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According as man is predominantly actuated by love to God, or love to himself, he brings to pass that which is good, or that which is evil. That [Pelagian] definition of free will, he maintains, cannot apply to God nor to holy beings. It in fact presupposes a corruption of the moral powers, and loses its applicability the more in proportion as man advances farther in moral development,-in proportion as he advances to true freedom. At the highest point of moral advancement, freedom and necessity meet together; the rational being acts with freedom, in determining himself according to the inward law of his nature. . . . Proceeding on the abovestated conception of freedom, Augustine must believe that he found in the actual appearance of human nature, an opposition to the freedom which was so apprehended; inasmuch as this true conception of freedom is in this case nowhere applicable. Man uniformly finds himself in a state contradicting this freedom,-in a condition of bondage to sin. Thus this determinate conception of freedom leads Augustine to the presupposition of a corruption of human nature, and of an original moral condition which preceded it. And cohering also with this is the thought that, when once this original freedom had been disturbed by the first freely chosen aberration from the law of the original nature, a state of bondage followed after the state of freedom. As human nature, evolving itself in conformity with its condition by nature, surrendering itself to the godlike, becomes continually more confirmed and established in truc freedom; so, in surrendering itself to sin, it becomes continually more involved in the bondage of sin; to which Augustine frequently applies the words of Christ: 'He who commits sin is the servant of sin.' Evil is its own punishment, as goodness is its own reward."* Such was the sense in which Augustine represented sin as the punishment of sin. As we have already seen, he denies that it can injure any nature but that of the sinner; and that the posterity of Adam are only injured by sin, as it was the sin of their nature as well as his. He held the depravity to be penally from God in the sense that the Creator, in making man, so constructed his nature, that the embrace of sin would constitute an enslaving of the nature to its power,—a slavery growing out of the very nature of sin in its relation to the soul; and in no sense caused by the interposition of God; but from which nothing but the power of God is adequate to relieve the soul.

In reference to the broad line of distinction which runs between the powers of nature,-the operation of second causes,-and the immediate agency of God, as bearing upon this whole subject, the ground taken by Augustine is clearly defined. "The whole of this ordinary course of nature has certain natural laws of its own, according to which, even the spirit of life, which is a created substance, has its specific appetites,

* Neander's Church History, Torrey's translation, vol. ii. p. 602.

but bounded in a certain way, which even the corrupted will cannot pass. And the elements of this material world have a definite power and quality, what each one can or cannot do, and what can or cannot be done respecting each. From these, as the primordial sources, all things which are generated take, each in its time, their origin and growth, and the limits and modifications of their respective kinds. Hence it happens that pulse is not produced from wheat, nor wheat from pulse-man from beast, nor beast from man. But, besides this natural movement and course of things, the power of the Creator hath in itself a capacity to do, concerning all these, otherwise than their own (quasi seminales rationes) natural powers can do. Yet neither can that which he has implanted in them, relative to these powers, be exercised independently of him, nor yet does he assert his omnipotence by the exercise of an intrusive, arbitrary force, but by the power of wisdom; and, concerning each particular thing, in his own time he does that which he had before created in it a capacity to have done. It is, therefore, a different mode of things by which this plant germinates so, and that in a different way;—this time of life is prolific, and that is not;—a man can speak, and an animal cannot. The (rationes) efficient causes of these and the like modes of operation are not merely in God, but are also by him implanted and concreated in the things he has made. But that wood, cut from off the earth, dry, polished, without any root, without earth or water, should suddenly flourish and bear fruit, that a woman, barren in youth, should bear a child in old age, that an ass should speak,-and whatever there is of this kind, he gave it, indeed, to the natures he created, that these things might take place with them. So that he does not with them what, in creating them, he had made impossible to be done with them; since he is not more powerful than himself. But he constituted things in a distinctive manner, so that they should not have these phenomena in the natural course of things, but in that way, for which they were thus so created, that their nature should be fully subject to a more powerful will. God, therefore, has in himself the hidden causes of certain acts, which causes he has not implanted in the things he has made; and these causes he puts in operation, not in that work of providence by which he creates natures as they are, but in that by which he manages, after his pleasure, the things which, according to his pleasure, he made. And here is the grace by which sinners are saved. For, as it respects nature, depraved by its own corrupted will, it has in itself no return, except by God's grace, whereby it is aided and restored. Nor need men despair by reason of that saying,— Prov. ii. 19, None who walk in it shall return;' for it was spoken of the burden of their iniquity, in order that whoever returns should attribute his return, not to himself, but to the grace of God-'not of works, lest any should boast.' Therefore the apostle speaks of the mystery of this grace as hidden,-not in this world, in which are hidden

