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rected from time to time by having recourse to thefe rules. This principle of confcience, therefore, being, as it were, the refult of all the other principles of our conduct united, muft deferve to be confidered as the guide of life, together with them; and its diftates, though they vary, in some meafure, with education, and will be found to be, in some respects, different among different nations of the world, yet, in general, evidently concur in giving their sanction to the fame rules of conduct, that are fuggefted by the three before mentioned confiderations. For, if we confider what kind of fentiments and conduct mankind in general will, without much reflection, and without hesitation, pronounce to be right; if we confider what are the actions that we most esteem and admire in others, and that we reflect upon with the most fatisfaction in ourfelves, they will appear to be the fame with those which tend to make ourselves and others the most truly happy.

Following thefe four guides, we shall find that temperance, or the due govern

ment of our paffions, with refpect to ourfelves; juftice, benevolence, and veracity with respect to others; together with gratitude, obedience, and refignation to God, ought to be most affiduously cultivated by us; as what are, at the fame time, the most pleafing to our maker, the most conducive to our own happiness, and that of others, and the most agreeable to the natural and unperverted dictates of confcience.

That we are capable of governing ourfelves by these rules, and, from a proper regard to motives, can voluntarily chufe and pursue that course of life which the will of God, a regard to our own happiness, to the good of fociety, and the dictates of our confciences, uniformly recommend to us, is fometimes expreffed by faying that we are the proper fubjects of moral government. Unlefs we fuppofe that men have this voluntary power over their actions, whereby they can, at pleasure, either obey or difobey the proper rule of life; that is, unless they be fo conftituted, that the proper motives to right conduct can have a fufficient influence

upon

upon their minds, all religion is in vain. To what purpose can it be to give men a law, which it is not in their power to obferve; or what propriety can there be either in rewarding them for actions to which they could not contribute, or in punishing them for offences which they could not help.

We may, therefore, take it for granted, as the first, and most fundamental principle of all religion, as neceflary to our being the proper fubjects of moral government, that we are equally capable of intending and doing both good and evil; and therefore that it is not in vain that laws are proposed to us, and motives are laid before us, both to perfuade us to what is right, and to diffuade us from what is wrong, fince it depends upon ourselves, whether we will be influenced by them or not.

If we observe the proper rules of condu, or the laws of our natures, we shall fecure to ourselves many folid advantages; and if we do not obferve them, we entail

These are,

upon ourselves many evils. therefore, called the punishments of vice, and the former the rewards of virtue; and fince they are dispensed by the providence of God, and take place according to his appointment, in the conftitution of the courfe of nature; he is properly confidered as our moral governor, and judge, and we are faid to be accountable to him for our conduct.

From a regard to the four rules of right and wrong, explained above, I fhall now endeavour to analize the fentiments, the paffions, and affections of mankind, and lay down particular rules for our conduct in life.

SECTION

Of the different objects of purfuit, and the different paffions and affections of men correfponding to them.

N order to form a proper judgment concerning the conduct of man, as an individual, and a member of society, according to the rules above laid down, it will be neceffary to have a just idea of, and to keep in view, the different objects of our pursuit, and the different paffions and affections of our nature correfponding to them.

We find ourselves placed in a world, in which we are furrounded by a variety of objects, which are capable of giving us pleafure and pain; and finding by our own experience, and the information of others, in what manner each of them is adapted to affect us, we learn to defire fome of them, and feel an averfion to others. To these