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ceding case, succeeded with the jury, and the suspicions of perjury excited in the former case were now turned into reality. A verdict was given for the defendant. In consequence of this verdict, a prosecution was instituted against the witness (Mead) for perjury; and, altogether, eighteen indictments arose out of that proceeding against Mead and others. The bills were all found, but the whole of the cases were removed at once by certiorari into the Court of King's Bench, and all of them made special jury cases for the Crown has that power without the concurrence of the prosecutor. One of them was tried; and the witness Mead, now the defendant, having been a witness for the Crown, was now, as is usual on such occasions, defended by the Crown. He was, however, found guilty. The prosecutor was about to proceed with the other cases, but a sufficient number of special jurymen not answering to their names, it became necessary for the prosecutor to pray a tales. This, however, could not be done without the warrant of the Attorney-General, and that was at once refused. The consequence was, that after an expenditure of 10,000/-after bringing 100 witnesses up from York-after all the labor, expense, and anxiety of the prosecutor (the former de fendant in the Exchequer), he was deprived of the means of bringing the parties whom he accused to justice, and at the same time was ruined in the attempt. The seventeen indictments against the other parties of course fell to the ground.

The unfortunate farmer (Lowe), on whom such ruin was brought in his attempt to obtain justice, was fated to lose his life in this unfortunate cause. The defendant Mead had obtained a rule for a new trial; and while the proceedings were pending, a fracas took place between him and Lowe (for the parties lived in the same town). Offence was taken at a song sung in allusion to the trial, and the result was that Mead shot at his opponent, and killed him on the spot. He was tried for the murder, and found guilty of manslaughter only, it being considered that Mead got some provocation; but to show that the judge viewed the case as one of much guilt, I may mention that Mead was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. This, Sir, it will be admitted, is a bad case, and one of much hardship; and I am justified in saying that the whole arose from the refusal of the warrant of the Crown for a tales. Shall I be told, after this, that the Crown and the subject are on equal footing when opposed in courts of justice? While other countries, which say much less in their own praise than we are in the habit of doing, but do much more to deserve it, are taking steps to remove such inconsistencies and absurdities from their systems of jurisprudence, are we to stand still and allow them to remain, and attempt no means to remedy the evils they

occasion? The case I have mentioned, though a bad one, is one which, bating the murder, might happen every day; but even happening only once, is it not enough to prove the assertion I have made, that the Crown and the subject are not on the same footing in our courts? In no case, I repeat, has the latter the same advantages as the former.

Having thus cleared the way, I will now point out briefly the means which might be adopted for preventing unnecessary suits, and for limiting the duration and expense of those which are necessary. In the other parts of my remarks, I will advert rather to the general heads than go on to the more minute details. In the first place, I would remove all kinds of oppression by means of suits at law, by cheapening all legal proceedings; and I would render them much less harassing and vexatious, by promoting, as much as possible, expedition in the progress of a suit. My next principle is, that no proceeding should be allowed which went only to the profit of the Court or the practitioners, and which might be done as matters of course; but all should be supposed to be done by the party himself, which could be done at present by application to the Court. In the third place, I would not send a party to two courts, where one would be sufficient, or oblige them to go to a bad and dear court, where application might be made to a cheap and expeditious one. Fourthly, I would not place the onus of proof on the party who has a fair presumption of right; but, as in case of bills of exchange, mortgages, and things of that sort, where, as in the Scotch law, the plaintiff is presumed to be so much in the right as to get all he asks, unless the defendant is enabled to show cause to the contrary. In the fifth place, I would allow parties having prospective interests to defend, to institute (as is permitted in the law of Scotland) declaratory suits, by which they might compel parties who have, or conceived they have, claims, to urge them or be barred in future. This would be found a most useful practice, and the party by whom the suit is instituted, might pay the whole or part of the costs, as the Court should determine. In the sixth place, I would abolish all obsolete proceedings in law. These are, for the most part, a trap to the unwary, and afford a ready means by which the incautious may be made tools in the hands of the designing and dishonest. Of these obsolete proceedings, I will instance the absurd one of wager of law. This kind of defence may be set up in cases of detenue, or of simple contract debt. In that case, all the defendant has to do is, to come into the Court and swear that he does not owe the money, and bring along with him eleven persons who will swear that they believe him in what he swears. They may be eleven strangers to the party claiming the debt, and

therefore less likely to know anything about the matter, and could safely swear as to their belief of defendant. A case of this kind was some time ago brought into the Common Pleas, when some of the oldest practitioners were at a loss how to treat such a defence; and were about to demur to it, so little are they practically acquainted with that which is still a legal defence to an action for debt.

Now, this I would abolish together. I would also, without the least feeling of remorse-without thinking for a moment about the pain it might give to several of my learned friends-without caring a rush for the immense mass of antiquated learning which it would render useless, or shedding a single tear over the piles of musty records which it would sweep away,-without being moved by any of these considerations, I would at once and for ever abolish the obsolete, absurd, and most ridiculous system of fine and recovery. If ever there was any one practice in our civil code more absurd than another, it was this. I beg to be understood that I do not mean to do away with cutting off the entail; but I would far remove the absurd, extravagant, and, what is not less objectionable to the party in the case, most expensive legal mummery by which that step is accomplished in one of our courts of law. If a man has an estate in fee, he may sell it, or will it, or convey it by deed of gift, to whom he pleases; but, with an estate in tail, which he means to dispose of, he must go to the Court of Common Pleas; and there, by paying a variety of heavy fines to the Court and the officers, he may do all he requires, and effectually bar the rights of all parties in remainder. But why may he not be allowed to accomplish his object, if a fair one, without going through all that ridiculous ceremony, and paying those heavy fines? In bankruptcy, all those forms are dispensed with, and the entail is cut off, and the estate sold for the benefit of creditors. Why should not this be done for the honest landowner, of which a dishonest tradesman is allowed to avail himself.

