Dear Sir, FROM JOHN JAY TO JOHN ADAMS. Office for Foreign Affairs, August 26, 1785. It gives me pleasure to inform you that your letters of 2d, 6th, and 17th June last have been received, and were this day laid before Congress, who, I am persuaded, will read them with as much satisfaction as I have done. You have been in a situation that required much circumspection. I think you have acquitted yourself in a manner that does you honor. The vessel that is to carry this sails in the morning, so that at present, I can only add my best wishes, and assure you that I am, &c., JOHN JAY. REPORT OF SECRETARY JAY ON HIS LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO THE AMERICAN MINISTER AT LONDON. Office for Foreign Affairs, June 23, 1785. The Secretary of the United States for the Department of Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred his letter of the 19th ultimo to his Excellency the President of Congress, reports thereupon: That, in his opinion, it would be advisable to permit your Secretary to write a letter of the following tenor, in cyphers, and by a private hand, to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of London, viz: Sir, It is more than probable that this letter will find you in London. The manner of your reception at that Court, and its temper, views, and dispositions respecting American objects, are matters concerning which particular information might be no less useful than it is interesting. Your letters will, I am persuaded, remove all suspense on those points. While men or States are influenced by their passions and their interest alternately, without having reduced their pursuit of either to system, it is impossible to predict which of those motives will preponderate on certain occasions, and render certain combinations of circumstances. Hence it is uncertain how far and in what instances the national ill temper of Britain towards this country may lead that kingdom to gratify it at the expense of a more conciliating and advantageous policy. It is well known that these countries, prior to the late war, carried on a valuable trade with Honduras and Campeachy, and employed above one hundred vessels in exchanging, at the English settlements, beef, pork, and other kinds of provision for logwood, mahogany, sarsaparilla, &c., It being the policy of Spain to keep other nations at a distance from their American dominions, she beholds these settlements with pain and jealousy. The uneasiness which subsists at present between those two nations on that subject, seems to offer us an opportunity of negotiating with the English for a participation in their right to cut logwood, or at least to trade with them as formerly. They may, perhaps, think it expedient to strengthen their footing in those parts by interesting us in the advantages resulting from their continuing to maintain it. It would not be difficult for you to sound the Minister so effectually, and yet circumspectly on this head, as to enable you to discern his disposition and sentiments on the one hand, and yet avoid committing either Congress or yourself on the other, as the experiment, whether successful or not, can cost little, as in the one event it may produce good, and the other no inconveniences can follow. I think it would be advisable to make it. Various considerations, of which I am sure you are apprized, render it necessary to manage this matter with caution and secrecy, as well on account of those with whom you may have to negotiate as of those who may eventually be affected, or think themselves so, by the issue. The English and their Minister do not like us; and you know dislike and disgust, whether well or ill founded, always oppose, and frequently exclude, both confidence and candor; in such cases, therefore, constant provision and much circumspection are requisite. Your knowledge of Spain, and the political relation in which she stands to us and to others, make it unnecessary to observe that the measure in question would, if known, meet with strong, if not open, opposition from that, and probably from other quarters. I shall write another official letter to you by this conveyance, and am, with great respect and esteem, &c. All which is submitted to the wisdom of Congress. JOHN JAY. Dear Sir, FROM JOHN ADAMS TO JOHN JAY. Bath Hotel, Westminster, June 26, 1785. By the ninth article of the Confederation, the United States, in Congress assembled, have the sole and exclusive right and power of entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever. I have ventured, sir, in some former letters to you, notwithstanding the delicacy of tampering with the Confederation, to suggest to your consideration whether it may not be necessary for the States to reconsider this proviso, and give to Congress unlimited authority to enter into treaties of commerce with foreign Powers, at least for a limited term of years. I have also inquired whether it might not be necessary for the States to confer upon Congress authority to regulate the external commerce of all the members of the Confederation for a like term of years. If the States should hesitate at this, I am persuaded they would readily comply with the recommendations of Congress to this effect. For example, if Congress should recommend to the Legislatures of the States to lay duties, heavy duties, upon all British vessels entering into or clearing out of their ports, especially upon all vessels coming from or bound to the West India Islands, Nova Scotia, Canada, or Newfoundland, and upon all merchandizes imported from, or exported to, any ports of the British dominions, I can scarcely doubt that every Legislature would immediately comply; and by this means our own navigation would be encouraged, and the British discouraged to such a degree as to compel the British Government to enter into an equitable treaty. Nay, I cannot doubt the readiness. of the States to comply with a recommendation of Congress wholly to prohibit British vessels and merchandizes. VOL. II.