mixture of suits carried on in different ways, that the business is not done, the monopoly of attornies, together with several other causes, and not the unfitness of the judge, occasion this Court to be the least frequented of any. From these circumstances, the judge does not sit sometimes for more than half an hour in the morning, and perhaps there may not be on the paper more than six or seven causes, when I well know that Lord Ellenborough, when Chief Justice of the King's Bench, had at one time 558 causes set down for trial in London only; and the present Chief Justice has had on his paper no less than 840 untried causes. I mention this to support my first proposition, that there is not a competition between the different Courts. To say that there is a competition between the Courts-to say, under the circumstances stated, that suitors have a free access to all, is a fiction-such an assertion is not founded on fact. Experiments have been tried to remedy this state of things, but they were unsuccessful. The first of these was in 1821, when the Chief Justice sat in one Court, and a puisne judge in another. That experiment failed entirely. There was no business done before the puisne judge, and the experiment was tried only for a short time I believe for not more than one year. Where that action and re-action before spoken of exists-where there is little practice in Court-we are likely, in majorem sensum, to have worse judges to try causes; while, on the other hand, great and extensive practice must inevitably form better judges and more acute counsel. There is, however, no other way to produce an equality of business, but by really throwing open the Courts, removing monopolies, and leaving it to men's own discretion to select as they please. In 1821, the Chief Justice sat in one Court, and a puisne judge in the other, but the business all went to the former. Another experiment has since been tried to lessen the pressure of business on the Chief Justice-the experiment still going on under the Bill of the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Peel). That experiment-the measure being compulsory-has not failed; but I sincerely wish it had failed; for that measure has done a great deal of mischief. It was the worst change that could have been devised. Where the Court of King's Bench meet, with the Chief Justice presiding-where the suitors resort-where the bar is mustered-where the public attend-where both counsel and attornies appear-where the business is disposed of, as it ought to be, gravely and deliberately, with the eyes of mankind, the eyes of the bar, as well as the world at large, turned on the proceedings, -would not all persons declare that to be the Court in which important legal questions ought to be decided? Would not the world, on the other hand, say, if another Court were instituted, in which two counsel and two attornies were present, the one in the cause on, the other in the cause that was to follow, where there was no audience, and the public eye was entirely directed from that to the other Court,-would not the world, I ask, say, that a Court so constituted was that in which the trifling business should be transacted? But under the Bill to which I have alluded, the very contrary effect is produced: all the important business is transacted before three judges, and in the dark; for when only two counsel and the attornies in the case are present-when the great body of counsel are absent-and the public are in the other Court, where the Chief Justice presides, I consider that the business is, in truth, done in the dark. An immense mass of trifling business frequently occupies the time of the Court, which might be disposed of elsewhere; and thus the more important business might be expedited. Thus, a motion for judgment, as against the casual ejector, which is a motion of course-a motion to refer a bill to the Master, to report the amount of principal and interest, which is a motion of course-a motion for judgment in case of a nonsuit, which is a motion of course-and a thousand others, are heard with the utmost attention to publicity, before the whole Courtbefore the whole bar-before the whole body of attornies-before the whole public,-all of which might be settled by the judges at chambers. The consequence is, that much time is lost, and the most important business-special arguments, raising the most important legal questions-are obliged to be heard in the private, unsatisfactory, and inefficient manner I have described. I wish this system to be remedied, because it is a great and growing evil. It may be said that the judges have not time to do the business. I deny that there is time. Six hours a day, well employed, is amply sufficient for the purpose. Let them come down to the Court at ten o'clock in the morning, and remain till four-a period of six hours-and the business might be done. But the system at present extremely ill arranged. In the first place, one of the judges is called on to attend in the Bail Court, and sometimes he remains there all day, as Mr. Justice Bayley was obliged to do on Monday last; and in the same way, Mr. Justice Holroyd was this day prevented from doing any thing until twelve o'clock. A second reason for the delay of business, is the time occupied at chambers at Serjeant's Inn, with the squabbles of the attorniesfor barristers very seldom attend there. This business formerly was done in the evening, but now it frequently keeps a judge away till twelve o'clock. Thus, by attending to this trifling business at chambers, the judge can only give his attendance for four hours instead of six. It may be said that though commissioners might be appointed to take bail, yet they could not transact the chamber. is business so satisfactorily. Barristers of five or six years' standing would be sufficiently skilful to take bail cases; but it was argued that it was necessary for the business at chambers to be transacted by the judges, in order that they might repress, if necessary, the proceedings of certain men. Now, for my part, I could never see the magic power of the number twelve, although Lord Coke had expressed himself as much enamored of it as an algebraist would be of the number nine. Lord Coke thought thus highly of it, perhaps, because there were the twelve Apostles, and the Laws of the Twelve Tables. I am, however, of opinion, that the number fourteen is equally efficacious. It is divisible by seven, which twelve is not; and it has, in my mind, this great advantage, that though in theory and history it does not appear so prominent as Lord Coke's favorite number, it happens to be two more than twelve. If twelve were considered to be the proper number of judges in Lord Coke's time, I think no objection can at this day be offered to the addition of two, considering that the business has increased tenfold. It cannot be argued, when there are 800 causes for trial at Guildhall, that twelve judges are sufficient. That number might have sufficed when Lord Mansfield lived, in the late reign; at which time, perhaps, sixty causes