I doubt the propriety of borrowing more money, without funds or prospect to repay any. Our Treasury is low, the States backward, our people intent on private gain, and too inattentive to national concerns and exigencies.

With great and sincere esteem, &c.,

JOHN JAY.

Dear Sir,

FROM JOHN ADAMS TO JOHN JAY.

Grosvenor Square, May 16, 1786.

Last night I was honored with your letter of April 7th, and am happy to find that twelve States have granted to Congress the impost. New York, I am persuaded, will not long withhold her assent, because that, in addition to all the other arguments in favor of the measure, she will have to consider that all the blame of consequences must now rest upon her; and she would find this alone a greater burden than the imposts. This measure alone, as soon as it is completed, will have a great effect, and instantly raise the United States in the consideration of Europe, and especially of England. Its beneficial effects will be soon felt in America by producing a circulation of that property, the long stagnation of which has been a principal cause of the distress of the community. The States, jointly and severally, would find immediate benefits from establishing taxes to pay the whole interest of their debts, those of the Confederation as well as those of particular States. The interest of money would instantly be lowered, and capitals be employed in manufactures and commerce that are now at usury. It is no paradox to say that every man would find himself the richer the more taxes he pays; and this rule must hold good until the taxes shall amount to a sum sufficient to discharge the interest due to every creditor in the community. The power to regulate the commerce of the whole will not probably be long withheld from Congress; and when that point shall be agreed to, you will begin to hear a bray in England for a treaty. Like Daniel Defoe's game-cock among the horses' feet, it will be, "Pray, gentlemen, don't let us tread upon one another."

You have, I hope, before now, Lord Caermarthen's answer of February 28th to my memorial of November 30th. I had determ

ined in my own mind not "to demand a categorical answer, without the further orders of Congress ;" and it is a great satisfaction to find your opinion coincides. It is now with Congress to deliberate what answer they should make to his Lordship; and, for my own part, I do not see what answer they can give, until they know the sense of Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, and South Carolina.

With the highest regard, &c.,

JOHN ADAMS.

Dear Sir,

FROM JOHN ADAMS TO JOHN JAY.

Grosvenor Square, May 25, 1786.

I have not presented a formal memorial in the name of our sovereign, concerning the negroes carried off contrary to the treaty, although it has been frequently and constantly insisted upon with the British Ministry, for several reasons; one was, a desire to confine the first memorial to one point-the frontier posts, that the real motives and intentions of the Cabinet might be the more distinctly laid open to Congress. Another reason was the frankness of Ministers to own, in conversation, that the negroes must be paid for, as a clear point. Another was, that time might be allowed to you, sir, to transmit me the whole amount and evidence of the claim; and, lastly, that I might have the explicit instructions of Congress to demand payment for the negroes in money, and especially at what prices they should be stated.

By the answer of Lord Caermarthen to the memorial of the 30th of November, Congress will see that the detention of the posts is attempted to be justified by the laws of certain States impeding the course of law for the recovery of old debts, &c. Were another memorial to be now presented relative to the negroes, the same answer would undoubtedly be given, or, more probably, a reference only to that answer.

It is my duty to be explicit with my country; and, therefore, I hope it will not be taken amiss by any of my fellow-citizens, when they are told that it is in vain to expect the evacuation of posts, or payment for the negroes, or a treaty of commerce, or restoration of prizes, payment of the Maryland or Rhode Island demand, compensation to the Boston merchants, or any other relief of any kind,

until these laws are all repealed. Nor will the Ministry ever agree to any explanation concerning the interest during the war, or payments by instalments. The old creditors have formed themselves into a society, and have frequent meetings; send committees to Mr. Pitt and Lord Caermarthen; and, I am well informed, oppose even a treaty of commerce upon this ground; and the Ministers know them to be so numerous, that they could raise a clamor-a consideration which has always had more weight at this Court and in Parliament than the interest of America or the British Empire.

What, then, is to be done? The States, it may be said, will not repeal their laws. If they do not, then let them give up all expectation from this Court and country, unless you can force them to do as you please by investing Congress with full power to regulate the trade.

