so long and well matured, have embarked their fortunes in speculations in this branch of business.

The importance of the subject to one of the principal members of our Union, induces me to attend with great anxiety, the re-assurance from your Excellency, that no change has taken place in his Majesty's views on this subject; and that his dispositions to multiply, rather than diminish the combinations of interest between the two people, continue unaltered.

Commerce is slow in changing its channel. That between this country and the United States, is as yet but beginning; and this beginning has received some checks. The Arret in question would be a considerable one, without the explanation I have the honor to ask. I am persuaded, that a continuation of the dispositions which have been hitherto manifested towards us, will insure effects, political and commercial, of value to both nations.

I have had too many proofs of the friendly interest your Excellency is pleased to take, in whatever may strengthen the bands, and connect the views of the two countries, to doubt your patronage of the present application; or to pretermit any occasion of repeating assurances of those sentiments of high respect and esteem, with which I have the honor to be, your Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant,

TH: JEFFERSON.

TO JOHN JAY.

Paris, November 3, 1787.

SIR,

My last letters to you were of the 8th and 27th of October. In the former, I mentioned to you the declaration of this country, that they would interpose with force, if the Prussian troops entered Holland; the entry of those troops into Holland; the declaration of England, that if France did oppose force, they would consider it as an act of war; the naval armaments on both sides; the nomination of the Bailli de Suffrein as Generalissimo on the ocean; and the cold reception of Mr. Grenville here, with his conciliatory propositions, as so many symptoms which seemed to indicate a certain and immediate rupture. It was indeed universally and hourly expected. But the King of Prussia, a little before these last events, got wind of the alliance on the carpet between France and the two empires: he awaked to the situation in which

that would place him: he made some applications to the court of St. Petersburg, to divert the Empress from the proposed alliance, and supplicated the court of London not to abandon him. That court had also received a hint of the same project; both seemed to suspect for the first time, that it would be possible for France to abandon the Turks, and that they were likely to get more than they had played for at Constantinople: for they had meant nothing more there, than to divert the Émpress and Emperor from the affairs of the west, by employing them in the east; and at the same time, to embroil them with France as the patroness of the Turks. The court of London engaged not to abandon Prussia: but both of them relaxed a little the tone of their proceedings. The King of Prussia sent a Mr. Alvensleben here, expressly to explain and soothe the King of England, notwithstanding the cold reception of his propositions by Grenville, renewed conferences here through Eden and the Duke of Dorset. The minister, in the affection of his heart for peace, readily joined in conference, and a declaration and counter-declaration were cooked up at Versailles, and sent to London for approbation. They were approved, arrived here at one o'clock the 27th, were signed that night at Versailles, and on the next day, I had the honor of inclosing them to you, under cover to the Count de Moustier, whom I supposed still at Brest, dating my letter as of the 27th, by mistake for the 28th. Lest, however, these papers should not have got to Brest before the departure of the Count de Moustier, I now inclose you other copies. The English declaration states a notification of this court, in September, by Barthelemy, their minister at London, that they would send succours into Holland,' as the first cause of England's arming; desires an explanation of the intentions of this court, as to the affairs of Holland, and proposes to disarm; on condition, however, that the King of France shall not retain any hostile views in any quarter, for what has been done in Holland. This last phrase was to secure Prussia, according to promise. The King of France acknowledges the notification by his minister at London, promises he will do nothing in consequence of it, declares he has no intention to intermeddle with force in the affairs of Holland, and that he will entertain hostile views in no quarter, for what has been done there. He disavows having ever had any intention to interpose with force in the affairs of that republic. This disavowal begins the sentence, which acknowledges he had notified the contrary to the court of London, and it includes no apology to soothe the feelings which may be excited in

the breasts of the Patriots of Holland, at hearing the King declare he never did intend to aid them with force, when promises to do this, were the basis of those very attempts to better their constitution, which have ended in its ruin, as well as their own.

I have analysed these declarations, because, being somewhat wrapped up in their expressions, their full import might escape, on a transient reading; and it is necessary it should not escape. It conveys to us the important lesson, that no circumstances of morality, honor, interest, or engagement, are sufficient to authorise a secure reliance on any nation, at all times, and in all positions. A moment of difficulty, or a moment of error, may render for ever useless the most friendly dispositions in the King, in the major part of his ministers, and the whole of his nation. The present pacification is considered by most, as only a short truce. They calculate on the spirit of the nation, and not on the agued hand which guides its movements. It is certain, that from this moment the whole system of Europe changes. Instead of counting together England, Austria and Russia, as heretofore, against France, Spain, Holland, Prussia and Turkey, the division will probably be, England, Holland and Prussia, against France, Austria, Russia, and perhaps Spain. This last power is not sure, because the dispositions of its heir apparent are not sure. But whether the present be truce or peace, it will allow time to mature the conditions of the alliance between France and the two empires, always supposed to be on the carpet. It is thought to be obstructed by the avidity of the Emperor, who would swallow a good part of Turkey, Silesia, Bavaria, and the rights of the Germanic body. To the two or three first articles, France might consent, receiving in gratification a well rounded portion of the Austrian Netherlands, with the islands of Candia, Cyprus, Rhodes, and perhaps lower Egypt. But all this is in embryo, uncertainly known, and counter-worked by the machinations of the courts of London and Berlin.