-25 Although I have been received here, and continue to be treated with all the distinction which is due to the rank and title you have given me, there is, nevertheless, a reserve, which convinces me that we shall have no treaty of commerce until this nation is made to feel the necessity of it. I am every day astonished at the ignorance of all ranks of people of the relation between this country and ours. Cui bono? they cry. To what end a treaty of commerce, when we are sure of as much American trade as we have occasion for without it? The experiment has been tried, and the Americans have found that they cannot supply themselves elsewhere. There must be quid pro quo. And what have the United States to give in exchange for the liberty of going in their own ships to our sugar colonies, and our colonies upon the Continent? These smart reasoners are answered. The Americans allow Britons to come in their own vessels to all their ports in the United States; and this is more than a quid for your quo. This is the true reciprocity; and while we allow you this liberty, we have a right to demand it in return. But, replies the Briton, you cannot avoid this; you have no Government; you cannot agree to prohibit our ships and goods, or to lay duties on them. Then, says the American, you give up the argument of reciprocity; you confess that you are not willing to allow us a quid for your quo, and that you are disposed to take advantage of our supposed disunion to get unequal benefits from us. But you will find yourselves disappointed in this disunion that you build so much upon. Nothing but too much good nature to you, and too high an opinion of your wisdom, has prevented the States hitherto from uniting in a reciprocal discouragement of your ships and goods; but when the Americans find themselves deceived, you will soon see them too much united for your purposes. Such have been the dialogues in conversation for a year or two, and these ignorant sophisms of the Britons will never be confuted to any effect until vigorous measures are taken by all the States in concert. Whatever measures are taken, I should recommend them to be taken upon this express proviso, to continue in force only until things shall be otherwise settled by a treaty of commerce. I receive sometimes unexpected visits from persons, who, I suppose, are sent on purpose to say things to me, which they wish, no doubt, to have transmitted to you. Since the appearance of the resolutions of the merchants, traders, and mechanics of Boston, I have several times fallen into company with persons whose connex ions I knew, and who have assumed very grave faces, and inquired about the disturbances at Boston, as they call them, and given very sage hints of their fears that those proceedings would obstruct my success. A few days since my servant announced Lord Hood would be glad to see me if I was at leisure. I desired his Lordship might walk up. I was surprised that, among so many visits of ceremony, his Lordship should not be content with leaving his card. But in the year 1768, I had appeared before him, then Commodore Hood, in a special Court of Admiralty, for the trial of four sailors for killing Lieutenant Panton in defending themselves from his press gang. His Lordship took advantage of this very transient acquaintance of seventeen years' standing to make me a friendly visit. He soon began a conversation about the Boston proceedings. It is not necessary to repeat what was said, as it was of no consequence for you to know, excepting that his Lordship was very sorry to see the account of those proceedings; was very much afraid they would obstruct the return of friendship, and prove a bar to what he wished to see a good treaty of commerce. I told his Lordship that those proceedings were prefaced with, "Whereas there is no treaty of commerce," and, as I understood them, they were not to be in force any longer than there should be no treaty of commerce. His Lordship concluded by saying, that the sooner such a treaty was made the better. I had no doubt then, and have been confirmed by others since in the opinion, that his Lordship did not come of his own head. All parties are upon the reserve respecting American affairs. They are afraid of each other; and it is my clear opinion that it is Congress and the States, and they alone, who can enable me to do anything effectual. I may reason till I die to no purpose. It is unanimity in America in measures which shall confute the British sophisms, and make them feel, which will ever produce a fair treaty of commerce. With great esteem, &c., JOHN ADAMS. FROM JOHN JAY TO JOHN ADAMS. Office for Foreign Affairs, September 6, 1785. Dear Sir, My last to you was of the 26th ultimo, in which I mentioned the dates of the letters with which you had honored me, and the receipt |