the north or fouth respectively change the ema- I pray I pray for all mankind, I am grieved at every fad ftory I hear; I am troubled when I hear of a pretty bride murdered in her bride-chamber by an ambitious and enraged rival: I fhed a tear when I am told that a brave king was mifunderstood, then flandered, then imprisoned, and then put to death by evil men: and I can never read the ftory of the Parifian mailacre, or the Sicilian vefpers, but my blood curdles, and I am difordered by two or three affections. A good man is a friend to all the world; and he is not truly charitable that does not wish well, and do good to all mankind in what he can. But though we muft pray for all men, yet we fay fpecial litanies for brave kings and holy prelates, and the wife guides of fouls, for our brethren and relations, our wives and children. The effect of this confideration is that the univerfal friendship of which I fpeak, must be limited because we are fo: in thofe things wherein we ftand next to immenfity and infinity, as in good wishes and prayers, and a readiness to benefit all mankind, in thefe our friendships must not be limited: but in other things which país under our hand and eye, our voices and our material exchanges; our hands can reach no further but to our arms end, and our voices can but found till the next air be quiet, and therefore they can have intercourfe but within the fphere of their own activity; our needs and our converfations are ferved by a few, and they cannot reach to all: where they can they muit; but where it is impoffible, it cannot be neceffary. It must therefore follow, that our friendships to mankind may admit variety as does our converfation; and as by nature we are made fociable to all, fo we are friendly, but as all cannot actually be of our fociety, fo neither can all be admitted to a special actual D 2 actual friendship. Of fome intercourfes all men are capable, but not of all; men can pray for one another, and abftain from doing injuries to all the world, and be defirous to do all mankind good, and love all men; now this friendship we must pay to all because we can; but if we can do no more to all, we muft fhew our readiness to do more good to all by actually doing more good to all them to whom we can. To fome we can, and therefore there are nearer friendships to some than to others, according as there are natural or civil nearneffes, relations and focieties; and as I cannot exprefs my friendfhips to all in equal meafures and fignifications, that is, as I cannot do benefits to all alike, fo neither am I tied to love all alike: for although there is much reafon to love every man, yet there are more reasons to love fome than thers; if I muft love because there is reason I fhould, then I muft love more, where there is more reafon and where there is a fpecial affection and a great readiness to do good and to delight in certain perfons towards each other, there is that special charity and endearment which philofophy calls friendship; but our religion calls love or charity. Now if the inquiry be concerning this fpecial friendship, 1. How it can be appropriate, that is, who to be chofen to it: 2. How far it may extend, that is, with what expreffion fignified: 3. How conducted, the answers will depend upon fuch confiderations which will be neither useless nor unpleasant. 1. There may be a fpecial friendship contracted for any fpecial excellency whatfoever; because friendships are nothing but love and fociety mixed together, that is, a converfing with them whom we love; now for whatfoever we can love any one, for that we can be his friend; and fince every excellency is a degree of amability, every fuch worthiness worthiness is a juft and proper motive of friendfhip or living converfation. But yet in these things there is an order and proportion. Therefore, 2. A good man is the best friend, and therefore fooneft to be chofen, longer to be retained; and indeed never to be parted with, unless hecease 1. to be that for which he was chofen. Τῶν δ ̓ ἄλλων ἀρετὴ ποιεῦ φίλον ὁεὶς ἄρις, Where virtue dwells, there friendships make, But although virtue alone is the worthieft cause of amability, and can weigh down any one confideration; and therefore to a man that is virtuous every man ought to be a friend: yet I do not mean the fevere and philofophical excellencies of fome morofe perfons who are indeed wife unto themselves,and exemplar to others. By virtue here I do not mean justice and temperance, charity and devotion; for these I am to love the man, but friendship is fomething more than that: friendship is the nearest love and the nearest fociety of which the perfons are capable; now justice is a good intercourse for merchants, as all men are that buy and fell; and temperance makes a man good company, and helps to make a wife man: but a perfect friendship requires fomething elfe, these must be in him that is chofen to be my friend, but for thefe I do not make him my privado, that is, my fpecial and peculiar friend: but if he be a good man, then he is properly fitted to be my correlative in the nobleft combination. And for this we have the best warrant in the world for a juft man fcarcely will a man die: the Syriac interpteter D 3 interpreter reads it, rig ddíne for an unjust man fcarcely will a man die, that is, a wicked man is at no hand fit to receive the expreffion of the greatest friendship: but all the greek copies that ever I faw, or read of, read it as we do; for a righteous man, or a just man, that is, juftice and righteoufhefs, is not the nearest indearment of friendship; but for a good man fome will even dare to die, that is, for a man that is fweetly difpofed, ready to do acts of goodnefs and to oblige others, to do things useful and profitable; for a loving man, a beneficent, bountiful man, one who delights in doing good to his friend,fuch a man may have the highest friendship, he may have a friend that will die for him. And this is the meaning of Lælius, virtue may be despised, so may learning and nobility; at una eft amicitia in rebus humanis de cujus utilitate omnes confentiunt: only friendship is that thing which because all know to be useful and profitable, no man can defpife; that is, χρησότης οι αγαθότης, goodiefs or beneficence makes friendships. For if he be a good man, he will love where he is beloved; and that is the firft tie of friendship. ̓Αλλήλες ἐφίλησαν ἴσω ζυγῷ. That was the commendation of the bravest friendship in Theocritus. They loved each other with a love, Η ρα τοτ ̓ ἦσαν Χρυσεῖοι πάλαι ἄνδρες ὁκ ̓ ἀντιφίλησ ̓ ὁ φιληθείς. The world was under Saturn's reign, For |