great preponderance in the process which is now being adjudged at Constantinople. Already invested, under different titles, with Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, the West provinces of the Ottoman empire, she has only to wait awhile, to enter into possession of the rest. Constantinople cannot escape her; and does she not already reign there? The force of circumstances seems to me to command this result; to be prepared for it, we must anticipate it.

But the question is complicated; while Russia leans towards Asia, she oppresses Europe. Europe cannot witness her growing power, without imposing limits to it: but it is France who should establish and defend the continental equilibrium; I say establish, rather than maintain, for it does not exist: I cannot give the name of equilibrium to that iniquitous and violent parcelling off of men, instituted by the Congress of Vienna,-which is, thank God! already broken in fact, in the North, the South, and all the points of the globe.

In the isolated position of France, dismantled as she is by treaties, it would be difficult-I say more, impossible-for her to check Russia effectually, in a serious conflict: England, who is called our ally, is not so in reality; in the Turco-Egyptian question, she has only her commerce in view, and the smallest commercial bait would immediately detach her. Besides, England is no more a powerful ally; in contra-position to Russia, who is in her ascendant, England is in her decline, and can only lose in a general movement of emancipation. The future is preparing for her an awful catastrophe.

France has but one mode of balancing Europe and mastering Russia with the same stroke: it is, solidly to establish her frontiers on the Rhine and the Alps; to create, on one side, a Germany; on the other, an Italy. If it be the destiny of heroic Poland ever again to be formed into an independent and sovereign nation, she would arise alone, favoured by so great a shock.

Such is, in my opinion, the true solution of the Oriental question; it is nothing less than the abrogation of the ignominious treaties of 1815, and the complete remodelling of the European continent. No doubt, this plan is far different from the half measures, which the Government of July scarcely dares to venture on; or the timid protocols which it stammers forth. Nor will they ever go beyond the statu quo, till the question has been propounded in its real terms.

These general considerations may suffice to show in what manner the cause of Italian independence, pleaded in this work, is connected with the debate on the Bosphorus. To speak accurately, it is part of a general question, treated of in a particular point of view. In the actual state of interests and ideas, there are no isolated facts, no municipal questions; and the famous adage," tout est en tout," was never so true.

But if Italy be not bound up with the general European interestsif she should not prove, so to speak, virtually an ally-she would not the less, therefore, deserve our solicitude and sympathy. It is fearful to reflect, that twenty-four millions of intelligent men, who, at different epochs, have done so much for the civilization of the world, should be now condemned, as the reward of their long and glorious services, to the most brutal as well as most silly of all servitudes. So little, on our

parts, is required to free this unfortunate race; so distinguished in the eyes of men would be their redeemer! It would not even be a sacri

fice. To do so would be no proof of devotion to their cause; it would only be the judicious exercise of French power to the advancement of French interests.

But the day is not yet arrived when these things can be felt or even seen. Egotism and baseness of heart obscure our mental visions; when we feel nothing, we can comprehend nothing; we do but half see, and half feel.

We must let this miserable race disgracefully complete its phasis of materialism and servility. From this excess of evil some reviving good will doubtless arise, as in the physical world putrefaction produces life. CHARLES DIDier.

CHAPTER I.

Effects of Italian Independence on the Constitutional Countries of Europe, and especially on France and England.

The independence of Italy is the common interest of every free people. This independence would aid the progress of the representative system, bind Greece to the constitutional monarchies of Europe, and establish a due balance of power between the countries governed by chartered rights and those which are ruled by absolute government. Besides this general interest, France and England have each a special advantage to reap from Italian independence.

France.

An orator in the Chamber of Deputies has said, "That French blood should be shed for France alone." This axiom in politics needs explanation.

Nations have sometimes an urgent interest to induce them to shed their blood for the safety of another people. In the contest between Europe and Napoleon, we have seen England prodigal of her blood and wealth in the cause of Spain and Portugal.

The absolute monarch, Louis XVI., to consolidate the independence and liberty of the United States, did not spare French blood, either in the plains of America, or on the seas of the two hemispheres.

When immortal Florence expended her last resources in resisting Charles V., had France lent her aid, even at the price of her blood, she would have escaped the humiliations to which she was long exposed.

