embassador at Madrid. Are not these circumstances precisely similar to the present ones of the army at Bayonne, and the legantine commission of general Junot?

Spain, notwithstanding her exhausted state, was obliged, at the same time, to levy 50,000 men, although in effecting it, she was driven to the last resources of revolutionary compulsion, making a forced enrolment, even of young ecclesiastics, who had not served more than six months of their noviciate. She had no griev, ance whatever to complain of, but was evidently compelled, in opposition to inclination and interest, to yield to the views and dictates of France. The marquis de Castel Franco, major of the body guards of his most catholic majesty, was dis patched to Lisbon to offer to Portugal the alternative of adhering to her alliance with England, or of accepting that of Spain and France. In the peculiar circumstances of Great Britain at that period, Portugal could not expect to derive from her any military assistance. It is said, that in October or November preeeding, the British cabinet had given assurances of ample succour, but in the mean time the clouds of adversity had thickened around the political hemisphere; the subjugation of Austria, which would leave to France a much greater dispose. able force than England and Portugal united could hope to contend against; the northern confederacy so menacing to England, and the result of which was not then foreseen; and the schemes respecting India, which were said to have been arranged between Russia and France, all concurred to enforce on the British cabinet, the necessity of carrying all the troops which could be so employed, to that situation in which they could most effectually resist and annoy the enemy. Yet, al though the government of Portugal might consider itself ill supported by GreatBritain, it was not easy to accede to the proposition of uniting with France and Spain, and declaring war against its ancient ally. Inclination did not lead to such an election, and the Portuguese ministry represented the ruinous effects of such a measure, and intreated, at least, a short delay. Portugal had in England a large fleet of merchant ships, for the cargoes of which payment had already been made by the acceptance of bills of exchange, and on these vessels it was to be expected, that an embargo would be laid. From the Brazils, large and valuable convoys were expected, which neither Portugal nor her intended allies, in case she acceded to their offers, could protect against the superiour power of the British navy. On every side, therefore, the danger was menacing, and no absolute safety could be expected from either alliance. The safety of Portugal was, however, an object of small consideration with Buonaparte, in comparison with the execution of his grand project, the attack of Great Britain on every side, and the utter expulsion of her com merce, from all parts of Europe. Under the dictation, therefore, of the French embassador, the king of Spain, after receiving a minister, deputed by his son in law, the prince regent of Portugal, issued a declaration of war against that country, This state paper is too long to be inserted in this place; it will suffice to observe, that its whole tenour shewed that Spain felt, in fact, no cause of quarrel with Portugal, but that the war was undertaken merely to gratify the views of a too powerful and dangerous ally. The terms proposed by France, and which Por tugal thought it necessary to reject, were, a total separation from England, a payment in money equal to a million sterling, the introduction of French garrisons into Lisbon and Oporto, and the possession of two ports in the Brazils, as a security for the freedom of commerce in that part of the world,* Can any man, after the perusal of these specific and formal demands upon Portugal, put implicit faith in the " opinions of the mercantile world" relative to Buonaparte's forbearance upon the principle of the balance of trade being in his favor? Is it not evident that his object is the same now as it was then, and that he possesses, at this time, a greater means of executing his will than at any former period of his reign? That this proceeding on the part of France was not an empty threat, and that its object was not confined to the mere extortion of money, in order to replenish its exhausted trea sury, was soon apparent; for the French army of observation, amounting to 30,000 men, under the command of Le Clerc, marched through Spain into the province of

* See the State Papers relative to this transaction in the New Series of the Annual Register for the year 1801, page 303, that is, the continuation of the Old Annual Register, printed for Rivingtons,

Beira, and besieged Almeida, when the court of Madrid, more alarmed at the approach of its ally, then inclined to commit hostilities against Portugal, took advantage of its proximity to the intended scene of action, and invaded the Portuguese territory, without a moment's delay.