I would also abolish the absurd forms through which a woman is obliged to go in suffering a recovery with her husband, or in barring her dower, and the still more absurd practice of making the crier of the Court, as the vouchee in cases of fine and recoveries, the only party from whom, by a fiction of law, the parties barred can claim compensation. In the case of the lady I would appoint a legal or equitable guardian, to see that she is not induced to act in her own wrong. I would do away with contingent remainders, in the form in which they are now set out. I would allow a man to say he leaves his estate to his son, and after him to his son's son; but this should be in simple terms, which would

not serve, as is the case of the present form, to puzzle and confuse the unwary, and often to cause them to defeat the very ends they have in view. I would propose, as another improvement, to take away from the Court of Chancery its jurisdiction in trusts, mortgages, &c., by extending the statute of uses. In dealing with this class of cases, the court of equity decides purely on the principles of common law. The court of equity, however, is not so well able to decide these cases as a court of common law; and the consequence is, that every term two or three cases are sent from the former to the latter for its opinion on the law. It is said that a court of common law has not the means of dealing with these cases, because they resolve themselves into matters of account. But the Court of Chancery, in itself, has no peculiar property of unravelling questions of account. This duty is performed by its appendage, the Master's office. If the number of Masters were increased in the Court of King's Bench, and if arbitrators were appointed before whom the parties should come in the first instance without counsel or attorneys, to have the subject talked over, to be shown the strength and weakness of their several cases, that Court would be quite as competent to decide questions of account as the Court of Chancery. The equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery would thus be ousted in nine cases out of ten over which it has gradually extended itself, owing to the defects of the courts of common law. The Court of Chancery would then be left to its original jurisdiction in cases of pure account, idiots, infants, and long trusts, which no court of common law can deal with. It is hard that an individual should be driven to two actions, ejectment and mesne process.

My next object is to diminish the number of suits,-to allow only those to be brought which ought to be brought, and to provide that those shall be terminated in the shortest possible space of time, and with the least possible expense. For this purpose, parties should have an opportunity of stating their case before arbitrators appointed by the Court. Much good would result from this practice, and it would always tend to keep open the door of reconciliation. Our Saviour has wisely observed"Agree with thine adversary whilst yet thou art in the way." That recommendation should be constantly set before the eyes of suitors. It is, in original intention, though not in effect, acted on in the practice of imparlance. Whatever tends to bring a party to his senses as soon as possible, ought to be resorted to at once. Above all things, it is of the greatest importance that a party should at the earliest moment be brought to the knowlege of his adversary's case. If parties are disposed to be litigious, the interests of both differ from the interests of justice. It usually

is the practice for practitioners to determine on the prosecution or defence of a suit, and they did not always value the interests of their client so much as their own.

The object of a judge in a court of law ought to be to make each party come out with the whole of his case as soon as possible. In Scotland, no man can produce a written instrument in a court of law, unless he has some time before shown it to his adversary. In England the practice is different, and much vexation and injustice is the consequence. As a means of facilitating compromises, I would propose that parties be allowed to pay money into court in cases of unliquidated damages, and likewise to make a tender in cases of injury to persons and property, as is done in the case of justices and others under the statute of George II. With the view of shortening the duration and abridging the expense of suits, and doing justice at the same time, why should we not adopt some of the useful rules of foreign nations, which accord with the spirit of the English law, and would prove so beneficial to all, except the profession to which I have the honor to belong? In this matter I speak disinterestedly. There are very few persons who make more money by the law than I do. Few persons share more largely in the benefits which result from its abuses. If the reforms which I propose were introduced, a whole class of cases would be banished from the Courts, which only benefit counsel, attorneys, and the officers of the Court, and work the ruin of the plaintiff and defendant. I would ask any man acquainted with law, whether half the number of cases at present standing on the paper of the King's Bench would appear there if the parties had the opportunity of going before a sensible arbitrator, as is done in France, in the Dutch maritime courts, and in the Danish courts. The average amount of the money in dispute in the causes in the Bench paper is 307., and the average expense of each cause is 100%. It came to my knowlege, that the average amount of money in dispute in fifty actions tried at the last Lancaster assizes was 50l. This never could have happened, if the parties had been afforded an opportunity of having some quiet conversation with each other.

The existence of such facts as these proves the necessity of appointing public arbitrators, before whom men may go before their passions are worked up, and their pockets worked low. I now come to consider the commencement of the suit, with respect to which I have three propositions to offer: first, to prevent the debtor from wilfully absenting himself, and thereby causing delay; secondly, to give the debtor notice of the cause, that he may be able to defend himself if in the right, and to yield if in the wrong: thirdly, to give him no unnecessary inconvenience,

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