Had Napoleon espoused the cause of Poland, what floods of French blood would he not have spared?

If, in 1831, the French Government had dared to protect Modina and Bologna against Austrian invasion, the troops of Francis II. would not have passed the Po, and possibly all Italy might now have been the powerful ally of France.

That nation alone, which needs no alliance, can adopt, in an unlimited sense, the maxim of the French deputy.

Is France in this position?

The absolute princes of Europe are her enemies;-her crime, in their eyes, is, that she is less a constitutional than a democratic monarchy; that, being situated in the centre of Europe, her capital seems the rendezvous of the highest intellects; her language is spread over the Continent; her tribune is responded to on all sides; and that her people are free.

These are the crimes which monarchs who would govern without control or contradiction cannot forgive; still less can they be pardoned by an aristocracy, desirous of preserving all their distinctions and privileges.

Surrounded by such numerous and vigilant enemies, is there a Frenchman who can consider a long peace probable, even should a third restoration be possible? and who does not believe that a restoration must be preceded by war? Who does not see, that the natural and necessary boundaries of France, Mont Cenis and the Rhine, can only be restored to her by war? Why, then, does France leave to her enemies the choice of time and circumstances for the moment of attack? What does she expect as the reward of humiliations which lower her in the eyes of strangers? Delay! But will not this delay be more favourable to her adversaries than to herself? Their policy is fixed; their lines of defence are traced; their contingents are determined and certain. France possesses neither settled political principles of action, nor frontiers easy to defend; her capital is unfortified, and the heart of her kingdom unguarded and vulnerable.

But suppose the twenty-four millions who inhabit Italy restored to independence;-by the nature of their institutions, and the sentiment of their own preservation, they become naturally the allies of France; and would the Northern Powers then dare to attack, or even menace her?

Italy has ever been to France a question of war; for the last fifty years this question has become vital. Napoleon, speaking of Joachim, King of Naples, said, that twice he had occasioned the loss of the empire;-yet Joachim reigned over only a fourth part of the Italian population.

England.

With regard to England, the political state of Italy cannot have the same influence on her, that it has on France. Nevertheless, if England would dare to protect Italian independence, the advantages she might derive from this protection would be incalculable.

What, for a long time, have been the wishes of the British Government with regard to the Continent?-It seeks only to oppose the ambition of France and the encroachments of Russia. What, at this moment, is the desire of the people of England ?-To see liberty extended and consolidated on the Continent, that their own may be established on a broader basis.

The independence of Italy would powerfully aid the accomplishment of both these objects.

Italy once free, the liberty of the people, from the Rhine to the Alps on one side, to Cadiz and Gibraltar on the other, would no longer be in danger :-France, having once attained the limits of Savoy and

the Rhine, could no more dream of the conquests which ruined the Empire: a return to those ambitious projects would be impossible. The Italians, the allies of France, if she were menaced by the Northern Powers, would become her greatest enemies, if she sought to extend her territory beyond the Alps or the Rhine; this enmity would be inspired by the most powerful of all feelings,-that of self-preservation.

It may be answered, that England would regard Italian prosperity with jealousy; for with that would revive the maritime activity of Venice, Genoa, and the coasts of Amalfi. But this narrow-minded jealousy no longer exists among the free people of the present epoch. In 1816, England was seen combating the African rulers for the benefit of all the maritime powers; renouncing herself the advantages which the British flag might have derived from this barbarian warespecially from their attacks on the Italians by sea. But what progress has not England made in generous policy since 1816? The advantages which the English have derived from the French Revolution of 1830, have opened their eyes to their real interests-have shown them, that the superiority of England to other nations, which the Tories endeavoured to establish, was profitable to the Tories, but injurious to the people.*

But suppose a war between England and Russia,—a war which public opinion regards as inevitable;- we believe, not only that the alliance of independent Italy would be highly advantageous to England; but that such an alliance would be indispensable to enable her to act on the offensive successfully against her enemy. If the British Government would courageously devote itself to the interests of its country, it would lose not a day in declaring itself for Italian independence. It would regard this political act as its first and firmest step, as well as the most advantageous, against the ambition of the Czars.

