fame organs, be equally capable of diftinguishing him from all other perfons after he should be rifen from the dead. And whatever

Mr.

would tend to undermine them. We may take it for granted that God cannot contradict himself. Whatever, therefore, he clearly appears to be in his works, we may affure ourselves that he will also appear to be in any revelation that he fhall please to make of himself. He cannot appear good and merciful in one method of making himfelf known, and cruel and unjust in another. Nothing, therefore, can be admitted as contained in any revelation, that is pretended to come from God, which is contrary to the plain principles of natural religion already demonftrated.

Since, however, there appear to be many difficulties on the subject of natural religion, and many of our conclufions have only a small degree of probability in their favour, we must by no means take it for granted that fuch conclufions are always juft, but must expect that a revelation from God will difcover many mistakes, and especially that it will supply many defects, in,the best formed fyftem of natural religion.

From

From the obfervations which have now been made, it may be feen, that we ought to be very far from relinquishing our reafon, when we come to confider the fubje of revelation. On the contrary, then it is that we ought to make the most use of it, to fee that we be not impofed upon in a matter of fo much confequence to us. It is only by the help of that faculty which we call reafon, that we can distinguish between any two fyftems of religion that may be propofed to us. It is by reafon only that we can judge both of their previous probability, and also of the pofitive evidence that is produced in favour of them. Let us, therefore, upon all occafions, call to our aid that power which God has given us to be the guide of life, and especially in matters of fo great importance to us as thofe certainly are which relate to the will of God, what he requires of us, and what we have to expect from him.

VOL. I.

T

SEC

SECTION IV.

Rules for efimating the value of human teflimony.

HE plain rules for eftimating the value of fingle evidences are the two following. Any thing, capable of being proved by mere teftimony, is credible in proportion to the opportunity the witness had of being well informed concerning it himself, and his freedom from any bias that might make him wish to impose upon others. If the perfon who gives us information concerning any tranfaction, at which we ourselves were not prefent, appears to be a competent judge of it, and have been in a fituation in which he had the best opportunity of being rightly informed, and if there be no appearance of its being his intereft to deceive us, we give our affent; but we hefi

tate,