the causal reasons of all things which arise naturally, as Levi was hid in the loins of Abraham, but in God, who created all things."*

In respect to God's sovereign relation to sin, he declares that "Some things God both produces and ordains; others he only produces. The holy he both produces and ordains; but sinners, so far forth as they are sinners, he does not produce, but only ordains."† And, with a still more specific reference to the present point, he says, in respect to the language of Paul in Romans ix. 18-20, "We seek for the meritorious cause of the hardening, and we find it; for (peccati universa massa damnata est) the whole lump of sin is condemned, deservedly. Nor does God harden by imparting depravity, but by not imparting mercy; for they to whom it is not imparted are neither worthy nor deserving of it, but rather, that it should not be imparted, of this they are worthy, this they have deserved. But we seek for the merit of mercy, and do not find it, for there is none; else grace is made void, if rendered to merit, and not freely bestowed."‡

That the doctrine of Augustine, in opposition to the Pelagian heresy, was that of the catholic church, and not a new invention of the bishop of Hippo, as is asserted by Wiggers and the apologists of Pelagius, is manifest from facts which that writer himself records:-the secrecy of the first proceedings of the Pelagians; the prevarications and falsehoods with which, when brought to trial, they veiled their opinions; and the unanimous condemnation which those opinions received, even from those synods who, misled by the duplicity of Pelagius and his associates, acquitted them of the charge of holding the obnoxious sentiments. It is further evident from the universal acceptance which was accorded to the teachings of Augustine on the subject, and to the decrees of those synods and councils by which Pelagianism was condemned.

6. The Mediaval Theology.

It is not our design to trace, in detail, the history of opinion on the present subject during the middle ages. Nominally, the theology of Augustine was universally received by the church of Rome. But, in reality, the growing corruption of that church produced some essential changes in this as well as the other doctrines of religion. About the beginning of the twelfth century, the Nominal philosophy, introduced by Rosceline and extensively adopted, combined with other causes to give a powerful impulse to Pelagian tendencies. According to the philosophy which prevailed prior to the rise of this sect, such universal conceptions as those of species, genera, and nature have, as their ground, some kind of objective realities. They are not the mere result of thought, but have, in some proper sense, a real existence, and lie, as essences, at the base of the existence of all individuals and particulars. From the Stoical † De Genesi ad Lit. lib. i. v.

* De Genesi ad Literam, lib. ix. 17, 18.

Epist. 105, iii. Op. Aug., Parisii ed. 1836, Ep. 194, 14.

