ing to purchase that our imperfect obedience should be ac cepted, when, according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself that any other obedience than imperfect should be required? What need of Christ's dying to make way for God's accepting such an obedience, as it would in itself be unjust in him not to accept? Is there any need of Christ's dying to persuade God not to do unjustly? If it be said, that Christ died to satisfy that law for us, that so we might not be under that law, but might be delivered from it, that so there might be room for us to be under a more mild law; still I would inquire, What need of Christ's dying that we might not be under a law that (according to their scheme) it would in itself be unjust that we should be under, because in our present state we are not able to keep it? What need of Christ's dying that we might not be under a law that it would be unjust that we should be under, whether Christ died or no?

Thus far I have argued principally from reason, and the nature of things......I proceed now to the

Second argument, which is, That this is a doctrine that the holy Scripture, the revelation that God has given us of his mind and will, by which alone we can ever come to know how those that have offended God can be accepted of him, and justified in his sight, is exceeding full in: Particularly the Apostle Paul is abundant in teaching, that "we are justified by "faith alone, without the works of the law." There is no one doctrine that he insists so much upon, and is so particular in, and that he handles with so much distinctness, explaining and giving reasons, and answering objections.

Here it is not denied by any, that the apostle does assert, that we are justified by faith, without the works of the law, because the words are express; but only it is said, that we take his words wrong and understand that by them that never entered into his heart, in that when he excludes the works of the law, we understand him of the whole law of God, or the rule which he has given to mankind to walk by; whereas all that he intends is the ceremonial law.

Some that oppose this doctrine indeed say, that the apostle sometimes means that it is by faith i. e. an hearty embracing the gospel, in its first act only, or without any preceding holy

life, that persons are admitted into a justified state; but, say they, it is by a persevering obedience that they are continued in a justified state; and it is by this that they are finally justified. But this is the same thing as to say, that a man, on his first embracing the gospel, is conditionally justified and pardoned: To pardon sin, is to free the sinner from the punishment of it, or from that eternal misery that is due to it; and therefore, if a person is pardoned or freed from this misery, on his first embracing the gospel, and yet not finally freed, but his actual freedom still depends on some condition yet to be performed, it is inconceivable how he can be pardoned otherwise than conditionally; that is, he is not actually pardoned, and freed from punishment, but only he has God's promise that he shall be pardoned on future conditions; God promises him, that now, if he perseveres in obedience, he shall be finally pardoned, or actually freed from hell; which is to make just nothing at all of the apostle's great doctrine of justification by faith alone: Such a conditional pardon is no pardon or justification at all, any more than all mankind have, whether they embrace the gospel or no; for they all have a promise of final justification on condition of future, sincere obedience, as much as he that embraces the gospel. But not to dispute about this, we will suppose that there may be something or other at the sinner's first embracing the gospel, that may properly be called justification or pardon, and yet that final justification, or real freedom from the punishment of sin, is still suspended on conditions hitherto unfulfilled; yet they that hold that sinners are thus justified on embracing the gospel, suppose that they are justified by this no otherwise than as this is a leading act of obedience, or at least as virtue and moral goodness in them, and therefore would be excluded by the apostle as much as any other virtue or obedience, if it be allowed that he means the moral law, when he excludes the works of the law. And therefore, if that point be yielded, that the apostle means the moral, and not the ceremonial law only, their whole scheme falls to the ground.

And because the issue of the whole argument from those texts in St. Paul's epistles depends on the determination of this point, I would be particular in the discussion of it,

Some of our opponents in this doctrine of justification, when they deny, that by the law the apostle means the moral law, or the whole rule of life which God has given to mankind, seem to choose to express themselves thus, that the apostle only intends the Mosaic dispensation. But this comes to just the same thing as if they said, that the apostle only means to exclude the works of the ceremonial law; for when they say, that it is intended only that we be not justified by the works of the Mosaic dispensation, if they mean any thing by it, it must be, that we be not justified by attending and observing what is Mosaic in that dispensation, or by what was peculiar to it, and wherein it differed from the Christian dispensation; which is the same as that which is ceremonial and positive, and not moral, in that administration. So that this is what I have to disprove, viz. that the apostle when he speaks of the works of the law in this affair, means only the works of the ceremonial law, or those observances that were peculiar to the Mosaic administration.

