the interest centres in the subject-matter, and the writer's own personality disappears, or at least is not asserted and made prominent.

EXAMPLES. Such essays as these are exemplified in the great body of articles that appear each month in such reviews as the Edinburgh, the Nineteenth Century, the Contemporary, the Fortnightly, and the North American. Also by such names as Macaulay and Carlyle, De Quincey and Hazlitt, Martineau and Leslie Stephen, Hutton and Dowden, Bagehot and Whipple, each of whom is best known by a considerable body of critical, historical, and miscellaneous essays.

It is the structure of such essays as these that has been studied as the norm of literary structure, in the chapter on General Processes in the Ordering of Material.

The second, which more nearly answers to the original type, may be called the personal essay, because in it the writer more freely reveals his own fancies and feelings, whims and peculiarities. Studied plan, and formal processes of exposition and argument, are avoided; the essay seeks more the free confidence and the wayward course of private conversation.

EXAMPLES. The most noted representative of this type of essay is Montaigne, who is regarded as the father of the essay. Others are-Cowley, the essayists of the Spectator, Charles Lamb, and Thackeray. In all these we feel a special interest in the writers; to read the essays is like having a chat with a personal friend, who is endeavoring to entertain rather than to instruct us.

Criticism. This is to be regarded as a kind of exposition; its aim being to find the principles that should determine a work of literature or art or polity, and pass judgment on it according as it fulfils or transgresses those principles.

Criticism is not merely fault-finding. The popular use of the word in this sense indicates that the mission of criticism has been too predominantly misinterpreted, and that what is really a noble science is near to falling into disrepute. Its office is to find the good as well as the bad; to lay down fair and deep principles; and to determine its awards never by prejudice or favor, but by

the rigorous application of sound standards of judgment. Such work as this demands peculiar endowments on the part of the critic. He must have a large and thorough knowledge not only of what he criticises, but of its whole sphere of ideas and technicalities; he must have the ability to enter, without disturbing prepossessions, into the thought and feeling of others, so as to see through their eyes and judge by their standards; and finally, he must maintain fixed standards of his own, which, while they do not preclude fair judgment, give him a definite point of view, and give his criticisms an individual conviction and value. Criticism so determined is in the broadest sense interpretation of life, art, literature; or, to adopt Matthew Arnold's definition,' it is "a disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world, and thus to establish a current of fresh and true ideas."

NOTE. It may be well to mention some of the names most identified with criticism. In literary criticism the name of Saint-Beuve, Matthew Arnold, Walter Bagehot, Professor Dowden, Leslie Stephen, and James Russell Lowell; in art-criticism preeminently the name of John Ruskin, who has almost created the sphere in which his artistic knowledge expresses itself. Some of the earlier critics are Francis Jeffrey, William Hazlitt, Sydney Smith, and Lord Brougham.

Popular Exposition. — Under this head may be mentioned a class of literary productions, usually in the form of essays, sometimes in brief paragraphs or aphorisms, which aims to give in attractive and readable style important advice for the everyday conduct of life, or remarks on manners, morals, foibles and follies of the day, and the like. Such works do not pretend to scientific completeness in the presentation of any line of thought; their aim is merely to rouse thought or give needed counsel in a style of conversational simplicity such as shall secure it a reading by the ordinary people for whom it is intended.

1 Arnold, "Essays in Criticism," p. 37. The above qualifications of the critic are condensed from Wilkinson, “A Free Lance in the Field of Life and Letters," pp. 108-111. Compare also preceding, pp. 302-307.

EXAMPLES. This class of literature is well represented by a large proportion of the essays of the Spectator and Rambler, and in general by essays of the personal type. In the present day it is represented by such works as Dr. Holland's "Gold Foil" and "Timothy Titcomb's Letters," and perhaps by the essays of Emerson; also by many of Sir Arthur Helps's works.

CHAPTER VII.

INVENTION DEALING WITH TRUTHS:

ARGUMENTATION.

In making exposition of an idea, the writer is for the time being concerned merely with the meaning and content of it, the question whether it is true or false being waived. It may be an idea so clear and sound, so obviously accordant with fact, that when once it is fully expounded the truth or error of it is plain enough without further treatment; or, on the other hand, it may still be debatable, questionable, that is, may still require some test or proof, before the reader can be regarded as satisfied of its conclusiveness. The various means by which such test of the truth of things is made are comprised under the head of Argumentation.

Argumentation may deal either with ideas or with facts, that is, either with truths generalized into notions, such as are the subjects of exposition, or with individual and particular truths, such as are the subjects of narration and description. And in thus handling truths, it comes to the same whether the writer is concerned with proving a thing true or with proving it false; for at any rate, if he is honest, he is endeavoring to ascertain where the truth is, and any negative process of finding where it is not is in reality only secondary thereto.

Reasoning as a science belongs to logic rather than to rhetoric; we are here concerned merely with reasoning as it appears in literature, that is, reasoning contemplating readers or hearers, and adapting itself as an art to their capacities and requirements. It is to this rhetorical art that we give the distinctive name argumentation. Our object therefore is not to trace out the technical minutiae of processes of reasoning, in themselves considered; we

are rather to inquire how reasoning can be adapted to clear and effective communication of thought, and what forms of argument are most useful and prevalent in ordinary literary tasks.

In establishing truth there are two main forms of attack: either to set the truth directly before the mind and adduce facts and arguments to substantiate it; or to attack some erroneous position which, being demolished, will leave the truth in question free to assert itself. Under these two heads we will arrange the various forms of argument.

I. PROOF OF TRUTH DIRECTLY.

In seeking how to arrange the various ways of proving truth directly, we may perhaps best follow the logical order in which knowledge is obtained. There are three principal ways. First of all, there is the direct observation and discovery of facts; secondly, from the accumulation of these discovered facts there is the inference of other facts or of general principles; and finally, there is inference from general principles or truths to other truths, general or particular. These three ways of obtaining knowledge are the basis of three types of argument.

I.

Discovery of Facts: Testimony and Authority. — Of the primary and fundamental means of discovering facts, our own personal observation, enough, perhaps, has already been said.1 It is, however, only a small proportion of the facts we must use, that we can obtain in this way. We must depend very largely on what others report to us. And of the evidence they furnish we discern two kinds. There is first, simple affirmation of what the witness has himself observed, which we name Testimony; and secondly, there is the report of what the observer, by special judgment or research or skill, has shaped into a trustworthy opinion; and this we name Authority.

1 See preceding, pages 227 sqq.