philosophy, Rosceline introduced the opposite doctrine,—that only individuals have any real existence. General conceptions are the mere result of logical combinations of thought. They are but abstractions, which have no objective significance. They are mere names, and not things. Hence the designation of Nominalists, by which this sect of philosophers is distinguished. In Rosceline himself the skeptical tendency of the Nominal theory developed itself in questions and controversies respecting the personality of the Three who subsist in the divine Essence, and the nature of that Essence,-which do not fall within our present inquiry. His most eminent disciple, Abelard, who was also the great expositor of the new philosophy, illustrates, in his writings, its bearing upon the subject of original sin. Rejecting the Augustinian doctrine of a universal human nature which was in the first man, he was constrained to reject with it the whole doctrine of original sin peculiar to that system. Hence, he expounds Romans v. 12 as meaning no more than that the sin of Adam involves his children in the punishment, but not in the guilt; and by the word, sin, understands that, not the crime, but the penalty, is, by metonymy, designated. "He could not cast off the theory that all continued subject to those punishments that had passed upon them from Adam; and, indeed, in order to free himself from it, it would have been necessary for him to assume an entirely different position towards the church doctrine of his time, and to make a far more thorough and resolute application of the thoughts which he had expressed. But, resolved as he was to hold fast on the above determinations of the church doctrine, while he refused at the same time to acknowledge the catholic doctrine concerning original guilt and sin, it could not be otherwise than that, from his own point of view, which would not allow him to acknowledge the mysterious connection between the development of the entire race and original sin, God must appear only so much the more as a being who acted arbitrarily and unjustly. Thus he was driven from rationalism to the most abrupt supernaturalism, falling back, as the last resort, upon the unlimited will of the Creator, who may dispose of his creatures according to his own pleasure. He thinks that those who are punished without any guilt of their own can no more complain, than the brutes which God has appointed for the service of man, can enter into judgment with him. He goes to the extreme of making the distinction of right and wrong to depend on the divine will ;* a representation which, it is evident, directly contradicts his doctrine of God's omnipotence."†

"Hac ratione profiteor, quoquomodo Deus creaturam suam tractare velit, nullius injuriæ potest argui. Nec malum aliquo modo potest dici, quod juxta ejus voluntatem fiat. Non enim aliter bonum a malo discernere possumus, nisi quod ejus est consentaneum voluntati et in placito ejus consistit."-Lib. ii. p. 595.

† Neander, vol. iv. p. 494.

In the midst of surrounding developments of error, Odo, or Udardus, of Tournay, a contemporary of Abelard, exhibits an illustrious example of the lingering power of Augustine; as he was, also, of the fervent piety which occasionally shone amid the shadows of the "dark ages." At first a teacher of the realistic philosophy, in the cathedral school at Tournay, he was attended by crowds of enthusiastic pupils from France, Germany and the Netherlands. In his school, engaging in the exposition of Augustine's work De Libero Arbitrio, he came to a passage which sets forth the wretched condition of those whose souls are devoted to earthly pursuits, to the forfeiture of heavenly glory. Applying the argument to himself and his ambitious scholars, so greatly was he moved by his own expostulations, that, bursting into tears, he rose from the chair, and, followed by a number of his pupils, went forth to the church, where he devoted himself to the pursuit of those higher honours which come from God. He became as eminent for piety and zeal in defence of the gospel, as formerly in the walks of philosophy; and was, successively, abbot of St. Martin of Tours, and, in 1105, chosen bishop of Cambray. Among his writings are three books on original sin, from which a paragraph will serve to exhibit the thoroughly Augustinian tone of his theology:

"What is the difference between native and personal sin? For sin is spoken of in two modes,-as natural and personal. That is natural with which we are born, which we derive from Adam, in whom we all sinned. For in him was my soul,-generically, and not personally; not individually, but in the common nature. For the common nature of all human souls was, in Adam, involved in sin. And therefore every human soul is criminal, as to its nature; although not so personally. Thus the sin which we sinned in Adam, to me indeed is a sin of nature, but in him a personal sin. In Adam it is more criminal, in me less so; for in him, it was not I who now am, but that which I am, that sinned. There sinned in him, not I, but this which is I. I sinned as (generically) man, and not as Odo. My substance sinned, but not my person; and since the substance does not exist otherwise than in a person, the sin of my substance attaches to my person, although not a personal sin. For a personal sin is such as,—not that which I am,—but I who now am, commit,—in which Odo, and not humanity, sins,-in which I a person, and not a nature, sin. But inasmuch as there is no person without a nature, the sin of a person is also the sin of a nature, although it is not a sin of nature."*

It is impossible to render into English the terseness and perspicuity of the original. "Quid distat naturale peccatum et personale? Dicitur enim duobus modis peccatum personale et naturale. Et naturale est cum quo nascimur, et quod ab Adam trahimus, in quo omnes peccavimus. In ipso enim erat anima mea, specie non persona, non individua sed communi natura. Nam omnis humanæ animæ natura communis erat in Adam obnoxia peccato. Et ideo omnis humana anima culpabilis est secundam suam