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its own nature, can properly merit his difcharge from condemnation. The truth of this will if we confider, first, that as guilt is a perfonal thing, which cannot be tranfpofed from one to another, and as it is very just that the guilty perfon fhould bear his own burthen, by suffering the punishment due for his fault, and as the punifhing or pardoning of the finner is the peculiar property of God; fo if any one fhould appear in the finner's behalf, and fhould offer to make fatisfaction to God for the offence committed, and fhould fuffer for him all that is poffible to be suffered to that end; yet ftill God is at liberty to reject whatever is thus fuffered in the finner's behalf, and may juftly punish him in his own perfon, notwithstanding what hath been suffered for him in the perfon of another; it being no way contrary to juftice to demand fatisfaction from the offender, and to reject or refufe fatisfaction from any other hand. From hence it will follow, that there is nothing which any one can fuffer for another, which, in its own nature, doth strictly merit the finner's discharge; for if it did, in its own nature, thus merit, tho' God did not require fuch fuffering, yet it would be the finner's right to be exempted from punishment, and it would be an act of criminal injuftice in God to lay any punishment upon him. But that God may punish the finner in his own perfon, and very justly refufe what is done or fuffered by another in the finner's behalf, I think no perion, who understands what justice and equity is, will deny; and confequently, there is nothing, which another can fuffer in the finner's behalf, that, in the nature of the thing, can me rit deliverance from him. The truth of this will

farther appear, if we confider, fecondly, that there can be no fuch thing as making fatisfaction by another, in the prefent cafe; for tho' in the cafe of debt, another may make fatisfaction for us, by fully

fully repairing the damage we have done, or paying to the full what we owe, yet in the cafe of guilt it is quite otherways; for as no one can, in this cafe, undo what another has done, and as guilt cannot be tranfpofed from one perfon to another, fo the nature of the thing requires, that if any do fuffer for fin, it must be the guilty perfon, and he only; because punishment, in the prefent cafe, is a chaftifing the fool for his folly, and a vindication of the juft authority of God, which hath been affronted by the disobedience of his creature; but if the punishment be transposed from the guilty to another who is fubftituted to fuffer in his ftead, then, in that cafe, the fool is not at all chastised for his folly, neither is the authority of God vindicated thereby, and fo the ends of punishment are not at all anfwer'd. For as it is unreasonable to fuppofe that God punishes the finner for punishment's fake, to gratify an angry paffion; fo if he should punish the innocent in the guilty's ftead, this would be fo far from retrieving his honour, fo as to repair the damage done by fin, that on the contrary it would add to his difhonour, by representing him as unjuft and unholy, in punishing the innocent, and letting the guilty go free. And tho' the perfon fuffering fhould voluntarily offer himfelf to fuffer in the finner's behalf, it makes no alteration in the cafe, becaufe fuch a voluntary offer makes no alteration in the finner; he is as guilty after it as before, and confequently is as much the proper object of punishment as before. And the innocent perfon, as he doth not contract the guilt of the other, by that voluntary offer, he being as innocent as before, fo that offer cannot make him the proper object of that punishment, and confequently the fuffering of the innocent cannot make fatisfaction for the guilty. From the whole

I think

I think it plainly appears that there is nothing which the finner can do for himself, nor which any other can do, or suffer for him, which, in the nature of the thing, can merit his exemption from punishment, or give a right to claim his deliverance at God's hand. Again,

Fourthly, I obferve, that as the original right to pardon or punish the finner is the peculiar property or prerogative of God, and as there is nothing which the finner can do for himself, nor which any other can do or suffer in his behalf, which, in the nature of the thing, can merit his discharge; from hence it will follow, that it is wholly at God's pleasure to give pardon upon what terms he will, and to require what qualifications he pleases in those he thinks fit to make the objects of his mercy. Again,

Fifthly, I obferve, that when God hath offered pardon to the finner, upon any terms, and under any qualifications, when thofe terms are made good in fuch fort as God crdained, and when thofe qualifications are attained which he required, then the perfon, which hath made good the terms required, hath a right, by virtue of God's promife, to claim forgivenefs for the finner at God's hand; and it would be an act of criminal injuftice in God to with-hold it from him. But then it ought to be remembered, that this right to claim pardon is not founded in merit, but in grace; for tho' when any one has made good the terms required, he then has a right to claim the pardon promifed, yet that right is not founded upon the proper and original meritoriousness of these terms, but upon the free promise of God, which he has been pleased to make as a reward of grace to the performance of thofe terms, the right of claim depending wholly upon that promise because if no fuch promise had

been

been made, then the performance of thofe terms would have given no right at all. Again,

Sixthly, I obferve, that whoever makes good the terms required for the finner, which God has promifed pardon to, or whoever doth that with which God is fo well pleafed as to pardon the finner for its fake, fuch a one may fitly be efteemed a faviour or redeemer to the finner; for tho he hath not done that which, in its own nature, merits the finner's difcharge, yet forafmuch as he hath done what God requires and accepts as the condition of his mercy, or doth that which God is fo well pleafed with as to give the finner his pardon for its fake, he is, in a fecondary and lefs proper fenfe, a redeemer to the finner; becaufe he hath done what God required and accepted to that end, and because the finner's actual deliverance is the iffue and confequence of it. Again,

Seventhly, I obferve, that whatever God is pleafed to make the condition of his mercy, or whatever is done which he is fo well pleafed with as to pardon the finner for its fake, the performance, or doing of that thing, may, in a fecondary and lefs proper fenfe, be called the price of that redemption, and the finner may be faid to be redeemed by it, or bought with it; for tho' the performance, or doing of that thing, doth pot, in its own nature, merit the finner's difcharge, yet forafmuch as God is pleased to make thofe terms the condition of his mercy, and to pardon the finner upon its account, the performance of thofe terms becomes, by the free grace of God, in a fecondary and lefs proper fenfe, the price of that deliverance. Again,

Eighthly, I obferve, that whatever God is pleafed to accept, as the price of the finner's redemption, the paying of that price may, in a fecondary and lefs proper fenfe, and according to

the

the common way of speaking, be faid to merit that forgiveness; juft as we ufe to fay, when the prince advances the foldier to fome high poft for his fervice in the wars, that he is advanced for his merit. Now tho' the foldier hath merited nothing by his fervice, but his wages, when we use the word merit, in its first and most proper fenfe, becaufe that wages is all that he covenanted for, and fo is all that hath a legal right to claim, and is all that the prince is, in justice, obliged to give; yet fofafmuch as his good fervice is fuch as hath recommended him to his prince's favour, therefore thofe good fervices are faid, in a fecondary and lefs proper fenfe, to merit that favour for him at his prince's hand. So in like manner whatever God is fo well pleafed with, as to pardon the finner for its fake, that may, in a fecondary and lefs proper fenfe, be faid to merit that forgivenefs at God's hand. Thus much I thought proper to obferve as previous to the following enquiry. But note, that when I fay, God would be criminally unjuft if he did fo or fo, 'I do not mean that he is guilty of the breach of a law, which he is obliged to fubmit to by any fuperiour authority, but only that he would act contrary to the univerfal rule of equity.

The ENQUIRY.

This Enquiry confifts of four general parts; firft, whether the believing penitent finner will be delivered from condemnation; fecondly, whether Jefus Chrift, the Son of God, has obtained that deliverance for him; thirdly, whether that deliverance is obtained by his fufferings and death; fourthly, whether his fufferings and death do, in their own nature, and in the ftrict fenfe of the word, merit that deliverance, and are a full and equal fatisfaction to God for the fins and offences of all believing penitent finners. And,

First,