And here it must be noted, that nobody controverts it with them, whether the works of the ceremonial law be not included, or whether the apostle does not particularly argue against justification by circumcision, and other ceremonial observances; but all that is in question is, whether, when he denies jusjustificaton by works of the law, he is to be understood of the ceremonial law only, or whether the moral law be not also implied and intended; and therefore those arguments that are brought to prove that the apostle meant the ceremonial law, are nothing to the purpose unless they prove more than that, viz. that the apostle meant those only.

What is much insisted on is, that it was the Judaising Christians' being so fond of circumcision, and other ceremonies of the law, and depending so much on them, which was the occasion of the apostle's writing as he does against justification by the works of the law. But supposing it were so, that their trusting in works of the ceremonial law were the sole occasion of the apostle's writing, (which yet there is no reason to allow, as may appear afterwards;) if their trusting in a particular work, as a work of righteousness, was all

that gave occasion to the apostle to write, how does it follow, that therefore the apostle did not upon that occasion write a gainst trusting in all works of righteousness whatsoever? Where is the absurdity of supposing that the apostle might take occasion, from his observing some to trust in a certain work as a work of righteousness, to write to them against persons' trusting in any works of righteousness, and that it was a very proper occasion too? Yea, it would have been unavoidable for the apostle to have argued against trusting in a particular work in that quality of a work of righteousness, which quality was general, but he must therein argue against works of righteousness in general. Supposing it had been some other particular sort of works that was the occasion of the apostle's writing, as for instance, works of charity, and the apostle should hence take occasion to write to them not to trust in their works, could the apostle by that be understood of no other work besides works of charity? Would it have been absurd to understand him as writing against trusting in any work at all, because it was their trusting to a particular work that gave occasion to his writing?

Another thing that is alleged as an evidence that the apostle means the ceremonial law, when he says, we cannot be justified by the works of the law, is, that he uses that argument to prove it, viz. that this law that he speaks of was given so long after the covenant with Abraham, in Gal. iii. 17. “ And this, I say, that the covenant, that was confirmed before of God in Christ, the law, which was four hundred and thirty years after, cannot disannul." But, say they, it was only the Mosaic administration, and not the covenant of works, that was given so long after. But the apostle's argument seems manifestly to be mistaken by them. The apostle does not speak of a law that began first to have being four hundred and thirty years after; if he did, there would be some force in their objection; but he has respect to a certain solemn transaction, well known among the Jews, by the phrase of the giving of the law, which was that great transaction at mount Sinai, that we have account of in the 19th and 20th chapters of Exodus, consisting especjally in God's giving the ten commandments, which is the

moral law, with that terrible voice, which law he afterwards gave in tables of stone. This transaction, the Jews, in the apostles' time misinterpreted; they looked upon it as God's establishing that law as a rule of justification. This conceit of their's the apostle brings this invincible argument against, viz. that God would never go about to disannul his covenant with Abraham, which was plainly a covenant of grace, by a transaction with his posterity, that was so long after it, and was plainly built upon it: He would not overthrow a covenant of grace that he had long before established with Abraham, for him, and his sced, (which is often mentioned on the ground of God's making them his people) by now establishing a covenant of works with them at Mount Sinai, as the Jews and judaising Christians supposed.

But that the apostle does not mean works of the ceremonial law only, when he excludes works of the law in justification, but also of the moral law, and all works of obedience, virtue and righteousness whatsoever, may appear by the following things.

1. The apostle does not only say, that we are not justified by the works of the law, but that we are not justified by works, using a general term; as in our text, it is said, to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth, &c.; and in the 6th verse," God imputeth righteousness without works;" and chap. xi. 6, "And if by grace, then it is no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace: But if it be of works, then is it no more grace; otherwise work is no more work." So Eph. ii. 8, 9, “For by grace are ye saved, through faith...........not of works;" by which there is no reason in the world to understand the apostle of any other than works in general, as correlates of a reward, or good works, or works of virtue and rightWhen the apostle says, we are justified or saved not by works, without any such term annexed, as the law, or any other addition, to limit the expression, what warrant has any one to confine it to works of a particular law or institution, excluding others? Are not observances of other divine laws, works, as well as of that? It seems to be allowed by the divines in the Arminian, scheme, in their interpretation of

eousness.