At other times, they brought false accusations against the tribunes before the assembly itself; or, by privately slandering them with the people, totally deprived them of their confidence. It was through artifices of this kind, that the people were brought to behold, without 265 concern, the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, the only Roman that was really virtuous-the only one who truly loved the people. It was also in the same manner that Caius, who was not deterred by his brother's fate from pursuing the same plan of conduct, was in the end so entirely forsaken by the people, that nobody could be found among them who would even lend him a horse to fly from the fury of the nobles; and he was at last compelled to lay violent hands upon himself, while he invoked the wrath of the gods on his inconstant fellowcitizens.

At other times they raised divisions among the people. Formidable combinations broke out suddenly on the eve of important transactions; and all moderate men avoided attending assemblies, where they saw that all was to be tumult and confusion.

In fine, that nothing might be wanting to the insolence with which they treated the assemblies of the people, they sometimes falsified the declarations of the number of the votes; and once they even went so far as to carry off the urns into which the citizens were to throw their suffrages (h).

(h) With respect to all the above observations, see Plutarch's Lives, particularly the Lives of the two Gracchi. No instance is here drawn from those assemblies in which one-half of the people were made to arm themselves against the other. Allusion is only made to those times which immediately either preceded or followed

But when the people have entirely trusted their 266 power to a moderate number of persons, affairs immediately take a widely different turn. Those who govern are from that moment obliged to leave off all those stratagems which had hitherto ensured their success. Instead of those assemblies which they affected to despise, and were perpetually comparing to storms, or to the current of the Euripus (i), and in regard to 267 which they accordingly thought themselves at liberty to pass over the rules of justice, they now find that they have to deal with men who are their equals in point of education and knowledge, and their inferiors only in point of rank and form. They, in consequence, soon find it necessary to adopt quite different methods; and, above all, become very careful not to talk to them any more about the sacred chickens, the white or black days, and the Sibylline books.-As they see their new adversaries expect to have a proper regard paid to them, that single circumstance inspires them with it:-as they see them act in a regular manner, observe constant rules, in a word, proceed with form, they come to look upon them with respect, for the very same reason which makes themselves be reverenced by the people.

The representatives of the people, on the other hand, do not fail soon to procure for themselves every advan

the third Punic war, as these are commonly called the best periods of the republic.

(i) Tully makes no end of his similes on this subject. Quod enim fretum, quem Euripum, tot motus, tantas et tam varias habere putatis agitationes fuctuum, quantas perturbationes et quantos æstus habet ratio comitiorum? See Orat. pro Murænâ.- Concio, says he in another place, quæ ex imperitissimis constat, &c. De Amicitiâ,

tage that may enable them effectually to use the powers with which they have been intrusted, and to adopt every rule of proceeding that may make their resolutions to be truly the result of reflection and deliberation. Thus it was that the representatives of the English 268 nation, soon after their first establishment, became formed into a separate assembly: they afterwards obtained the liberty of appointing a president:-soon after, they insisted upon their being consulted on the last form of the acts to which they had given rise:lastly, they insisted on thenceforth framing them themselves.

269

But that circumstance which, of all others, constitutes the superior excellence of a government in which the people act only through their representatives, that is, by means of an assembly formed of a moderate number of persons, and in which it is possible for every member to propose new subjects, and to argue and to 270 canvass the questions that arise,-is, that such a constitution is the only one capable of the immense advantage (1) of putting into the hands of the people the moving springs of the legislative authority.

In a constitution where the people at large exercise the function of enacting the laws, as it is only to those persons towards whom the citizens are accustomed to turn their eyes, (that is, to the very men who govern), that the assembly have either time or inclination to listen, they acquire, at length, as has constantly been the case in all republics, the exclusive right of proposing, if they please, when they please, in what manner they please: a prerogative this, of such extent,

(1) See b. ii. chap. iv.-EDITOR.

that it would suffice to put an assembly, formed of men of the greatest parts at the mercy of a few dunces, and renders completely illusory the boasted power of the people. Nay more, as this prerogative is thus placed in the very hands of the adversaries of the people, it forces the people to remain exposed to their attacks, in a condition perpetually passive, and takes from them 271 the only legal means by which they might effectually oppose their usurpations.

To express the whole in a few words-A representative constitution places the remedy in the hands of those who feel the disorder: but a popular constitution places the remedy in the hands of those who cause it: and it is necessarily productive, in the event, of the misfortune-of the political calamity, of trusting the care and the means of repressing the invasions of power, to the men who have the enjoyment of power.

CHAPTER VII.

A farther Disadvantage of Republican Governments (1). The People are necessarily betrayed by those in whom they trust.

HOWEVER those general assemblies of a people who were made to determine upon things which they neither understood nor examined,—that general confusion in which the ambitious could at all times hide their artifices, and carry on their schemes with safety,—were not the only evils attending the ancient commonwealths. 272 There was a more secret defect, and a defect that struck immediately at the very vitals of it, inherent in that kind of government.

It was impossible for the people ever to have faithful defenders. Neither those whom they had expressly chosen, nor those whom some personal advantages enabled to govern the assemblies (for the only use which the people ever make of their power, is either to give it away, or allow it to be taken from them), could possibly be united to them by any common feeling of the same concerns. As their influence put them, in a great measure, upon a level with those who were invested with the executive authority, they cared little to restrain oppressions out of the reach of which they

(1) See chap. v. of this book, sect. 2.-EDITCR.