I will run the hazard, sir, of all the clamor that can be raised against me by my friends or by my enemies, (if any such there are,) and of all the consequences that can befall me, for writing my sentiments. freely to Congress, on a subject of this importance. It will appear to all the world with an ill grace if we complain of breaches of the treaty, when the British Court have it in their power to prove upon us breaches of the same treaty of greater importance. My advice, then, if it is not impertinent to give it, is, that every law of every State, which concerns either debts or royalists, which can be impartially construed contrary to the spirit of the treaty of peace, be immediately repealed, and the debtors left to settle with their creditors or dispute the point of interest at law. I do not believe a jury would give the interest. I beg leave to suggest another thing: if Congress are themselves clear that interest during the war was not part of that bona fide debt which was intended by the contracting parties, they may declare so by a resolution; or the Legislatures of the separate States may declare so; and then the courts of justice and the juries will certainly give no interest during the war. But even in this case, those States which have few debts, and have made no laws against the recovery of them, will think it hard that they should be subjected to dangers by the conduct of such as have many, and have made laws inconsistent with the treaty, both respecting debts and Tories. You will give me leave, sir, to suggest another idea. Suppose the States should venture to do themselves justice; for example, suppose Maryland should undertake to pay herself for her

bank stock and negroes carried off after the treaty, by accepting security for it from her own citizens who are debtors to British subjects, and giving discharges to those debtors, or engaging to stand between them and the claims of the creditor; suppose the Carolinas, Virginia, and all the other States which had negroes carried off after the peace, should do the same. Suppose Massachusetts should make up the losses of the inhabitants of Boston, in goods carried off by General Howe, in the same way, (at least those of them who were promised compensation by General Howe,) for these are undoubtedly creditors of the British Government. Suppose further, that each State should undertake, in the same way, to compensate the owners of vessels taken after the commencement of the armistice.

I throw out these hints as possibilities and speculations only, sensible that they might open a door to much altercation; but I will not fail to add, that I think it would be much sounder policy and nobler spirit to repeal at once every law of every State which is in the smallest degree inconsistent with the treaty, respecting either debts or Tories, and am well persuaded that no inconvenience would be felt from it; neither lawsuits, nor bankruptcies, nor imprisonments, would be increased by it; on the contrary, the credit and commerce of all the States would be so increased that the debtors themselves, in general, would find their burdens lighter.

With great esteem, &c.,

JOHN ADAMS.

P. S. Enclosed are two acts of Parliament and the King's last proclamation. The other acts which affect America shall be sent as soon as they are passed, and I can obtain them.

FROM JOHN ADAMS TO JOHN JAY.

Grosvenor Square, May 28, 1786.

Dear Sir,

An agent from South America was not long since arrested at Rouen, in France, and has not since been heard of. Another agent, who was his associate, as I have been told, is here, and has applied to Government for aid. Government, not being in a condition to go to war with Spain, declines having any thing to do with the business. But if application should be made to rich individuals, and profitable prices offered for twenty or thirty thousand stands of arms, a number of field-pieces, a few battering cannon, some mortars, a good deal

of ammunition, clothing, &c., do you think that in this capital of mammon they might not be obtained? I might mention names and facts which have been communicated to me, but my information is not official, nor authentic enough for this. It is sufficient to say, that an office like that once undertaken by Mr. Beaumarchais would not probably be refused by all men here.

You are probably better informed than I can pretend to be of the disturbances which took place in the Spanish provinces of South America during the late war, of the pacification of them, and of the complaints and discontents which now prevail. It is a fixed opinion in many minds here that a revolution in South America would be agreeable to the United States, and it is depended on that we shall do nothing to prevent it, if we do not exert ourselves to promote it. I shall decline entering far into this speculation, which is out of my depth. But I must venture to say, that Portugal is bound, by a treaty of 1778, to assist Spain in such a case. France must assist her, from the family compact, and for a still more weighty reason, viz: to prevent England from getting too rich and powerful by it; and Holland is now bound by treaty to France, and perhaps to Spain. We should be very cautious what we do; for England will certainly reap the greatest advantage, as she will supply with her manufactures all South America, which will give her a sudden wealth and power that will be very dangerous to us.

That British Ambassadors will very soon endeavor to excite the two empires and Denmark to an alliance, for the purpose of setting the Spanish and Portuguese colonies free, is very probable; as an inducement, they may agree to assist in opening the Danube and the navigation by the Dardanelles. The object of the next war, I think, will be the liberty of commerce in South America and the East Indies. We shall be puzzled to keep out of it; but I think we ought if we can. England would gain the most by such a turn in affairs, by the advantages she has over other nations in the improvements of her manufactures, commerce, and marine; and England, unfortunately, we cannot trust.

Such speculations as these are not new; a pamphlet was written in 1783, under the title of "La Crise de l'Europe," by a learned British knight, and circulated upon the continent. As I cannot send you the whole, you may possess yourself of the spirit of it by a few extracts.