monarchy, be supported by artifice and false pretence.'1 Indeed, it involves a still greater sin against the primitive law of the equality of men. For men, according to Godwin, should not only be equal before the law, but may almost be said to be equal in capacity. Man, the mere recipient of logical impressions, has been stripped of all differences to which a plea for inequality could attach itself; and Godwin apparently regards all inequalities as in some sense a result of the general system of imposture, though here he admits a qualifying phrase. Monarchy and aristocracy could in his view be only justified on the theory which divides men from their birth into the saddled and bridled and the booted and spurred. As he holds the contrary view, that they are simple units, differing only numerically, the saddles and the spurs are artificial additions, and therefore to be summarily abolished. The doctrine of equality was susceptible of an interpretation which would allow the aggregate mass of similar units to exercise a very vigorous pressure upon the constituent atoms. But Godwin proceeds a step further by help of his moral theory. Hume had taught him the fallacy of the social-contract theory, which, with Rousseau and others, supplied the binding force of government. Man, being a purely reasoning animal, and as such under an obligation always to follow the course most conducive to the general happiness, could not pledge himself to obedience; and, indeed, all promises 'absolutely considered' are an evil, as hampering the free action of reason.5 All coercion is thus essentially wrong. 'That any men or body of men should impose their sense upon persons of a different opinion is, absolutely speaking, wrong and deeply to be regretted, though it may occasionally be necessary. Now as government is nothing but 'regulated force,' all government implies evil, and Godwin characteristically jumps to the conclusion that all government should be abolished. With the utmost calmness he sweeps away one restraint after another. The army and the church, of course, vanish at once; but even national assemblies involve that 'flagrant insult upon all truth and justice, the deciding upon ד 1 Godwin, ii. 103. 2 Ib. i. 143, book ii. ch. iii. 4 Ib. i. 214. 5 Ib. i. 196. 6 Ib. i. 258. truth by the casting up of numbers,'1 and he decides that a constitution should consist of little more than two articles; one containing a scheme for electoral districts, the other a provision for the meeting of the assembly at stated periods, 'not to say that the latter of these articles may very probably be dispensed with.'2 Even the punishment of criminals is wrong, because a gallows is not an argument; and the only punishment which he can find it in his heart to tolerate, even as a temporary expedient, is transportation, or, as he delicately calls it, colonisation. We have failed, even in this, from forgetfulness that the 'colonists are men for whom we ought to feel no sentiments but those of kindness and compassion.' It is but a short step to propose the abolition of laws altogether. 'We can scarcely hesitate to conclude universally that law is an institution of the most pernicious tendency.' 4 Godwin, indeed, verbally admits that anarchy is an evil, and even, though reluctantly, that it is a worse evil than government. He finally decides that we shall employ just as much coercion as is necessary to exclude anarchy, though it might puzzle us to exhibit the difference between anarchy and that ideal state in which all laws and forms of government have been abolished. Godwin says, truly enough, that he differs from Rousseau in that the state of nature is with him the final, as with Rousseau it was the initial, stage of human development. He would, in fact, pulverise society. All association involves some sacrifice of individual judgment, and 'individuality is of the very essence of intellectual excellence.' 7 Co-operation is so hateful to him, that he even doubts whether musical concerts or theatrical performances, which involve an absurd and vicious co-operation,'s are not doomed to disappear. Cohabitation prevents an absolute independence, and the abolition of the present system of marriage appears to involve no evils.' Godwin merely doubts whether the future plan will be promiscuous intercourse, or the formation. of alliances terminable at the pleasure of either party. He inclines to the latter hypothesis, as it is the nature of the human mind to persist in its choice, and therefore 'the parties 1 Godwin, ii. 205. 2 Ib. ii. 292. 3 Ib. ii. 391. 4 Ib. ii. 404. 5 Ib. ii. 372. 6 Ib. ii. 129. 7 Ib. ii. 500. 8 Ib. ii. 504. 9 Ib. ii. 508. having acted upon selection are not likely to forget this selection when the interview is over.'1 148. Godwin's attack upon marriage may be illustrated by the remarkable declaration in favour of woman's rights by Mary Wollstonecraft, afterwards his wife. The book is curious as an anticipation of the arguments used in a future generation. It is, in substance, an appeal against the whole theory, sanctioned curiously enough by the teaching of the great revolutionary prophet Rousseau, that women were made for the pleasure of men, and that their education should fit them to be our mistresses, rather than our companions. It protests against the degrading influences of the false gallantry which lowers women under pretence of raising them, and claims for them a perfect political and social equality. There is, indeed, an absence of those direct attacks upon marriage which have appeared in some later writings, and which were, as we have seen, implicitly adopted by Godwin. For whatever reason, that side of the question is left untouched, and the author is content with a vehement assertion of the general principle of abstract rights, and a declaration that the present evils of society are due to the unjust use of physical force, and to the wicked system of class distinctions. The book is throughout rather rhetorical than speculative; and the fervour and even religious spirit of the writer for Mary Wollstonecraft, unlike her husband, was a decided theist, though not a Christian-is impressive in spite of a very unfortunately pompous style. No two things can be less alike than her vehement declamation and the frigid egotism of her husband. Mary Wollstonecraft has the zeal of the champion of a proselytising faith, and cares little for enquiries into the foundation of a system which commends itself to her intuitive perceptions of the just and generous. 