The following solution of the British armaments, is supposed in a letter of the 25th ultimo, from Colonel Blachden of Connecticut, now at Dunkirk, to the Marquis de la Fayette. I will cite it in his own words. A gentleman who left London two days ago, and came to this place to day, informs me that it is now generally supposed that Mr. Pitt's great secret, which has puzzled the whole nation so long, and to accomplish which design, the whole force of the nation is armed, is to make a vigorous effort for the recovery of America.

VOL. II.

S

When I recollect the delay they have made in delivering the forts in America, and that little more than a year ago, one of the British ministry wrote to the King a letter, in which were these remarkable words: 'if your Majesty pleases, America may yet be yours;' add to this, if it were possible for the present ministry in England to effect such a matter, they would secure their places and their power for a long time; and should they fail in the end, they would be certain of holding them during the attempt, which it is in their power to prolong as much as they please; and at all events, they would boast of having endeavoured the recovery of what a former ministry had abandoned, it is possible." A similar surmise has come in a letter from a person in Rotterdam to one at this place. I am satisfied that the King of England believes the mass of our people to be tired of their independence, and desirous of returning under his government; and that the same opinion prevails in the ministry and nation. They have hired their newswriters to repeat this lie in their gazettes so long, that they have become the dupes of it themselves. But there is no occasion to recur to this, in order to account for their arming. A more rational purpose avowed, that purpose executed, and when executed, a solemn agreement to disarm, seem to leave no doubt, that the re-establishment of the Stadtholder was their object. Yet it is possible, that having found that this court will not make war in this moment for any ally, new views may arise, and they may think the moment favourable for executing any purposes they may have in our quarter. Add to this, that reason is of no aid in calculating their movements. We are, therefore, never safe till our magazines are filled with arms. The present season of truce or peace should, in my opinion, be improved without a moment's respite, to effect this essential object, and no means be omitted, by which money may be obtained for the purpose. I say this, however, with due deference to the opinion of Congress, who are better judges of the necessity and practicability of the measure.

for

I mentioned to you, in a former letter, the application I had made to the Dutch ambassadors and Prussian envoy, the protection of Mr. Dumas. The latter soon after received an assurance, that he was put under the protection of the States of Holland; and the Dutch ambassador called on me a few days ago to inform me, by instruction from his constituents, that the States General had received a written application from Mr. Adams, praying their protection of Dumas ; that they had instructed their greffier, Fagel, to assure Mr.

Adams, by letter, that he was under the protection of the States of Holland; but to inform him, at the same time, that Mr. Dumas's conduct, out of the line of his office, had been so extraordinary, that they would expect de l'honnêteté de Mr. Adams, that he would charge some other person with the affairs of the United States during his absence.'

Your letter of September the 8th has been duly received. I shall pay due attention to the instructions relative to the medals, and give any aid I can, in the case of Boss's vessel. As yet, however, my endeavours to find Monsieur Pauly, avocat au conseil d'etat, rue Coquilliere, have been-ineffectual. There is no such person living in that street. I found a Monsieur Pauly, avocat au parlement, in another part of the town; he opened the letter, but said it could not mean him. I shall advertise in the public papers. If that fails, there will be no other chance of finding him. Mr. Warnum will do well, therefore, to send some other description by which the person may be found. Indeed, some friend of the party interested should be engaged to follow up this business, as it will require constant attention, and probably a much larger sum of money than that named in the bill inclosed in Mr. Warnum's letter.

I have the honor to inclose you a letter from O'Bryan to me, containing information from Algiers, and one from Mr. Montgomery, at Alicant. The purpose of sending you this last, is to show you how much the difficulties of ransom are increased since the Spanish negotiations. The Russian captives have cost about eight thousand livres a piece, on an average. I certainly have no idea that we should give any such sum; and therefore, if it should be the sense of Congress to give such a price, I would be glad to know it by instruction. My idea is, that we should not ransom but on the footing of the nation which pays least, that it may be as little worth their while to go in pursuit of us, as any nation. This is cruelty to the individuals now in captivity, but kindness to the hundreds that would soon be so, were we to make it worth the while of those pirates to go out of the Streights in quest of us. As soon as money is provided, I shall put this business into train. I have taken measures to damp at Algiers all expectations of our proposing to ransom at any price. I feel the distress which this must occasion to our countrymen there and their connections; but the object of it is their ultimate good, by bringing down their holders to such a price as we ought to pay, instead of letting them remain in