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places that the scripture speaks of faith as the soul's receiving or coming to Christ, it also speaks of this receiving, or coming to, or joining with Christ, as the ground of an interest in his benefits: To as many as received him, "to them gave he pow er" to become the sons of God.

Ye will not come unto me And there is a wide difference

"that ye might have life." between its being looked on suitable that Christ's satisfaction and merits should be theirs that believe, because an interest in that satisfaction and merit is but a fit reward of faith, or a suitable testimony of God's respect to the amiableness and excellency of that grace, and its only being looked on suitable that Christ's satisfaction and merits should be theirs, because Christ and they are so united, that in the eyes of the Judge they may suitably be looked upon and taken as one.

Although, on the account of faith in the believer, it is, in the sight of God, fit and congruous, both that he that believes should be looked upon as in Christ, and also as having an interest in his merits, in the way that has been now explained; yet it appears that this is very wide from a merit of congruity, or indeed any moral congruity at all to either. There is a twofold fitness to a state; I know not how to give them distinguishing names, or otherwise, than by calling the one a moral and the other a natural fitness. A person has a moral fitness for a state, when his moral excellency commends him to it, or when his being put into such a good state is but a fit or suitable testimony of regard or love to the moral excellency, or value, or amiableness of any of his qualifications or acts. A person has a natural fitness for a state, when it appears meet and condecent that he should be in such a state or circumstances, only from the natural concord or agreeableness there is between such qualifications and such circumstances; not because the qualifications are lovely or unlovely, but only because the qualifications and the circumstances are like one another, or do in their nature, suit and agree or unite one to another. And it is on this latter account only that God looks on it fit, by a natural fitness, that he whose heart sincerely unites itself to Christ as his Saviour, should be looked upon as united to that Saviour, and so having an interest in him; and

not from any moral fitness there is between the excellency of such a qualification as faith, and such a glorious blessedness as the having an interest in Christ. God's bestowing Christ and his benefits on a soul in consequence of faith, out of regard only to the natural concord there is between such a qualification of a soul, and such an union with Christ, and interest in him, makes the case very widely different from what would be, if he bestowed this from regard to any moral suitableness: For, in the former case, it is only from God's love of order that he bestows these things on the account of faith: In the latter, God doth it out of love to the grace of faith itself. God will neither look on Christ's merits as ours, nor adjudge his benefits to us, till we be in Christ; nor will he look upon us being in him, without an active union of our hearts and souls to him; because he is a wise being, and delights in order and not in confusion, and that things should be together or asunder according to their nature; and his making such a constitution is a testimony of his love of order: Whereas if it were out of regard to any moral fitness or suitableness between faith and such blessedness, it would be a testimony of his love to the act or qualification itself: The one supposes this divine constitu tion to be à manifestation of God's regard to the beauty of the act of faith; the other only supposes it to be a manifestation of his regard to the beauty of that order that there is in uniting those things that have a natural agreement, and congruity, and unition, the one with the other. Indeed a moral suitableness or fitness to a state includes a natural: For it is never so that if there be a moral suitableness that a person should be in such à state, there is not also a natural suitableness; but such a natural suitableness as I have described, by no means necessarily includes a moral.

This is plainly what our divines intend when they say, that faith does not justify as a work, or a righteousness, viz. that it does not justify as a part of our moral goodness or excellency, or that it does not justify as a work in the sense, that man was to have been justified by his works by the covenant of works, which was to have a title to eternal life given him of God in testimony of his pleasedness with his works, or his reVOL. VII.

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gard to the inherent excellency and beauty of his obedience. And this is certainly what the Apostle Paul means, when he so much insists upon it, that we are not justified by works, viz. that we are not justified by them as good works, or by any goodness, value, or excellency of our works. For the proof of this I shall at present mention but one thing, (being like to have occasion to say what shall make it more abundantly manifest afterwards) and that is, the apostles, from time to time, speaking of our not being justified by works, as the thing that excludes all boasting, Eph. ii. 9, Rom. iii. 27, and chap. iv. 2. Now which way do works give occasion for boasting, but as good? What do men use to boast of, but of something they suppose good or excellent? And on what account do they boast of any thing, but for the supposed excellency that is in it?