* To throw more light on this subject, we will add, that, in 1830, towards the end of October, we went from Paris to London. Generals Lafayette, Lamarque, and Mons. Mauguin, expressed a wish, that we would let them know in what manner the English liberals would consider the aggrandisement of France to Mont Cenis and the Rhine. Mr. Brougham (since Lord Brougham) told us to write to General Lafayette, and say that the liberal party in England would with pleasure see France take possession of Savoy and extend her territory to the Rhine. "Why do you, sir, who are so eminently English, give such advice?"- -"Because," answered he, "the more liberty there is on the Continent, the more will there be in England;liberty cannot be firmly established on the Continent without France, and France must be great and powerful to serve as a support to continental liberty." My friends in Paris were charmed with this language of the first English orator. General Haxo alone, strong in his own opinion, would never believe in the sympathy of the English people for France. On his return from Antwerp, he said to us :-“ Did you see how your English, with their sympathy for us, endeavoured to thwart us in Belgium?"-"I perceived it ;-but the English Ministry, which follows the Tory politics at no great distance, do not represent the free majority of the people. Besides, there is a great difference between sending commissioners to your camp, and showing themselves disposed to make war on you. An unpopular war in England would now be impossible." What would General Haxo, that great warrior and patriot, have said, had he lived to see the ovation of Marshal Soult in London ? We wish to show, in this note, that the English people have opened their eyes to their true interests. That they have seen, that though the Tories may find it to their advantage to protect European aristocracy, under the banners of absolute kings, that they are interested in aiding the cause of the people.

Before showing the many ways in which Italy may be of service to England, by opposing the ambitious proceedings of her adversary, it is indispensable that we should combat the opinion which the Tories, those enemies to liberty, both at home and abroad, have endeavoured to establish in England. They have succeeded in making the British Cabinet regard as an axiom, that an alliance with Austria is eminently useful and necessary to England, in order to keep Russia in check. We do not deny, that before the French Revolution of 1789, the Austrian alliance may have been very serviceable to the interests of Great Britain; for before that epoch, Austria, dreading neither France, nor Italy, nor any of the other provinces of her empire, was free in her movements. At present, when France and Russia are become more powerful than heretofore,-when the Porte is weakened,-when Hungary and Gallicia cause much embarrassment to Austria,-and when Italy, instead of assisting her as formerly, absorbs a large portion of her forces,-Austria is happy if she can keep her own. One of the most eloquent of the French deputies, alluding probably to these circumstances, said:" Austria is the most impotent of all the European states; her frontiers are open to all; and if she did but menace us, we should overwhelm her with the weight of Italy."

If Austria, in order to second the wishes of England, were to turn her arms against Russia, no more would be wanting to excite the Italians to take up arms, and the French to march upon the Rhine and Savoy. The Russians themselves, whose only religion is the extension of their own territory towards more genial climates, would provoke insurrection in Italy by a thousand means.

Behold, then, reasons more than sufficient to show that Austria, apparently so powerful, would be incapable of menacing Russia, in such a manner as to produce a useful diversion in favour of England.

Having shown that Great Britain would have nothing to hope from an alliance with Austria,-let us examine whether England, wishing to show herself favourably disposed towards Italy, need fear the hostility of Austria, or the result of her alliance with Russia.

We shall show, in the next chapter, with what small means England need second the efforts of Italy.

Above all, an Austro-Russian alliance would be monstrous; for if Austria clings tenaciously to Italy, we believe that a wise policy would make her hesitate much, between the loss of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom and the invasion of Russia, menacing her independence. If, aided by England, Austria could not dispose of any considerable force against Russia, how could she act efficaciously in favour of the Czar, if England, with France for her ally, assisted the Italians? For France, tantalized by the Rhine and Savoy, would not allow such an opportunity to escape her.

In fine, it may be supposed that the Russians, by an alliance with Austria, would be able to dispose of that part of their forces, which they would otherwise have employed against her. But this supposition also fails, when we reflect on what has already been said of the weakness of the Austrian Government, and her political position. This power, which makes so much noise in the world, is, nevertheless, so feeble, that the Russians, being at war with them, may boldly send