i. 16) are not God however, but or God (Cor. I. xi. 12); the same happening two ways 1 directly, 2 indirectly; and the first also either immediately or mediately; so that there are in all three ways, 1 directly and immediately, 2 directly and mediately, 3 indirectly; in one or other of which all things are of God. To speak distinctly of productions occurring in these three several ways:

1, Those of the first sort or direct immediate, must be in or with God as well as of, and consequently divine. For as true as it is, that nothing only comes of nothing and that something is not every thing, so true is it, that only one sort ever comes immediately of one, which must be one with it, and what comes not immediately, another even when it comes directly; of which a carved image, the production lately mentioned, may be an example. Let us consider therefore what it is in an image that properly comes from the maker, and what not: for what proceeds from him immediately is all that is properly of him, or all his proper contribution; as for example the labour and design: wherein is exemplified this first kind, or the direct and immediate production of God.

2, But, to exemplify the second sort, perhaps even the design was not originally this image-maker's: if so, it merely passes through his mind, and is no more a part of him than the food that passes through his body; when the labour, or perhaps only the employment of such labour, will be his proper contribution or production. So likewise while all that we see or can conceive must proceed from the great Artificer of the universe, and consequently all must be of him, we are yet to remember, that it is the universal purpose and admirable consent of parts with the power by which they are created and combined that proceeds directly and immediately from him, and is therefore properly his; not that which proceeds but mediately however directly, still less indirectly,-not any dissenting purpose, nor any insulated or contravening part. Thus the part of an honest shepherd is directly, but mediately by Christ, a part beginning in God: while that of a rebellious angel is a

part in the universe, and yet no part in its Author; for though a part in the universe, it is not an universal part, as every operation of the Creator must be, be it never so minute; a sparrow cannot fall on the ground (Matt. x. 29), nor a drop of rain either without him. He is with all and in all, though we see but too much that is not all in him, nor able to claim any connexion with him either.

3, Then by means of this illustration we may also be able to distinguish not only that which is directly of God both 1: 2 immediately and mediately, but also what is of him indirectly and it may be oppositely, like the rebellious part just alluded to. For if the original mode or design of that angel was directly of God and immediately too perhaps, as well as the power (Luke iv. 6; John xix. 11), the angel was not immediately nor his rebellion by means of the power delivered to him even directly, but indirectly and oppositely of God, of whom are all things.

Blind as men are therefore, they may be able to detect the fallacy of that atheistical conclusion "Est Jupiter," &c., or that because all things are of God therefore they must be God; that is more than divine: for only let the power of God to make something new be conceded, and the possibility of his external relations or of things that are not God is proved. If for instance, not to repeat any of the superior examples before mentioned, the Creator has ever made, endowed or afflicted any creature with properties that he had not himself; say gravitation, limitation, palpability and other material properties, or the spiritual and intellectual properties of folly, shame, and remorse; though the design and also the power of such creation is of God and in, yet the effect or production itself will be only of. The effect therefore may be thought to be generally without, at the same time that it is of its Author; while the power and design by which such effect is produced are also of; but in, and not without him; being therefore in and with God, they must be considered to be God; not indeed as constituents, because he has none,

but as counterparts and correlatives, whether we consider them in their origin or egress; just as a man's thoughts are internal before publication, and external likewise after; or only constituent before, but incidental likewise after, when reflected in print; being first in and afterwards of their author or subject, together both in and of.

Whatever we may consider therefore as being both in God, and of, we need not hesitate to style his immediate production, and whatever comes by this, his mediate, direct; as by the first his Power and Purpose, and by the next all their immediate effects, among which are to be reckoned especially those excellent properties of rational and intellectual creatures by which they approximate towards the character of the First Cause, or, as St. Peter expresses it, "all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of Him that hath called us to glory and virtue. Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises; that by these ye might be PARTAKERS OF THE DIVINE NaturÉ, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust" (Pet. II. i. 3, 4). For such as the Deity is in himself, such is he likewise in every relation; such as the purpose of the Deity is in his Mind or Conception, such is it likewise in publication; and such as the power is in his Spirit, such is it likewise in production. "For the Word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Heb. iv. 12). "There are also diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord; and there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God that worketh all in all" (Cor. I. xii. 4-6). As the feelings and sentiments of one man entertained by another or by many others, will still continue to be the feelings and sentiments of that one;

so the Spirit of God, who is all Spirit, and the Mind of God, who is all Mind, being in the world will still continue to be God and with God in the world, as out of it or before the world was made. Divinity is Divinity all the world over, and much beyond it: Divinity is always God, here and every where; and in all time, as well as before and after. Therefore every subject being of its subjective in the same manner generally as its constituents are of the subject, so will it here be particularly of the Subjective of the Kingdom, the Universal Subjective. "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things."

On the other hand, what a subject is not in himself he cannot be in his mediate productions; as that which never made a part of its subject or author before production cannot become a part thereby, or on being produced. For the subject does not consist of its secondary productions at any rate, if it do of those in which they originate operating; and, it may be, reflected, in them. The revealed Will of God for example, which we have in the form of commandments and declarations is an habitual production of God, who always wills, and always the same: but the form in which we have that Will is a production of the Will itself; as our acceptance of it is a part or property of our life reflecting the Will of God, though by a very imperfect image, being a third or fourth rate production, and as different from its divine Author and Original as any one thing can be from another of the same general quality or character. So a man may be the original author of misery to others, before he has felt it himself, by falsehood or by violence; as God will soon or late be the Author of repentance to him by his judgments: in which case, as the man would consist, not of misery, but of falsehood or violence in the first place; and in the next, of repentance; so God would consist, not of repentance, but (as far as he can consist of any thing) of judgment in the first place, and in the next, of glory and worship, reflected perhaps

by the new life of a sinner through Jesus Christ; "who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption" (Cor. I. i. 30).

So far as the aforesaid mediate production can be one with the First Cause by reflexion, the same may be conceded to the visionaries above mentioned; and more, if they think it would serve their argument, in that it is not so easy to distinguish the Creator from his productions, as to distinguish one creature from another, to the existence of which that one is only instrumental; because a production AB ORIGINE, like all the Creator's, is more entirely of its Author than a partial production compounded of ready materials, like all the creatural or artificial productions, can possibly be. To make this apparent, let another example be supposed.

If then one in authority should frame and utter an edict to any purport whatever; the framing and uttering would constitute a part of the great man's life, and consequently of the great man himself. But this it would not be of him exclusively for to every edict other matters are requisite besides framing and uttering by means of which it may also be identified with the lives of others. If, for example, such edict be only received in the ear, it will be a part of the hearer's life, and consequently of the hearer also as well as of the speaker; and he perhaps not the real maker. So here are three partners already to the edict; in which the vehicle of sound, the ambient air, will also have some property, if nothing else. And if the edict be committed to writing, the scribe together with his pen, ink and paper, will have a property in it. If the edict is to be enforced by arms or eloquence, soldiers, orators and others will "divide the spoil with the great": and in fact, if there was nothing else to divide it with, the man in authority must divide the production with the patterns. of his own conceptions, not one of which originates with him in this or in any other case. But how may it be on the other side of the question? There is not a power nor