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* and superstition.; wheri observation and reflection shall have taught .mankind the folly of such a system; and when, in the philosophy of the mind, as in every other science, they shall be content to abide by the test, of experience and clear deduction, and no longer build, their opinions on the ex

* fravagant delusions of theory—thus, wj.H j.t also probably . fare with "the doctrines, and the defender* of immaterial ism. . ■., P.; ««'« ■* •■' '■•■> ■ :!rV-«

The immaterlah'st will tell yod. trjat every, other system,

* except his own, is visionary, fanciful,'and unfounded.— What! and sball that man talk of visionary systems, who himself.peoples the whole surface.of wjth spirits, with shadows, and with airy unsubstantial visions!. Shall 4hat man exclajm against fanciful and unfounded theories, who, with the potent wand of his,own.imagination, conjures

'from the vasty deep .innumerable trpops.of such airy beings, 'and visionary spectres, and then will seriously inform you that "these, entering into masses of" inert, impenetFable,and senseless matter," into mere clods of earth, will cause them to leap tip, arid walk, arid talk, and eat, and drink,and sleep, actually mocking their fellow clods, and even deceiving themselves 'irito the vain and absurd belief {hat they are reasonable ecea"tur'e's-—then, when the mummery is,over, departing from ;them, leaving their temporary habitations to. become xlay and earth dgain—themselves to enter into a more perfect and 'a more blissful S/tate of being? §urely this is to out-herod ^Hejrdd, arid to tread beyond thV very verge'of possibility-. 1 "How very little, after this, appear the wonders of romance, ^and the fictions of poetry, and all the minor wanderings of the human imagination^ , , . ....... „, .. :. i, .. ...

. 'The immaterialist aflirms that every other, system, is,absurd and foolisb ;—but with what fape^. with, what faint shadow of plausibility, can that man talk of. absurdity and.folly 'jri others, wnb himself not only belieyeg ju 4he existence of such spiritual beings as we have here described, but who actually asserts that such belief is rational, philosophical, tind just:—who, seejng.that every thing which has existence is subject lo ofec^iy, wisely therefore concludes, that, by depriving the soul ofevery possible mode of existence, be shall rationally account for its immortality :—who contends that matter and spirit, possessing no properties in common, may yet be intimately combined, and be made mutually to act upon eaqh Q^ec,:—who, forced, to confess that in every discoverably case, in thift.WQrW, the soul never acts without the intervention of. the .senses, yet ..{continues ,tp assert that it is capable of an after and a separate existence in ano«

ther rJ-r-and, yet more than all, who, believing that the body is only a clog1, and an incumbrance to the soul, confining its powers, and chaining down its faculties', yet professes to look forward with hope and with pleasure to the day, when this same incumbrance shall be restored, and the soul, restrained in its aspirins; flight, shall again be chained down within its tenement of base and worthless clay?

The immaterial!*! contends, that those who deny the immortality of the soul are infidels and unbelievers, and that they must necessarily disbelieve in the religion of Jesus; a few words on this matter will suffice, for, so perfectly apparent is this part of the subject, that, should they not succeed in retorting .back the charge upon those who make it, whole pages, nay whole volumes, would fail of their effect; suffice it then to say, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is at direct and perfect variance with the promise of a resurrection from the dead; the terms of the two propositions are indeed directly opposed to each other; they contain at once a verbal and an actual contradiction within themselves. That they cannot therefore'both be true is ap

• parent; one of them must be false ; one of them, in the very nature of things, must, be nothing more than an idle and a worthless fable—we can only have our choice between them—really to retain them both (however some persons may deceive themselves) is an absolute and a moral impossibility. Jesus came to teach a resurrection from the dead, through the will and by the unaided power of the same being who first called us iuto existence; but, if the soul be immortal, we can have no occasion for such a resurrection; it is an event which never can be required, and which consequently never can take place. Should therefore

'the proved immortal, Jesus was an impostor; should the soul be provedimmortal, we need no longer to be Christians, no longer to look forward with anxious and with trembling hope to the day of restoration into life: the spark of immortality is within us, eternity is mixed up in the very essence of our nature, and it becomes an unalterable law of our being that we should never die! In that case, parodying, or rather applying, the words of the dramatic poet, we may triumphantly exclaim,

"The soul, secured in her existence, smiles
At the weak goipel, and belies its words." -

Lastly, the immaterialist, to crown the whole, asserfsthat those who doubt, or who deny the existence of the spiritual agency which he believes in, are concealed atheists,/ who in fact deny the necessity for the existence of a God. To allow, he argues, that, matter is capable of life and animation, that it may be so organized as to produce thought, memory, reflection, and all the phenomena of mind, is to allow that there is no necessity for the interference of a Creator—for matter, he says, may have always existed, and, upon such a supposition, have always had that power. In reply to this, we must observe that the argument, Lad in itself, holds good witli greater force against his own opinions, than against those of his adversaries; for surely spirits, whatever may be the case with mortal matter—yet surely spiritual beings, of a nature so exalted as to be endued with powers of immortality, may rationally be supposed capable of having existed throughout a previous eternity; and where then will be the necessity, nay the possibility, of believing in the existence of a prior cause that called them into being? Besides, in denying the possibility of the Deity's making man of the dust of the earth alone, do they not circumscribe his po'vers, and contradict the tenor of his revelation i And (knowing him as we do merely by the boundless display of those powers, and the facts and the promises of that revelation,) is not that in fact and in reality to doubt and to deny the truth of his existence? Yet such is actually the effect of the creed, and such the natural consequence of the doctrines, which are held and strenuously maintained by , the supporters of immaterialism!

