reserved, might do for the audience to which it was addressed, but it is surely a gratis dictum, the reverse of which might just as well be said; and it is opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present Confederation, which had made the reservation in express terms. It was hard to conclude, because there has been a want of uniformity among the States as to the cases triable by jury, because some have been so incautious as to dispense with this mode of trial in certain cases, therefore the more prudent States shall be reduced to the same level of calamity. It would have been much more just and wise to have concluded by the other way, that as most of the States had preserved with jealousy this sacred palladium of liberty, those which had wandered should be brought back to it; and to have established general right rather than general wrong. For I consider all the ill as established which may be established. I have a right to nothing which another has a right to take away; and Congress will have a right to take away trials by jury in all civil cases. Let me add, that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every Government on earth, general or particular, and which no just Government should refuse, or rest on inference.

The second feature I dislike, and strongly dislike, is the abandonment, in every instance, of the principle of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President. Reason and experience tell us that the first magistrate will always be reëlected, if he may be reëlected. He is then an officer for life. This once observed, it becomes of so much consequence to certain nations to have a friend or a foe at the head of our affairs, that they will interfere with money and with arms. A Galloman or an Angloman will be supported by the nation he befriends. If once elected, and at a second or third election out-voted by one or two votes, he will pretend false votes, foul play, hold possession of the reins of Government, be supported by the States voting for him, especially if they be the central ones, lying in a compact body themselves, and separating their opponents; and they will be aided by one nation in Europe, while the majority are aided by another. The election of a President of America, some years hence, will be much more interesting to certain nations of Europe than ever the election of a King of Poland was. Reflect on all the instances in history, ancient and modern, of the elective Monarchies, and say if they do not give foundation for my fears; the

Roman Emperors, the Popes while they were of any importance, the German Emperors till they became hereditary in practice, the Kings of Poland, the Deys of the Ottoman dependencies. It may be said that if elections are to be attended with these disorders, the less frequently they are repeated the better. But experience says, that to free them from disorder they must be rendered less interesting by a necessity of change. No foreign Power, nor domestic party, will waste their blood and money to elect a person who must go out at the end of a short period. The power of removing every fourth year by the vote of the people is a power which they will not exercise, and if they were disposed to exercise it, they would not be permitted. The King of Poland is removable every day by the Diet, but they never remove him. Nor would Russia, the Emperor, &c., permit them to do it. Smaller objections are, the appeals on matters of fact as well as law, and the binding all persons, legislative, executive, and judiciary, by oath to maintain that Constitution. I do not pretend to decide what would be the best method of procuring the establishment of the manifold good things in this Constitution, and of getting rid of the bad. Whether by adopting it in hopes of future amendments; or, after it shall have been only weighed and canvassed by the people, after seeing the parts they generally dislike and those they generally approve, to say to them: "We see now 'what you wish. You are willing to give to your Federal Govern'ment such and such powers, but you wish at the same time to have 'such and such fundamental rights secured to you, and certain sources ' of convulsion taken away. Be it so. Send together your deputies ' again. Let them establish your fundamental rights by a sacrosanct 'declaration, and let them pass the parts of the Constitution you have approved. These will give powers to your Federal Govern❝ment sufficient for your happiness.'

This is what might be said, and would probably produce a speedy, more perfect, and more permanent form of Government. At all events I hope you will not be discouraged from making other trials, if the present one should fail. We are never permitted to despair of the Commonwealth. I have thus told you freely which I like and what I dislike, merely as a matter of curiosity; for I know it is not in my power to offer matter of information to your judgment, which has been formed after hearing and weighing everything which the wisdom of man could offer on these subjects. I own I am not a

friend to a very energetic Government. It is always oppressive. It places the governors, indeed, more at ease, at the expense of the people. The late rebellion in Massachusetts has given more alarm than I think it should have done. Calculate that one rebellion in thirteen States in the course of eleven years is but one for each State in a century and a half. No country should be as long without one. Nor will any degree of power in the hands of Government prevent insurrection. In England, where the hand of power is heavier than with us, there are seldom half a dozen years without an insurrection. In France, where it is still heavier, but less despotic, as Montesquieu supposes, than in some other countries, and where there are always two or three hundred thousand men ready to crush insurrections, there have been three in the course of the three years I have been here, in every one of which greater numbers were engaged than in Massachusetts, and a great deal more blood spilt. In Turkey, where the sole nod of the despot is death, insurrections are the events of every day. Compare again the ferocious depredations of their insurgents with the order, the moderation, and the almost selfextinguishment of ours; and say, finally, whether peace is best preserved by giving energy to the Government or information to the people. This last is the most certain and the most legitimate engine of government. Educate and inform the whole mass of the people. Enable them to see that it is their interest to preserve peace and order, and they will preserve them. And it requires no very high degree of education to convince them of this. They are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty. After all, it is my principle that the will of the majority should prevail. If they approve the proposed Constitution in all its parts, I shall concur in it cheerfully, in hopes they will amend it whenever they shall find it works wrong. This reliance cannot deceive us as long as we remain virtuous; and I think we shall be so as long as agriculture is our principal object, which will be the case while there remain vacant lands in any part of America. When we get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, we shall become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one another as they do there. I have tired you by this time with disquisitions which you have already heard repeated by others, a thousand and a thousand times, and therefore shall only add assurances of the esteem and attachment with which I have the honor to be, &c.,

