Sin, and Belief a Virtue, where there is fuffi- CHAP. cient Evidence: And as there is more of Will, XVIII. than Understanding in Matters of plain, practical Faith, therefore Sin and Duty, Reward and Punishment, are annex'd to the Tranfgreffion, or Obedience of Faith.

No Man can have any Inclination that mathematical Demonftration fhould not be true; being oppofite to nothing that he chufes or refuses, as a moral Agent. But when the Evidence of the other fort, as cogent in its kind, as the other in its kind, happens crofs to Inclination irregularly indulg'd, we know what a bad Chance it ftands, of being received: Here the Will is particularly affected in the reigning Interest of its Purposes, and puts itself into an oppofing or refufing Posture; but being unconcern'd in the other Truth, because no moral Good or Evil iffues from it, it has nothing to object.

WHAT gives the moral Certainty, is of like Nature with that, in many Cafes, which affords mathematical Certainty, i. e. if the contrary Suppofition involves a moral Abfurdity, or Impoffibility in the general Course of human Belief, fafely trufting unfeen Things to be true; which is fo abfolutely neceffary in the World, and is the Law that holds Society together, in its effential Mutuality of Truft. If it is morally impoffible it should be otherwife, with refpect to the firft Teftifiers of the Chriftian Faith, or their Conveyance of it to others, that they should be deceived themselves, or have any Defign of deceiving others; fuppofing Mankind to act upon the common known Principles which influence their Actions, and their own Faculties to be fo commonly

T 2

CHAP. commonly true as not to deceive them; then XVIII the moral Certainty of the Truth of their Testi

mony, and the Conveyance of it to us, is unexceptionable.

WHEN the Sceptick practises his Doubts upon the Principle of believing nothing certain, nor any Perfons, nor any Record to be fufficiently credible, because there is a natural Poffibility of Deception; he acts upon a Principle that diffolves, by fufpending the Obligations to moral Duties; he does his best to bring Ruin and Confufion into Society; he undermines the Support of all Civil Government, and Administration of Juftice; and overthrows all Hiftory, all Science, all Truft in the World: Which being fo dreadful an Abfurdity, and fo great a Contradiction to the Perfections of God the Author and Governor of Society, against his fuffering fuch an Evil and Deception in the World, it must be morally impoffible that such a Principle can be right, or true; and therefore Belief upon fufficient Evidence is morally certain and authentick. But to offer to fupport fuch a Principle by Teftimony of former Times, is intolerably worse; because that is acknowledging the Validity and the fufficient Evidence of Teftimony, when it makes for them, and doubting it always, as often as it makes against them.

MR. Hobbs himself is forc'd to allow "the admitting Propofitions upon Trust in many "Cafes, to be no lefs free from Doubt than per"fect and manifeft Knowledge: For as there is "nothing whereof there is not fome Caufe; fo "when there is Doubt, there must be fome "Cause thereof conceiv'd. Now there be many

things which we receive from Report of others, CHA P. "of which it is impoffible to imagine any Caufe XVIII. "of Doubt: For what can be oppos'd against "the Confent of all Men, in things they can "know, and have no Cause to report otherwise "than they are (fuch is the great Part of our

Hiftories) unless a Man would say, that all "the World had confpir'd to deceive him *" Now, tho' the Teftimony is never fo plainly from God, and the Record thereof fupported by the most unexceptionable Hiftorical Evidence (which is all the Evidence the trueft Narration is capable of, nor is there any Evidence or Truth of Things furer than that of fome Hiftory) ftill, it is in the Power of Man, efpecially under the Biafs of irregular Affection, or culpable Prejudice, to fufpend his Affent to Truths never fo well attefted, and conveyed; by not fuffering his Understanding to attend fufficiently, if at all, to the Credibility, or Importance of the Things spoken of; regarding neither the internal, nor external Evidence that evince their Certainty, and their Excellency. And fuch is their Excellency, the less the Truth concerns us, the more fallible and various will human Judgment ever be; the more generally important thofe Truths are, fo much the clearer the Perception, fo much the more certain and unanimous the Judgment.

IT is abominably fhameful in the Author of Christianity as old, &c. barely to repeat the ftale Objection of various Readings in Diminution of the Credit of the Conveyance of those Truths, after they have been fo confounded in it, and put

Tripos, or Three Difcourfes, pag. 36.

CHAP. to flight by Phileleutherus Lipfienfis, and not able XVIII. to rally the leaft Reply, after so many Years ftudy for it. Efpecially, when it is confefs'd on all Hands, that no one Matter of Fact, or Faith, or Practice, in any of the material Things that concern Salvation, are in the leaft affected by them; but all remain as entire as if they came fresh from the Apostles Hand-writing. They themselves overlook abundantly more various Readings in every prophane Author of like Antiquity, as no Impeachment or Objection at all.

BESIDES there is a further moral Affurance to Christians, in common, and Security enough against any Doubting, from monumental Practice grounded upon the first Establishment, for preferving the Memory from Father to Son, from Age to Age, in the Obfervation of Baptifm, the Lord's Supper, Eafter-day annually, and the Lord's-day weekly; which hand down the Death, Refurrection, and the other great Articles of our Faith. The Refurrection of Chrift, and Afcenfion to Heaven, is moreover an easy, fhort, effectual Argument to every plain Chriftian, of the Refurrection of our Bodies, the Immortality of the Soul, and a future State, beyond any labour'd Proof. Nor,

For

2. Does the moral Certainty of the Evidence of Faith diminish by Progress of Time. with Refpect to that first and primary Care, there is, befides the Providence of God, the moral Argument from the Principles Mankind always act upon, in the conftant, and common Concern of tranfmitting to Pofterity important Facts and Truths, which concern them, as much

as

as themselves. And if Men are fo careful ofC HA P. tranfmitting to Pofterity Greek, and Roman Hi- XVIII. ftory of worldly Tranfactions, when, by the common Viciffitudes of earthly Dominion, the Concern of After-Ages will indeed diminish, and die away in Process of Time in proportion to the Distance; can they neglect to tranfmit that, with equal Care, wherein themselves were fo deeply interested, and latest Posterity no less?

THE Intereft and Concern that Pofterity may have in recorded Facts is one Thing, and the Truth and Certainty of thofe Facts quite another; the former indeed may thro' Distance of Time and Place dwindle into nothing, whilst the other remains, and will, as long as the Record lafts, for ever remain as true and certain, as at the first recording; if true then, it must always continue fo. Accordingly, who doubts the Truth of the Greek, Roman, or other authentick Hiftories, any more now, than a thousand Years ago? Whilft our immediate Concern in any of them is worn out and come to nothing. But in the other Cafe, the Truth and the Concern are the fame, and will remain fo to the End of the World; I mean, that Men ought ever to fhew the fame Concern for Truths they may be morally certain of, and are as much interested in, as thofe that first committed them to Writing.

IF the Certainty of thofe Things whereof they affirm lofes any thing of its Force and Conviction, by Succeffion of Time, it must proceed from the Diminution of the Reasons, and Declenfion of the attefting Circumftances, which made the first Witneffes and Teftifiers credible.