From the period when the French entered Spain, it was observed, that they continued their preparations with the most formidable alacrity, increasing their army, and exerting, to the utmost, the means which their command over the Spanish navy gave them of equipping an expedition in the ports of that country, but taking care to man the ships, as much as possible, with seamen of their own. The court of Madrid was not insensible of the danger with which it was threatened by this insidious amity, and therefore it took the best course for avoiding its own immediate ruin, and preventing the conquest of a country, which would have shortly led to the subjugation of Spain, by sending an army hastily collected, insufficient in numbers, deficient in provisions, equipage, and all manner of necessaries, under the command of the Prince of Peace, to the attack of the Portuguese frontier. In seventeen days from the commencement of operations, to the astonishment of Europe, the treaty of Badajos was signed between Spain and Portugal, whereby the province of Olivenza, with its strong capital, was ceded to the former, as an effectual security to the Castilian Estramadura. But i was soon evident, that this hasty peace was the fruit of the jealousy, which the Spanish court entertained of its ally: the peace was concluded in order to rid itself of the presence of the French army. The French government indeed, professed, that in obtaining the Portuguese territories and colonies, nothing further was intended than to compel Great Britain to re-purchase them at the conclusion of peace, by restoring those which she had captured from Spain. This pretext, however, no one credited, as the injudicious and intemperate conduct of Lucien Buonaparte, disclosed that the views of France were extended to Spain, as well as to Portugal.

Our conduct towards Portugal, notwithstanding the difficulties which assailed us in every quarter, was faithful and friendly. A few British, and some regiments of French enigrants, were sent to assist the Portuguese against their invaders: and immediately on the declaration of hostilities, our ministry, with great prudence, dispatched a force under lieut. col. Clinton, to take possession of the island of Madeira. This force was received, not as invaders, but as friends and allies; the strong places of the island were cheerfully entrusted to their care, and their behaviour, during their stay, justified the favourable opinion of the Portuguese government. This proceeding was under stood to be only preparatory to a similar occupation of the Brazils, should the progress of the French in the European dominions of Portugal render it necessary.

This is a plain, unvarnished narrative of a transaction which occurred not seven years ago; and as it developes fully the views and policy of France at that time, it would be extremely desirable to know upon what principle we have now any reason to expect that France will forbear to effect the completion of a project, which she not only meditated fifty years ago, but which her present ruler has since acted upon, and has positively declared that he will execute without delay? They who can bring themselves to doubt the certainty of an invasion of Portugal, must possess the infatuation, and incorrigible obduracy of a Pharaoh.

It must not, however, escape our observation, that, according to the treaty of peace in 1801, between France and Portugal, it is stipulated, art. 2, that, "all the ports and harbours of Portugal, in Europe, shall be immediately shut, and shall remain so, till peace between France and England, to all English ships of war and merchantmen; and the same ports and harbours shall be open to all ships of war or merchantmen belonging to France or its allies. In regard to the ports and harbours of Portugal, in the other parts of the world, the present article shall be obligatory, according to the terms above fixed for the cessation of hostilities."

* Is not this an undeniable proof of the reasonings I have urged in the preceding article, respecting the little to be apprehended from the co-operation of the Danish seamen with the French?

†These were, in 15 days for Europe, and the seas which wash its coast; and those of Africa on this side the equator, 40 days after the exchange for the countries of Africa and America beyond the equator; and three months after, for the countries and seas situated to the west of Cape Horn, and to the east of the Cape of Good Hope.

embassador at Madrid. Are not these circumstances precisely sim ones of the army at Bayonne, and the legantine commission of gal has been considered Spain, notwithstanding her exhausted state, was obliged and, therefore, we ought so ectual meaus of excluding levy 50,000 men, although in effecting it, she was dri revolutionary compulsion, making a forced enrolmen who had not served more than six months of the ance whatever to complain of, but was evide clination and interest, to yield to the views de Castel Franco, major of the body gu patched to Lisbon to offer to Port alliance with England, or of accepti circumstances of Great Britain at from her any military assistan eeding, the British cabinet mean time the clouds of the subjugation of Aus able force than Engl northern confedera then foreseen; a arranged betwe the necessity tion in whi though the Britain, Spain, an el

ould result from his recurving to Without the least delay, there.

gese navy, and secure the exclusive alleged, in opposition to what I hinted and the incorporation of Etruria into the ould be repugnant to the policy best calculaFrench power over the continent---that Buona small kingdoms of five millions of subjects---that, o de union of the crowns of Portugal and Spain, la into three kingdoms, Castile, Arragon, and

an

on has been made by a friend, whose learning, eloquence, pation of the reasons which led me to form this opinion, I the publication of my last. to the mere citation of a passage from the French Cal Carpentier's division has orders to march to Florence without

universally admired. But, instead of entering

papers, which "The fate of Etruria will soga

considered every point relative to this matter. The advantages

occasions will permit. It is enough to state, that our West

was a commercial nation, we shall derive from the possession of the Brazils, America, supposing that due encouragement be given to our settlements in North dia islands may be amply supplied from that quarter, without the intervention of cassion to our maritime power; and if any objection be raised against the possibility furnishing an adequate force to protect this part of South America, it may be obviated, by sending the Mahomedan sepoys to the West India islands, and by re moving our forces on duty there to the Brazils.