149. The doctrines thus expounded may seem to be the very lunacy of revolutionary speculation. Godwin deifies the principle of individualism; and differs from the later thinkers who agreed with him in regarding 'the suppression of injustice against individuals in the community' as the only legitimate end of government, by regarding even that amount of compulsion as a temporary rather than a permanent necessity. 1 Godwin, ii. 509. Like them, he holds that man, though bound by absolute duty in every action of his life, has certain 'passive rights,' or a 'sphere of discretion' within which he should be free from all compulsion.1 He, therefore, looks with suspicion upon legislative interference, even when directed towards the equalisation of property. The state may abolish entails, but he doubts whether it should abolish titles or armorial bearings; 2 and he admits powers of bequest and inheritance, even though they may tend to the production of inequalities.3 In all such matters, in fact, Godwin is willing to trust to the omnipotent and omnipresent force of reason, the great prime mover in all human affairs. He sincerely objects to violent revolutions, for they appeal to force instead of reason, and imply a tyranny marked by peculiar aggravations. The sun of reason, when it rises, will disperse all mists, and dissipate all oppression without extraneous aid. All government, as he is fond of repeating from Hume, is ultimately founded on opinion, and therefore, if opinion be set right, all reforms will spontaneously follow. The universal exercise of private judgment,' he says, 'is a doctrine so unspeakably beautiful that the true politician will certainly feel infinite reluctance in admitting the idea of interfering with it.' It follows that in any case men's actions should be influenced by an appeal to reason rather than to fear. But, whilst Godwin would limit, or indeed annihilate, the application of physical force, he sets no bounds to the application of argument. If we may not burn a man for heresy, it is our imperative duty to reason him out of his errors. Public opinion should be all-pervading and omnipotent, for truth will always be triumphant, and argument cannot be applied too freely. We must, indeed, be careful never to bow to authority in matters of opinion. If I surrender my understanding to that of another, I become the most mischievous and pernicious of animals.' 'Confidence is in all cases the offspring of ignorance.' I should not say, Do this, for I think it right; but do this, if I prove it to be right. Parents should not punish their children, but reason with them. It is 1 Godwin, i. 167. 2 Ib. ii. 447. 3 Ib. ii. 444. 6 absurd, again, to punish rebels, for such a course is once more to appeal to force instead of reason. A man should be always ready to say, 'Publish what you please against me; I have truth on my side, and will confound your misrepresentations.' 1 A society is effeminate when its members are not confident in the sacred armour of truth.'2 Perfect sincerity implies perfect liberty of speech on all conceivable subjects. 'If the unrestrained discussion of abstract enquiry be of the highest importance to mankind, the unrestrained investigation of character is scarcely less to be cultivated. If truth were universally told of men's dispositions and actions, gibbets and wheels might be dismissed from the face of the earth. The knave unmasked would be obliged to turn honest in his own defence. Nay, no man would have time to grow a knave. Truth would follow him in his first irresolute essays, and public disapprobation arrest him in the commencement of his career.' 'Vivre au grand jour' would thus be Godwin's motto as well as Comte's; and reason be the supreme and solitary force in all public and private affairs. 3 150. Thus mankind is, or ought to be, in Godwin's view, a vast collection of incarnate syllogisms. There might, indeed, be a little difficulty in discovering their major premisses, when mind itself and all innate principles have been destroyed. Still, from the clashing and combination of these arguments, a system of absolute truth would be gradually. evolved. That man is not an incarnate syllogism, and that other forces besides reason would mould society and determine political constitutions, is indeed true; and Godwin can at times assert the truth with sufficient emphasis, and even force it into his service. 'Nothing can be more unreasonable,' 4 he says, 'than to argue from men as we now find them to men as they may hereafter be made.' But to his imagination, the difference, however great in practice, seemed to oppose but a trifling obstacle to the realisation of the millennium. The exposure of a few palpable blunders would regenerate society. Government cannot be justified by the frailty of man, for it tends to increase that frailty. Punishment is bad, even as a temporary expedient. The true remedy for vice 1 Godwin, ii. 281. 2 Ib. ii. 282. 3 Ib. ii. 275. 4 lb. ii. 120. 5 Ib. ii. 472. |