TH: JEFFERSON.

P. S. The instability of our laws is really an immense evil. 1 think it would be well to provide in our Constitution that there shall always be a twelvemonth between the engrossing a bill and passing it-that it should then be offered to its passage without changing a word; and that if circumstances should be thought to require a speedier passage, it should take two thirds of both Houses instead of a bare majority.

Sir,

FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JOHN JAY.

Paris, December 31, 1787.

Since the receipt of the letter of Monsieur de Calonne of October the 22d, 1786, I have several times had the honor of mentioning to you that I was endeavoring to get the substance of that letter reduced into an arrêt, which, instead of being revocable by a single letter of a Comptroller General, would require an arrêt to repeal or alter it, and of course must be discussed in full council, and so give due time to prevent it. This has been pressed as much as it could be with prudence. One cause of delay has been the frequent changes of the Comptroller General, as we had always our whole work to begin again with every new one. Monsieur Lambert's continuance in office for some months has enabled us at length to get through the business; and I have just received from him a letter, and the arrêt duly authenticated, of which I have the honor to send you a number of printed copies. You will find that the several alterations and additions are made which, on my visit to the sea-ports, I had found to be necessary, and which my letters of June the 21st and August the 6th particularly mentioned to you. Besides these we have obtained some new articles of value, for which openings arose in the course of the negotiation. I say we have done it, because the Marquis de la Fayette has gone hand in hand with me through this business, and has been a most invaluable aid. I take the liberty of making some observations on the articles of the arrêt severally, for their explanation, as well as for the information of Congress.

ARTICLE I. In the course of our conferences with the Comptroller General, we had prevailed on him to pass this article with a suppression of all duty. When he reported the arrêt, however, to the Council, this suppression was objected to, and it was insisted to reëstablish the duties of seven livres and ten sous, and of ten sous the

livre, reserved in the letter of M. de Calonne. The passage of the arrêt was stopped, and the difficulty communicated to me. I urged everything I could, in letters and in conferences, to convince them that whale oil could bear no duty at all; that if the duty fell on the consumer, he would choose to buy vegetable oils; if on the fisherman, he could no longer live by his calling, remaining in his own country; and that if he quitted his own country, the circumstances of vicinity, sameness of language, laws, religion, and manners, and perhaps the ties of kindred, would draw him to Nova Scotia, in spite of every encouragement which could be given at Dunkirk; and that thus those fishermen would be shifted out of a scale friendly to France into one always hostile. Nothing, however, could prevail. It hung on this article alone for two months, during which we risked the total loss of the arrêt on the stability in office of Monsieur Lambert; for, if he had gone out, his successor might be less favorable; and if Monsieur Necker were the successor, we might lose the whole, as he never set any store by us, or the connexion with us. About ten days ago it became universally believed that Monsieur Lambert was to go out immediately. I therefore declined further insisting on the total suppression, and desired the arrêt might pass, having the duties on whale oil as Monsieur de Calonne had promised them; but with a reservation which may countenance our bringing on this matter again at a more favorable moment.

ARTICLE II. The other fisheries are placed in a separate article, because, whatever encouragement we may hereafter obtain for whale oils, they will not be extended to those which their own fisheries produce.

ARTICLE III. A company had silently, and by unfair means, obtained a monopoly for the making and selling spermaceti candles; as soon as we discovered it we solicited its suppression, which is effected by this clause.

ARTICLE IV. The duty of an eighth per cent. is merely to oblige the masters of vessels to enter their cargoes for the information of Government, without inducing them to attempt to smuggle.

ARTICLE VI. Tar, pitch, and turpentine of America, coming in competition with the same articles produced in the southwestern parts of France, we could obtain no greater reduction than two and a half per cent. The duties before were from four to six times that

amount.