So much then, at present, for that creed, so much for those doctrines—we leave them to their defenders to enjoy in peace, and are perfectly willing to await the slow but certain operation of time for their destruction; for ourselves, we have now to proceed to a more pleasing task; having destroyed the old fabric, it remains with us to erect a new one in its stead; having exploded opinions, which, though maintained by the great majority of mankind, are evidently visionary, absurd, and impious, contradicted by revelation, and at variance with just philosophy, we have now, in the place of such, to]display a belief, which, however it may have been opposed, and how few soever may be its votaries, is in fact rational in itself, clear in its doctrines, simple in its principles, and morally advantageous in its consequences ; at once supported by the facts and promises of revelation, and in accordance with all we' know of the real and philosophical nature of things. The belief referred to, has generally been called by the name of materialism, as contradistinguished from the system which we have already commented upon; it consists in an opinion that man is possessed of only one uature, that he has no opposite or contending principles witli

. in him, which are ever at variance with and preying upon

each other; that his qualities, both bodily and mental} are*U

and equally the result of that species of organization, which

the Great Cause of all things has in his wisdom provided

should ever be productive of such effects ; that when he difes

lie ceases to exist;, andj above all} that it is only from the

. mercy, and the wisdom^ and the power of his Creator, add

•not from any indestructible source of being inherent in-Itfili

self, that he can expect to-enjoy a future aYid'arTeterfel

. state of existence.

Leaving for the present' every other vieWof'thirsnlSjeet, . We shall content ourselves with briefly examimiigrt, according to the pluinand popular principles of philosophy; viewing things as we really tind them in nature, to e"*ery effect assigning a sufficient cause, but to none tillo'wing ^niore than is.absolutely necessary fop its 'production. "Arid here we must first repeat the common, but too often neglected maxim, that w e.know nothing either of the Internal'itature of thiugs, or of the real ni,d final causes which -operate . to produce them ; <»n this subject it is perhaps, in our pre«e,nt stwte, a moral impossibility that we should possOsYa single idea; all we have to do vvith-are facts, effects, an J consequences, us -we really frti'd them in nature; these we Tnufct either note down imn.edkitely from observation, Or elicit by experiment; but, havingfoiind them, all we have to do is to believe in their existence, and, arranging them in their proper places, corniest them with the rest of Out knowledge, t«3t is, with each other, in order to the formation of n'system of philosophy, M hicli shall be as nearly accordant "With .the actual phenomena of nature, as it Ires within Out p'tAVer Aq obtain. With regard, for instance, to the properties df bodies, we only know them by the effects produced bV .those hodies upon ,our •senses i and whatever effects are ^universally found to be produced, these, however wonderful or incredible they may appear to ins, we must necessarily .consider as-inherent avd inalienable qualities^ Upon which our ideas and definitions of tho<e bodies must toe four/fled. It is, for example, by these means we arrive at the facts thai JBre is endued with heat, whilst ice on the errrrttary Is- cold; that hardness is a property of iron, elasticity «f Ittfryj fluidity of water, and combustion of* gunpowder; these arte things, none of which we can in reality a'cebun't ft>r, or should, in the first instance, have gnewd at, r>r inspected'; but still there is one very cogent renscn tor inducing us fte think litem possible, and for believing their existence, which.

is, that they are true, and thatour senses convince usof their actual being and presence.. Why do we conclude that light' and heat proceed from thesun? Not, surely, on account ofany' intimate know'e Ige we suppose o lrselves possessed of as to the coustituent particles of that body, but simply becnuse we v always, in every instance, perceive them to accompany his pre* sence. Jf indeed the-fact Iiad never occurred, we might then have never suspected, nay even have actually denied its possibility; for (the emission of light and heat not having, in that' case, entered into our definition of matter, of which the body of the sun is supposed to be composed) we should have been ■ led to pronounce the thing naturally and physically impossible. With the fvet, however, daily and hourly before our eves,, where shall we find the man hardy enough to doubt, or to deny it, upon any such principles? Matter, then, we find endowed with numerous and even apparently opposite qualities,.which are only ascertainable by experience, but which, when known, and actually found in nature, it would be al> doubt of, or to call impossible.

We shall now, as more immediately connected with the subject under consideration, proceed to shew, upon similar principles, the various forms, or modes of existence, of which matter is susceptible, or rather of which we actually find it susceptible iu the world which we inhabit. It may indeed be capable, of others to an almost inexhaustible extent, but of these we can know nothing; whilst, at the same time, we way rest fully assured, that it necessarily must be capable of producing those, which, in the scenes around us, are actually the objects of our senses and our observation.

The first and apparently least perfect state of organization, under which we find matter, is in inanimate substances, such, as for instance, a clod of earth, or a block of marble; in this.state, we find it possessed of three remarkable and distinctive properties, viz. those of extension, or continuity of parts; attraction, or power of drawing other bodies; repulsion, or capacity of repelling them ;—all these we severally learn by the evidence of our senses, when w.e feel along, when we let drop, or when we strike against any object.

Matter in its next stage, which is that of vegetation, we find,possessed of the several other powers of expansion, 6r change of form, as from the germ to the flower or tree; of groiMh, or visible distension of parts ; of production, as in the eases of leaves, blossoms, fruit, Sec. ; t»nd of propn^a-> Hon,, through the means of seed, by which, in regular sue* cession, its on the earth.

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