and the heat of political contentions, may sometimes lose sight of what ought to be their real aim, they nevertheless know that it is not against the Appii, the Coruncanii, the Cethegi, but against all those who can influence the execution of the laws, that precautions ought to be taken;- that it is not the consul, the prætor, the archon, the minister, the king, whom we ought to dread, nor the tribune, or the representative of the people, on whom we ought implicitly to rely: but that all those persons, without distinction, ought to 280 be the objects of our jealousy, who, by any methods, and under any names whatsoever, have acquired the means of turning against each individual the collective strength of all, and have so ordered things around themselves, that whoever attempts to resist them, is sure to find himself engaged alone against a thousand.

CHAPTER VIII.

Fundamental Difference between the English Government, and the Governments just described.-In England, all Executive Authority is placed out of the Hands of those in whom the People trust.—Usefulness of the Power of the Crown.-The Power which the People themselves exercise in the Election of Members of Parliament.

In what manner then has the English Constitution contrived to find a remedy for evils which, from the very nature of men and things, seem to be irremediable? How has it found means to oblige those persons to whom the people have given up their power, to make them effectual and lasting returns of gratitude?— those who enjoy an exclusive authority, to seek the advantage of all?—those who make the laws, to make only equitable ones?-It has been by subjecting themselves to those laws, and for that purpose excluding them from all share in the execution of them.

Thus, the parliament can establish as numerous a 281 standing army as it will; but immediately another power comes forward, which takes the absolute command of it, fills all the posts in it, and directs its motions at its pleasure. The parliament may lay new taxes; but immediately another power seizes the produce of them, and alone enjoys the advantages and glory arising

from the disposal of it. The parliament may even, if you please, repeal the laws on which the safety of the subject is grounded; but it is not their own caprices and arbitrary humours, it is the caprice and passions of other men which they will have gratified, when they shall thus have overthrown the columns of public liberty.

And the English Constitution has not only excluded from any share in the execution of the laws those in whom the people trust for the enacting of them, but it has also taken from them what would have had the same pernicious influence on their deliberations-the hope of ever invading that executive authority, and transferring it to themselves.

This authority has been made in England one single, indivisible prerogative: it has been made for ever the 282 unalienable attribute of one person, marked out and ascertained before-hand by solemn laws and long-established custom (1); and all the active forces in the state have been left at his disposal.

In order to secure this prerogative still farther against all possibility of invasions from individuals, it has been heightened and strengthened by every thing that can attract and fix the attention and reverence of the people. The power of conferring and withdrawing places and employments has also been added to it; and ambition itself has thus been interested in its defence and service.

A share in the legislative power has also been given to the man to whom this prerogative has been delegated; a passive share indeed, and the only one that can, with safety to the state, be trusted to him, but by

(1) See Hallam's Mid. Ages, 83, 115.-EDITOR.

means of which he is enabled to defeat every attempt against his constitutional authority.

Lastly, he is the only self-existing and permanent power in the state. The generals, the ministers of state, are so only by the continuance of his pleasure. He would even dismiss the parliament itself, if ever he saw it begin to entertain dangerous designs; and he needs only to say one word to disperse every power in 283 the state that may threaten his authority. Formidable prerogatives these; but with regard to which we shall be inclined to lay aside our apprehensions, if on one hand we consider the great privileges of the people by which they have been counterbalanced, and, on the other, the happy consequences that result from their being thus united.

From this unity, and this total sequestration of the executive authority, this advantageous consequence in the first place results-the attention of the whole nation is directed to one and the same object. The people, besides, enjoy this most essential advantage, which they would vainly endeavour to obtain under the government of many;-they can give their confidence, without giving power over themselves, and against themselves; they can appoint trustees, and yet not give themselves masters.

Those men to whom the people have delegated the power of framing the laws, are thereby made sure to feel the whole pressure of them. They can increase the prerogatives of the executive authority, but they can- 284 not invest themselves with it:-they have it not in their power to command its motions, they only can unbind its hands.

They are made to derive their importance from (nay,

they are indebted for their existence to) the need in which that power stands of their assistance; and they know that they would no sooner have abused the trust of the people, and completed the treacherous work, than they would see themselves dissolved, spurned, like instruments now spent and become useless.

This same disposition of things also prevents in England that essential defect, inherent in the government of many, which has been described in the preceding chapter.

In that sort of government, the cause of the people, as has been observed, is continually deserted and betrayed. The arbitrary prerogatives of the governing powers are at all times either openly or secretly favoured, not only by those in whose possession they are,— not only by those who have good reason to hope that they shall at some future time share in the exercise of them,—but also by the whole crowd of those men who, in consequence of the natural disposition of mankind to 285 over-rate their own advantages, fondly imagine, either that they shall one day enjoy some branch of this governing authority, or that they are even already, in some way or other, associated to it.

But as this authority has been made, in England, the indivisible, unalienable attribute of one alone, all other persons in the state are, ipso facto, interested to confine it within its due bounds. Liberty is thus made the common cause of all; the laws that secure it are supported by men of every rank and order; and the Habeas Corpus Act, for instance, is as zealously defended by the first noblemen in the kingdom as by the meanest subject.

Even the minister himself, in consequence of this