pearance of danger, and warns them to have recourse to some methods of securing themselves from it. We see the greatest wisdom in the provision that is made in nature against the lofs or extinction of any species of vegetables or animals, by their easy multiplication, according to the want there is of them. The most useful vegetables grow every where, without care or cultivation, as, for example, the different kinds of grass. Small and tame animals breed faft, whereas the large and carnivorous ones propagate very flowly, which keeps the demand on the one hand, and the confumption on the other, nearly equal.

The human body exhibits the clearest and the most numerous marks of wisdom and contrivance, whereby each part receives its proper nourishment, and is fitted for its proper functions; all of which are admirably adapted to our real occafions in life. How conveniently are the organs of all our fenfes difpofed, how well fecured, and how excellently adapted to their proper uses ;

and

and how exceedingly ferviceable are all of them to us. We fee the wifdom of God both in what we call the inflincts of brutes, and the reason of man; each of these principles being exactly fitted to our feveral occafions.

We also see the wisdom of God in the natural fanctions of virtue in this world; fo that those persons who addict themselves to vice and wickednefs become miferable and wretched in the natural courfe of things, without any particular interpofition of providence; whereas virtue and integrity is generally rewarded with peace of mind, the approbation of our fellow creatures, and a reasonable share of fecurity and fuccefs.

Could we fee all the caufes of the rife and fall of empires, and in what manner the happiness of mankind is connected with the great events in the hiftory of the world, it is not to be doubted, but that we should fee as much wifdom in the conduct of divine providence with refpect to them; fo as not to doubt (though we should not have been VOL. I. informed

D

informed of it by revelation) that the Lord God ruleth in the kingdoms of men, giving them to whomsoever he pleafes, and promoting his own wife and benevolent purposes by the difpofition of them.

Laftly, it is an argument of the wisdom of God, that he has given wisdoṁ to man and other creatures, for he could not give a power of which he was not himself poffeffed in a much more eminent degree.

These attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness, are all that we can directly demonftrate from the confideration of the works of God. Every other of his attributes is deduced from thefe; and fince the divine being has been proved to be powerful, wise, and good, he must likewife be whatever a powerful, wife, and good being cannot but be. Thefe, therefore, together with the attributes of felf-existence, eternity, and unchangeableness, may be called the primary attributes of God; and all others may be called fecondary ones, or fuch as depend upon, and flow from those that are primary.

SECTION IV.

Of thofe attributes of God which are deduced from the confideration of his power, wifdom, and goodness jointly.

S the matter of which the world con

A

fifts can only be moved and acted upon, and is altogether incapable of moving itself, or of acting; fo all the powers of nature, or the tendencies of things to their different motions and operations, can only be the effect of the divine energy, perpetually acting upon them, and causing them to have certain tendencies and effects. stone, for instance, can no more move, or tend downwards, that is, towards the earth, of itself, than it can move or tend upwards, that is, from the earth. That it does tend downwards, or towards the carth, muft, therefore, be owing to the divine energy, an energy without which the power of gravitation would ceafe, and the whole frame of the earth be diffolved.

It follows from these principles, that no powers of nature can take place, and that no creature whatever can exift, without the agency; fo that we can no more continue, than we could begin to exist without the divine will.

divine agency;

God, having made all things, and exerting his influence over all things, must know all things, and confequently be omniscient. Alfo, fince he not only ordained, but conftantly fupports all the laws of nature, he must be able to foresee what will be the refult of them, at any diftance of time; juft as a man who makes a clock can tell when it will ftrike. All future events, therefore, must be as perfectly known to the divine mind as thofe that are prefent; and as we cannot conceive that he fhould be liable to forgetfulness, we, may conclude that all things, paft, prefent, and to come, are equally known to him; fo that his knowledge is infinite.

The divine being, knowing all things, and exerting his influence on all the works of