might have been set down for trial; but is it sufficient now, when 600 or 700 causes are to be heard? How the judges are to get through all the business now, is utterly beyond my comprehension. This is one of the illustrations which I feel it necessary to give, in answer to the heedless and senseless folly of those who charge the judges and the lawyers with causing all the delay in legal proceedings. How can it be expected that twelve judges can go through the increased and increasing business now, when the affairs of men have become so extended and multiplied in every direction-maximis rerum novetur? Those who advise an increase of the judges beyond their present number are not innovators. The innovators are, in truth, those who stand still while the world is going forward, those are the innovators who would only employ the same number of laborers while the harvest has increased in a tenfold proportion, they are the innovators who, adhering to the ancient system of having but twelve judges, although the labor is infinitely increased, neglect to keep up the equality, efficiency, and fitness of the establishment; but they are not innovators, who introduce and apply additional power, when the business to be done has exceeded all former bounds, and wish thus to preserve the equality, efficiency, and fitness of the judicial establishment. The advantage of this addition will appear still more clearly, when it is considered that it would give us the opportunity VOL. XXIX. NO. LVII. Pam. M of reforming the system with reference to the Welsh judges, which is an extremely objectionable one, and which cannot be done while there are only twelve judges. If two more judges were appointed, the principality might be divided into two circuits, and the newly-appointed individuals might go circuit with the other judges; and they might also assist at the Old Bailey Sessions. I highly approve of paying the judges by salaries, and not by fees, as a general principle; but, so long as it is the practice not to promote the judges, but to shut the door against the efforts of their fair ambition, so far must we find a tendency in those men to become less active in their exertions than they would be if some little stimulus were placed before them. I therefore would hold out a certain inducement to them to labor vigorously, by allowing them a certain moderate amount of fees. I say a moderate amount; and if it were thought expedient to pay them in part by fees, it should be ordered that such fees should not be in proportion to the length of a suit, or the number of its stages, but that the amount should be fixed and defined. I am quite aware that this mode of payment is not likely to meet with general support, especially with the support of the reformers of the law; but I state the proposition as the result of long reflection, which has produced a firm conviction on my mind that such a plan would be a beneficial one. The great object of every Government in the choice of judges ought to be to obtain the most skilful and learned men, and also to take care that the excellence of their character afforded the best security for their pure administration of justice. I am ashamed to state so mere a truism, but the House will presently see its application. Our present system, however, sins lamentably in both these respects. In the appointment of judges it would naturally be required that the whole field of law should be thrown open, in order that the selection might be properly made. The judges ought to be chosen from amongst the men most learned, most accomplished as advocates-men who have judgment to try causes ably-men who have large and enlightened views of legal questions, and who are prompt and expeditious in seizing on the bearings of a case. There ought not to be, in choosing judges from the bar, any exclusive restriction. He alone ought to be selected, in whom talent, integrity, and experience, most abound, and are most united. The Minister of the Crown might go into Westminster Hall, and choose the ablest man there. Be his talent what it might be his character what it might be his party what it might, no man to whom the offer was made would refuse to be a judge: But, in consequence of a custom that would be "more honored in the breach than the observance," party is too much studied in these appointments. One-half of the bar is excluded; for no man can be a judge who is not of a certain party. Unless he be a person known to adhere to a certain system of Government,unless he profess himself to be devoted to one system of policy,unless his party happen to be the party connected with the Crown, there is no chance for him; that man is sure to be excluded. Let any person point out, if he could, a single instance where a man, known to be in party fetters, and opposed to the Government, had, during the last hundred years, been promoted to the bench. I know of no such instance in England. I have, indeed, known one or two instances where promotion of that kind has been conferred on men who have changed their party. This was not precisely the case in Scotland. The right honorable gentleman opposite (Mr. Peel) has done himself great honor, by recommending Lord Cranstoun, who is a party man; and Mr. Clerk, Lord Eldin, who is in Scotland a greater party man than Lord Eldon is in this country. I should like to see the same impartiality acted on in England. It is of importance to the pure and able administration of justice that it should be so; but I despair of ever seeing such a course adopted. If all Westminster were to be called on, in the event of any vacancy unfortunately occurring on the bench, to name the man who is best suited to fill that vacancy, to point out the individual whose talents and integrity best deserve the situation-whose exertions would be the most likely to shed blessings on his country-can any person doubt for a moment whose name would be echoed on every side? No; there cannot be a doubt as to the individual who would be named by those most competent to judge; but then he is known to be a party man, and that being the case, all his merits, even were they far greater than he is admitted to possess, would not command his promotion. I blame this mischievous system, by which the country has lost the services of some of the ablest, most learned, and most honest men in the country. But judges must always be Tory judges, though for what reason I know not. Why should the bench be for ever a ministerial bench? And yet it always has been a ministerial bench, except, indeed, during those visits "few and far between," when the Whigs came into office for five or six months; and then, perchance, we might happen to have a Whig judge. I wish to see the choice extended: I wish to see it fall on men, not because they are party men, but because they are strictly impartial men. I speak impartially; but when there is a Crown cause, a case of libel, or any such matter, before the Court, there is there must be-uniformly a certain leaning one way. The judges have this leaning, and they cannot help it, |