The East India company will also derive infinite benefit from such an ac

WEST INDIA AFFAIRS."

Two letters have been sent me from Jamaica, which, on account of their impor tance, I can no longer postpone. The first is from a Jamaica planter, the second from expatriated saint. These communications are not exactly according to my taste; at all events, the Jamaica planter ought not to send me a letter from that colony, which, from its tone and virulence of language, evinces the greatest disrepect of that legislature, whose authority I am daily struggling to support. No man detests the slave trade more than I do; nor has any man struggled more assiduously than myself to arrest the progress of that pious hypocrisy which set on foot, and finally prevailed in, the abolition of a traffic, which prudence dictated we should have left alone until a more propitious time. But it does not follow, because I opposed the rash manner in which the abolition question was carried through the house of commons, that I am, therefore, to presume to set myself against THE LAW. Base and venal as the house of commons was, which passed that bill, it is my duty, as well as the duty of the West India planter to obey. If the law had not been passed, he might have written with force, as I have done; but when the law has passed, he and I, as honest subjects, are bound to comply with it. I have heard it said, that Mr. Wilberforce intends to bring in capt. Quashee Bowling, an emancipated negro, as member of parJiament for Old Sarum, through the pious intervention of lord Grenville; but, I have never noticed the circumstance, because there is now no longer a distinction between the enlightened African and the religious European. The facts contained in the planter's letter are too important to be omitted. I have given them publicity with fear and trembling, because I feel no sort of sympathy for a dwelling either in Newgate or the King's Bench; but I declare that I never will, henceforward, insert any article from any party, however injured in their interests, as they may suppose, which has the remotest tendency to deteriorate from the laws enacted, whether those laws be good or bad. I cannot alter the letter without making it my own, and therefore it must appear in its original form; and I am the more prompted so to do, from a letter

's put into my hands by a friend, who is one of the principal planters ra d who is not surpassed, in point of political knowledge, by any man living. which he allowed me to copy, is as follows: May 15, 1807. ssible to foretel what will be the consequences of the late resolutions of ment; but I must say that, for one, I contemplate nothing less than J is country; and that at no very distant period; and in a way which es for abolition cannot be aware of. I should be very sorry to alarm; but I have no hesitation in saying, that it is my opinion, eds who entertain the same) that this island will, ere long, be in a St. Domingo; and that there will be a struggle between the white d the blacks for ascendancy. When the period of the abolition arrives, e so little inducement for young men to come to this country, and so little ement for many that are here to remain in it, that a very considerable diminution the white population may be expected. It is generally suspected, that the negroes keep up a secret intercourse with St. Domingo; and when they see us so reduced in numbers, they will not fail to take all the advantages which such a circumstance gives them; indeed, the speeches of many of the members of the British legislature (which a number of the blacks have an opportunity of hearing read) tend to encourage revolt; and they cannot more effectually inflame their minds against us, than by representing us in the horrid light they have done."

With respect of the groans of the saints, I am at a loss to know upon what possible grounds the pious missionary, who is the author of the letter below, took it into his head to apply to me as his advocate, when it is well known that, as a member of the church of England, I am an inflexible, but tolerant opponent of those crazy vagabonds, who corrupt, mislead, and ruin the hearts and heads of our people, under the name of methodists. These soul-saving maniacs do their portion of political mischief here; but, in the West Indies, they disclose their nature, and shew themselves to be a set of more ignorant, illiterate, and debauched rascals, than any race of scoundrels that ever figured upon the face of the earth. When, therefore, such fellows send to me to defend them against the judicious laws of the colony; they ought, at the same time, to give me proofs of their honesty. I have proofs, in my possession, that they have shewn themselves to be, in general, the greatest villains that ever existed; and, if christianity cannot be dispensed in any other mode than through the medium of these fanatical incendiaries, it is better to leave the negroes to the dark superstition which they profess, and to the doctrines of Obi, and to the Fatishtas. Why do not they apply to the apostle, instead of tormenting me? Why do they not invoke St. William, of Palace-yard, the apostle of the African world? The papers annexed to his epistles, respecting the Jamaica legislature, display a thorough knowledge of these celestial cruizers, and meet my most perfect approbation. Christianity will never prosper under the ignorance and knavery of fanatics, bankrupts in fame and fortune; who are sent from Europe to teach infidels those sacred truths, which the preachers themselves do not understand. If, in the civilization of the unenlightened world, the grand truths of the gospel had been promulgated by such ministers of our blessed Saviour, as had truly and deeply examined the fundamental principles of our faith; if christianity had been promulgated by men of sense and virtue, its Divine precepts would have been received as the sacred rules of moral conduct here, under the hope of retributive felicity hereafter. But, villains, with starch grimaces, and with ascetic hearts, are the most unfit of men to preach the doctrines of mercy, justice, and benevolence.

OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SPORTING EXPEDITION TO THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

OF IPSWICH.

If any one conceives, that in the following relation, there is the most distant allusion to the executive part of the expedition against Buenos Ayres, a slight reflection will convince him to the contrary. It is well known to most of your military readers, who have been quartered in the ea tern district, that the vicinity of Ipswich abounds with game, and that several gentlemen, and, amongst others, Mr. Berners, of Wolverstone, are at considerable expence and trouble in preserving it.—The present account of a sporting expedition is supposed to have been written by the commanding officer of a regiment at Harwich, to his colonel, (recently dismissed the service) the

From all these facts, it it certain, that the invasion of Portugal has been considered by the present governor of France, as one of the most effectual meaus of excluding us from any intercourse with the continent of Europe; and, therefore, we ought so to act, as to anticipate the evil consequences which would result from his recurving to the same expedient to which he resorted in 1801. Without the least delay, there, fore, we should possess ourselves of the Portuguese navy, and secure the exclusive commerce of the Brazils. It has indeed been alleged, in opposition to what I hinted respecting the cession of Portugal to Spain, and the incorporation of Etruria into the kingdom of Italy, that such a measure would be repugnant to the policy best calculated for securing the stability of the French power over the continent---that Buona, parte's plan is evidently to erect small kingdoms of five millions of subjects---that, consequently, he will not assent to the union of the crowns of Portugal and Spain, and that he will divide the peninsula into three kingdoms, Castile, Arragon, and Portugal. This observation has been made by a friend, whose learning, eloquence, and knowledge of human affairs, are universally admired. But, instead of entering into a laboured explanation of the reasons which led me to form this opinion, shall confine myself to the mere citation of a passage from the French papers, which have arrived since the publication of my last. "The fate of Etruria will soon be decided. General Carpentier's division has orders to march to Florence without delay."

I have now fully considered every point relative to this matter. The advantages which, as a commercial nation, we shall derive from the possession of the Brazils, must be detailed, as occasions will permit. It is enough to state, that our West India islands may be amply supplied from that quarter, without the intervention of America, supposing that due encouragement be given to our settlements in North America. The East India company will also derive infinite benefit from such an accession to our maritime power; and if any objection be raised against the possibility of our furnishing an adequate force to protect this part of South America, it may be obviated, by sending the Mahomedan sepoys to the West India islands, and by re moving our forces on duty there to the Brazils.

WEST INDIA AFFAIRS.

Two letters have been sent me from Jamaica, which, on account of their impor tance, I can no longer postpone. The first is from a Jamaica planter, the second from an expatriated saint. These communications are not exactly according to my taste; at all events, the Jamaica planter ought not to send me a letter from that colony, which, from its tone and virulence of language, evinces the greatest disrepect of that legislature, whose authority I am daily struggling to support. No man detests the slave trade more than I do; nor has any man struggled more assiduously than myself to arrest the progress of that pious hypocrisy which set on foot, and finally prevailed in, the abolition of a traffic, which prudence dictated we should have left alone until a more propitious time. But it does not follow, because I opposed the rash manner in which the abolition question was carried through the house of commons, that I am, therefore, to presume to set myself against THE LAW. Base and venal as the house of commons was, which passed that bill, it is my duty, as well as the duty of the West India planter to obey. If the law had not been passed, he might have written with force, as I have done; but when the law has passed, he and I, as honest subjects, are bound to comply with it. I have heard it said, that Mr. Wilberforce intends to bring in capt. Quashee Bowling, an emancipated negro, as member of parJiament for Old Sarum, through the pious intervention of lord Grenville; but, I have never noticed the circumstance, because there is now no longer a distinction between the enlightened African and the religious European. The facts contained in the planter's letter are too important to be omitted. I have given them publicity with fear and trembling, because I feel no sort of sympathy for a dwelling either in Newgate or the King's Bench; but I declare that I never will, henceforward, insert any article from any party, however injured in their interests, as they may suppose, which has the remotest tendency to deteriorate from the laws enacted, whether those laws be good or bad. I cannot alter the letter without making it my own, and therefore it must appear in its original form; and I am the more prompted so to do, from a letter