From these things we may learn in what manner faith is the only condition of justification, and salvation: For though it be not the only condition, so as alone truly to have the place of a condition in an hypothetical proposition, in which justification and salvation are the consequent, yet it is the condition of justification in a manner peculiar to it, and so that nothing else has a parallel influence with it; because faith includes the whole act of unition to Christ as a Saviour. The entire,

active uniting of the soul, or the whole of what is called coming to Christ, and receiving of him, is called faith in scripture ; and however other things may be no less excellent than faith, yet it is not the nature of any other graces or virtues directly to close with Christ as a mediator, any further than they enter into the constitution of justifying faith, and do belong to its na

ture.

Thus I have explained my meaning in asserting it as a doctrine of the gospel, that we are justified by faith only, without any manner of goodness of our own. I now proceed in the

II. Place, to the proof of it; which I shall endeavor to produce in the following arguments.

First. Such is our case, and the state of things, that neither faith, nor any other qualification, or act or course of acts, does or can render it suitable or fit that a person should have an interest in the Saviour, and so a title to his benefits, on

account of any excellency therein, or any other way, than only as something in him may unite him to the Saviour It is not suitable that God should give fallen man an interest in Christ and his merits, as a testimony of his respect to any thing whatsoever as a loveliness in him; and that because it is not meet, till a sinner is actually justified, that any thing in him should be accepted of God, as an excellency or amiableness of his person; or that God, by any act, should in any manner or degree testify any pleasedness with him, or favor towards him, on the account of any thing inherent in him : And that for two reasons, 1. Because the nature of things will not admit of it: 2. Because an antecedent, divine constitution stands in the way of it.

1. The nature of things will not admit of it. And this appears from the infinite guilt that the sinner, till justified, is under; which arises from the infinite evil or heinousness of sin. But because this is what some deny, I would therefore first establish that point, and shew that sin is a thing that is indeed properly of infinite heinousness; and then shew the consequence, and shew that, it being so, and so the sinner under infinite guilt in God's sight, it cannot be suitable, till the sinner is actually justified, that God should by any act testify any pleasedness with, or acceptance of any thing, as any excellency or amiableness of his person, or indeed have any accept、 ance of him, or pleasedness with him to testify.

That the evil and demerit of sin is infinitely great, is most demonstrably evident, because what the evil or iniquity of sin consists in, is the violating of an obligation, the doing contrary to what we are obliged to do, or doing what we should not do ; and therefore by how much the greater the obligation is that is violated, by so much the greater is the iniquity of the violation. But certainly our obligation to love or honor any being is great in proportion to the greatness or excellency of that being or his worthiness to be loved or honored: We are under greater obligations to love a more lovely being than a less lovely; and if a being be infinitely excellent and lovely, our obligations to love him are therein infinitely great: The matter is so plain, it seems needless to say much about it.

Some have argued strangely against the infinite evil of sin, from its being committed against an infinite object, that if so, then it may as well be argued, that there is also an infi nite value or worthiness in holiness and love to God, because that also has an infinite object; whereas the argument, from parity of reason, will carry it in the reverse: The sin of the creature against God is ill deserving in proportion to the dis tance there is between God and the creature; the greatness of the object, and the meanness of the subject aggravates it. But it is the reverse with regard to the worthiness of respect of the creature to God; it is worthless, (and not worthy) in proportion to the meanness of the subject; so much the greater the distance between God and the creature, so much the less is the creature's respect worthy of God's notice or regard. The unworthiness of sin or opposition to God rises and is great, in proportion to the dignity of the object and inferiority of the subject; but on the contrary, the worth or value of respect rises in proportion to the value of the subject; and that for this plain reason, viz. that the evil of disrespect is in proportion to the obligation that lies upon the subject to the object; which obligation is most evidently increased by the excellency and superiority of the object; but on the contrary, the worthiness of respect to a being is in proportion to the obligation that lies on him who is the object, (or rather the reason he has) to regard the subject, which certainly is in proportion to the subject's value or excellency. Sin or disrespect is evil or heinous in proportion to the degree of what it denies in the object, as it were takes from it, viz. its excellency and worthiness of respect; on the contrary, respect is valuable in proportion to the value of what is given to the object in that respect, which undoubtedly (other things being equal) is great in proportion to the subject's value, or worthiness of regard; because the subject in giving his respect, can give no more than himself to the object; and therefore his gift is of greater or less value in proportion to the value of himself.

Hence, (by the way) the love, honor, and obedience of Christ towards God, has infinite value, from the excellency

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